The Social World

Author: Jason M. Brodsky

  • Why Iran needs the Maduro regime

    Why Iran needs the Maduro regime

    The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford and three warships have been sent to the Caribbean, where they are joining a dozen Navy warships already off the coast of Venezuela, in an unprecedented show of military force.

    President Trump and his administration are taking aim at the administration of Nicolas Maduro, over his alleged role in the drug trade which presents a national security threat to the United States. It’s clear that if the US succeeds in destabilizing and displacing President Maduro’s regime, it would be a blow to the region’s drug traffickers. What is less known is that it would also hit Iran.

    Venezuela has long served as a launchpad for Iranian operations to establish a foothold in South America. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Quds Force, and Iran’s Intelligence Ministry have all had a presence in Venezuela. The Quds Force has used economic delegations to Venezuela and other countries around the world as cover for terrorist activity. According to reports, in September 2020 an Iranian delegation landed in Caracas comprised of businessmen who acted as Quds Force facilitators.

    The Quds Force’s Unit 840, which plots terror schemes abroad, has historically been active in Venezuela. Evidence suggests the son of a senior intelligence advisor close to the supreme leader was at one point responsible for Unit 840’s Latin America operations. He has traveled to Venezuela to nurture these illicit networks. His presence shows the importance of Caracas for Iran.

    Another Quds Force group, Unit 11000, was recently implicated in a plan to assassinate Israel’s Ambassador to Mexico. Critically, a Unit 11000 operative who spearheaded the plot operated out of Iran’s embassy in Caracas. This is a strategy Tehran has employed elsewhere, particularly Europe, where IRGC Quds Force and intelligence agents are given diplomatic cover and use of Iran’s embassies worldwide as a staging ground for assassinations, bombings and surveillance.

    Another arm of the Iranian state, its intelligence ministry, also works out of Venezuela. Majid Dastjani Farahani, who is an Iranian intelligence officer, has launched operations to harm American citizens in retaliation for the killing of the late IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. Farahani is wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and its notice indicates he has ties to Venezuela. It’s the same for Mohammad Mahdi Khanpour Ardestani, another Iranian intelligence ministry officer, who has also worked out of Venezuela.

    In a 2021 indictment concerning a plot to kidnap Iranian-American journalist Masih Alinejad from New York, Iranian operatives researched seizing her and transfer her to Venezuela by sea. The Quds Force has also used Venezuela to fund its campaigns, sending gold from Caracas to generate income in exchange for Iranian oil. In 2024, the US Justice Department successfully seized a former Iranian-owned Boeing aircraft. It had been transferred from the Quds Force-affiliated Mahan Air to a Venezuelan cargo airline. Its crew included a former IRGC commander.

    Iran’s proxy Hezbollah has also used Venezuela as a hub to support its own terrorism, drug trafficking and business interests. For example, Ghazi Nasr Al Din, whom the US Treasury Department sanctioned in 2008, doubled as charge d’ affaires at the Venezuelan embassy in Syria and director for political aspects at its embassy in Lebanon. At the same time, he facilitated travel for Hezbollah operatives and raised funds in Venezuela for the terrorist organization.

    A former member of the Venezuelan National Assembly and Maduro ally Adel El Zabayar was indicted in 2020, with the US government alleging he served as a go-between in recruiting terrorists from Hezbollah and Hamas to carry out terror attacks on the United States.

    Likewise, Iran’s defense ministry has maintained its own pipeline in Venezuela. Qods Aviation Industries, which is a defense ministry subsidiary, has exported drones to Caracas, including the Mohajer-2.

    The defense ministry also manages an oil venture with Venezuela to fund defense projects, according to the US Treasury. In 2023, the US government sanctioned Iran’s then-defense attaché in Caracas for facilitating these deals.

    Public reports also suggest Iran has developed a drone development base at El Libertador Air Base, where it trains Venezuelan military personnel. As the Trump administration has intensified its pressure campaign against Caracas in recent months, Venezuela has asked Iran for “passive detection equipment,” GPS scramblers, and “almost certainly drones with 1,000 km range,” according to the Washington Post.

    Over the years, Maduro has reportedly sought missiles from Iran as well. The possibility of this triggered a crisis for the Biden administration in the summer of 2021, after Iranian warships headed for the region.

    If Maduro is ousted, Iran stands to lose many of its assets in Venezuela. Venezuela, much like Syria under the Assad regime, helps further Iranian interests across the region – military, terror, economic, and political. At a time when Tehran and its proxies across the Middle East have been weakened after the war with Israel, the loss of Maduro would be another blow to the Iranian regime.

