Category: Ukraine

  • Should the Nord Stream saboteurs be extradited to Germany?

    Should the Nord Stream saboteurs be extradited to Germany?

    The identity of the saboteurs who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022 was for years the western security establishment’s worst-kept secret. Just two weeks after a series of explosions within the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark crippled three of the four undersea natural-gas pipelines linking Russia to Germany, Scandinavian diplomats in Brussels were already being quietly briefed that the most likely culprits were Ukrainian. By January 2023, a forensic investigation by German police had discovered traces of the explosives on board the charter yacht Andromeda and found that the vessel’s movements aligned exactly with the location of the blasts. Crucially, the Germans also established both the cover identities and the real identities of the seven Ukrainian members of the sabotage commando.

    Ukraine’s hand in the sabotage operation was common knowledge among western security agencies

    By the time The Spectator published a detailed report in March 2023 pointing the finger at Kyiv, Ukraine’s hand in the sabotage operation was common knowledge among western security agencies. As one senior British intelligence official told me in January 2023, “The story will come out sooner or later… but we’re not going to be the ones to leak it.”

    Details of the German, Danish and Swedish investigations were kept secret not only from the public but also from EU and US politicians, and from the United Nations, for a simple reason: the news that Ukrainians were involved in an attack on Germany’s critical infrastructure could have a devastating impact on Kyiv’s relations with its major European supporters – as well as on public support for Ukraine. Or as Germany’s BND foreign intelligence agency put it in a response to a parliamentary question in October 2022: “Information regarding this question cannot be issued – even in classified form – due to considerations regarding the welfare of the state.”

    Denmark and Sweden officially shut down their investigations in February 2024 without releasing any information to the public. But the official omertà was finally broken last summer by the office of Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General, which has shown itself to be more concerned with justice being done than with saving the blushes of politicians in Kyiv – and Berlin. At least two European Arrest Warrants were obtained in June 2024 for Ukrainian suspects. And in August of this year 49-year-old former military diver Serhii Kuznietsov was arrested while on holiday near Rimini and remanded in custody by Italian magistrates, while another military veteran Volodymyr Zhuravlyov was detained in Pruszków, Poland, on September 30. But judges in both Poland and Italy have refused to extradite the suspects to Germany – sparking a political battle over whether they should face justice at all.

    “The problem with Nord Stream… is not that it was blown up, the problem is that it was built,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said recently, arguing against extraditing Volodymyr K to Berlin. The head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, Sławomir Cenckiewicz, told the Financial Times that “if Germany is prosecuting someone based in Poland who destroyed the source of income of the Russian war machine, then we see a clear contradiction in interests between Poland and Germany… From our point of view, this investigation doesn’t make sense, not only [for] Poland but also [for] the whole [NATO] alliance.”

    In other words, while Berlin prosecutors see the Nord Stream operation as an attack on Germany, the Poles view it as an attack on Russia. And while the Ukrainian citizenship of the suspects is not in doubt, the exact role the Ukrainian government and military played – as well as who conceived of, planned and ordered the attack – remains a mystery. The Russians, for their part, continue to insist that the attack was organized on a “state level,” and Putin himself has dismissed as “sheer nonsense” any suggestion that the pipelines could have been destroyed by a handful of possibly freelance Ukrainian frogmen. Kremlin media regularly blame the US for the attacks.

    The controversy over the extradition has become inextricably linked with Germany’s own political debates over the causes of Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the legacy of the policy of cooperation with the Kremlin by successive German chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel.

    From the moment Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom corporation first proposed massive undersea Baltic gas pipelines that would bypass Belarus, Ukraine and Poland and link Germany directly to the Yamal gas fields of northern Siberia in 2006, Poles and other eastern Europeans consistently and adamantly opposed the project. They argued that an abundance of cheap gas would increase European dependence on Russia, while at the same time enriching the Kremlin. Schröder and Merkel countered that increasing Russia’s economic dependence on European money would encourage peace and cooperation.

    Even when Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea fundamentally undermined this logic, Merkel nonetheless greenlit the €9.5 billion Nord Stream 2 project in 2015, despite strong opposition from Washington. In the event, the second set of pipelines were completed but never certified and never came online. One of the two Nord Stream 2 pipes survived the attacks intact and is still full of pressurized gas, ready in theory to be switched on at any moment.

    In several important ways, history has proved the critics of Nord Stream right – not least about the danger that the Kremlin would use its control of more than a third of Germany’s energy supply as a political weapon. In June 2022 Gazprom reduced the pressure through Nord Stream 1 to 40 percent of its previous flow, claiming that recent European sanctions had prevented the delivery of Siemens-made turbine blades. The following month the company shut down supplies, citing annual maintenance work. Service was resumed ten days later, but at only 20 percent capacity, and on August 31, Gazprom closed Nord Stream 1 indefinitely, officially because of further technical issues. Indeed, it was precisely in order to stop the Kremlin from applying energy blackmail on Berlin that, reportedly, the Ukrainian plotters decided to put an end to Nord Stream – and Russian leverage over Europe – once and for all.