  • Doha attack was a blast from the past

    Doha attack was a blast from the past

    Israel’s audacious strike against the leaders of the Hamas terrorist organization in Qatar exemplifies the Jewish state’s new security doctrine – one of boldness and risk-readiness. The Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023, was a watershed moment that reset security calculations in Israel in a significant way. The results are Iran’s proxy network defanged, and a Tehran shaken after its own 12-Day War with Israel. Many observers believe that Israel’s strikes in Qatar risk unraveling the Abraham Accords and undermining U.S. interests. But as past episodes have demonstrated, there is likely to be immediate outrage followed by a reversion to the status quo.

    On September 9, Israel shocked the world by launching a military operation to kill senior Hamas leaders who were gathering for a meeting at their longtime refuge in Qatar. Preliminary reports suggested that among the targets were senior officials Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammad Darwish, and Khaled Mashal. The strike took place on the territory of Qatar, which has long played both sides of the fence. It has created the impression it is a key U.S. partner in hosting an American airbase despite providing funding for Hamas, a U.S.-sanctioned terrorist organization with the blood of U.S. citizens on its hands and providing financial resources to media networks which incite hatred against Israel, putting Jewish Americans at risk.

    Public reporting indicates the strike was not successful in eliminating the top rung of Hamas leadership. There has also been handwringing that Israel’s daring attack – while tactically sensible – is nevertheless strategically unwise as it risks alienating the very Arab partners that Israel has been courting as a part of the Abraham Accords to counter the shared threat from Iran. Yet Israeli officials have been reframing it as achieving one objective in signaling that Qatar will no longer be immune from consequences in harboring terrorists.

    But history counsels that the initial alarmist reactions from Israel’s Qatar strike should be treated warily. This episode was reminiscent of two botched targeted killings in Israel’s history: in 1997 against then Hamas Political Leader Khaled Mashal in Jordan and in 2010 against Mahmoud Mabhouh in Dubai. In 1997, Netanyahu was prime minister as he is today. In that year, he ordered the assassination of Mashal in Amman. The timing of this decision came only three years after the Israel-Jordan peace treaty of 1994 – which is similar to the state of play in the current context with the Abraham Accords in force, even though Qatar is not a member.

    News accounts at the time reported that Israel’s prime minister authorized the operation against Mashal after a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem. Fast-forward to today, Netanyahu similarly greenlit the strike on Hamas in Qatar following a shooting on Jerusalem’s Ramot Junction that killed six civilians and wounded 12 others.

    Then, as now, there was also sensitive diplomacy under way as Israel mounted a daring counterterrorism operation. In 1997, Jordan reportedly sent to Israel an offer for it to mediate a suspension of suicide bombings from Hamas. In 2025, Hamas was considering a U.S. proposal for a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages.

    Nevertheless, there were some differences. In 1997, Israel acted through the Mossad in fomenting a covert assassination plot. Today, the Mossad reportedly opposed the strike in Qatar, and it was instead done through the Israel Defense Forces, which resulted in it being a military attack.

    In the immediate aftermath of the Mashal poisoning, there were angry recriminations. King Hussein conditioned the release of two Israeli agents who were captured on Israel identifying the drug it used on Mashal so that his life could be saved. King Hussein had threatened to close the Israeli embassy in Jordan and hold a public trial for imprisoned Israeli operatives if Mashal died. There were fears about the future of Israeli-Jordan relations, damage it could do to the 1994 peace treaty, part of then-President Clinton’s legacy, as well as intelligence ties between Israel and Jordan.

    Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan observed in 1997, “I think it is an act of gross stupidity. We are always reminded that Israel is the only democratic state in the region… and yet you find the only democratic state in the region being associated with an act of terror.” Similarly, Qatar’s foreign minister in 2025 labeled the Israeli military strike on the Hamas compound “state terrorism.” Multiple news reports citing anonymous Arab diplomats have been warning that Israel’s attack against Hamas in Qatar risks making the Jewish state a pariah in the region, as opposed to Iran, and undercuts the spirit of the Abraham Accords, which is President Trump’s legacy as well as U.S. security guarantees.

    In the end, despite all the predictions of doom, the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty survived despite a temporary strain in relations.

    A similar dynamic played out in 2010 when Israel, with Netanyahu as prime minister again, killed Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a co-founder of Hamas’s military wing, in a Dubai hotel. The local police then published CCTV footage which revealed embarrassing details about Israeli tradecraft and caused a rift in its relations with a few countries after non-Israeli passports were used in the operation. The killing took place just as the United Arab Emirates and Israel were engaged in sensitive and covert diplomacy to improve relations. Despite the warnings of rupturing relations, an Israeli cabinet minister visited Dubai in 2014 and the United Arab Emirates joined the Abraham Accords a decade later.

    It is true that the current geopolitical context is different from the previous episodes of Israeli targeted killings – especially with Israel increasingly isolated internationally over Gaza. However, this history of absorbable diplomatic fallout from Israeli targeted killings likely motivated Israeli decision-makers to take a gamble in the strike on Hamas in Qatar. While there are loud denunciations of Israel, skepticism should prevail over dramatic, substantive fallout. The Middle East has seen a version of this movie before.