    The critics were also right about the dangers of Germany and Europe’s economic dependency on cheap Russian gas. The Kremlin’s serial messing with supplies predictably sent gas markets into a panic, with spot prices for natural gas soaring to €70 per megawatt-hour in August 2022, up from €27 in January. In the aftermath of the destruction of Nord Stream in late September, Germany rapidly built floating harbors to offload supplies of expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG), and booked massive new shipments from the US, Canada, Qatar and – ironically – Russia (which as of last year was still Europe’s second largest LNG supplier, after America).

    The problem for the German economy was that several major sectors – notably large, energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, refining and fertilizers – have faced much higher costs. An IMF report suggested that the negative impact on Germany’s GDP of the shutoff of cheap Russian piped gas would be 1.5 percent in the second half of 2022, 2.7 percent in 2023, and 0.4 percent in 2024. That same IMF study predicted that the destruction of Nord Stream and its associated gas price rise would add some 2 percentage points to German inflation in 2022 and 2023 because of higher energy costs rippling through food, manufacturing, transport and consumer goods. While it’s impossible to know exactly what German economic performance would have been without the Nord Stream hit, Germany’s economy contracted by -0.3 percent in 2023 and -0.2 percent in 2024 while inflation shot up to 7.9 percent in 2022 before falling to 2.4 percent by 2024.

    In short, whoever carried out the Nord Stream operation cut off Russia’s most valuable tool of political blackmail and wrecked one of Gazprom and the Kremlin’s most lucrative income streams. But they also killed off German growth and pushed up inflation across the continent.

    To some, Germany’s insistence on prosecuting the saboteurs smacks of hypocrisy. “Forgive me if I say that the sight of Germany now ‘investigating’ the sabotage of Nord Stream feels like a mockery of history – another manifestation of German arrogance and hubris,” says Sławomir Dębski of the College of Europe in Warsaw. “Perhaps they should start by investigating Schröder and Merkel – they were the ones who blew up Europe’s trust in Germany as a reliable ally.”

    Berlin prosecutors see the Nord Stream operation as an attack on Germany – the Poles see it as an attack on Russia

    Others are outraged that Ukraine should have carried out such a destructive attack on its own allies’ economies despite receiving tens of billions of dollars in international aid and, it is said, in defiance of strong opposition from Washington. In August 2024 the Wall Street Journal, citing senior but anonymous sources, reported that the operation was ultimately commanded by General Valerii Zaluzhnyi (then Ukraine’s top commander) – and had gone ahead despite President Zelensky allegedly trying to call it off after pressure by US intelligence.

    From Ukraine’s point of view, the attack was a major success, qualifying as one of the most geopolitically effective covert operations in history. Ukraine’s main strategic weakness over the late summer of 2022 was that the promise of a resumption of cheap Russian gas would fatally weaken European resolve to back the war effort. But with Nord Stream physically gone, Europe’s return to its Gazprom addiction ceased to be a threat. For the Kyiv government to undertake such an attack would carry enormous political risks if the story ever came out. But specialist operatives acting independently would be legitimately deniable. Which has pretty much remained the case, until now.

    With extradition blocked and the two arrested suspects now at liberty, there will be no trial and no chance that details of the operation will be produced in court. And the biggest secret of all – the full truth about who in Kyiv ordered the attack – will likely remain hidden for years to come.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • Trump, the foreign policy president?

    Trump, the foreign policy president?

    President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine continued his excellent sartorial adventure at the White House, appearing in an elegantly cut black suit and shirt on Friday as he met with President Donald Trump in the Cabinet Room. But while they may have helped avoid any emanations of wrath from his host, his habiliments did not appear to prompt Trump to approve the dispatch of Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv, a coveted item indeed. “We’d much rather not need Tomahawks,” Trump said. “We’d much rather get the war over. It could mean a big escalation. It could mean a lot of bad things could happen.” 

    Back to square one, in other words. In August, Trump had claimed that his summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin would lead to a breakthrough. It never happened. Instead, the Russian President made Trump look like a patsy. Now he’s trying to play the same game.  

    Trump acknowledged that Putin might be trying to string him along once more. Was he concerned? “Yeah, I am, but I’ve been played all my life by the best of them,” he said. “I’m pretty good at this stuff. I think that he wants to make a deal.” So far, his optimism has proven unwarranted. 

    For his part, Zelensky played his cards, the ones that Trump previously claimed he did not possess before reversing that judgment, very well. He did not provoke Trump. Instead, he said it was important to maintain pressure on Putin and ensure that Ukraine receives real security guarantees. Zelensky also held out the possibility of Ukrainian cooperation with America on advanced drone technology in exchange for long-range missiles. 

    The question for Trump is simple: does he want to up the pressure on Putin before he enters negotiations in Budapest? Or does he want to try and placate the Russian tyrant in the coming weeks? Trump’s very avidity for a deal is what has made him such a pliant object in the hands of Putin, a former KGB agent who has a shrewd understanding of his counterparts. Few, if any, American presidents have been able to come out ahead in dealing with him, whether it was Bush, Obama or Biden. Instead, Putin has outmaneuvered them while steadily increasing his reach and power, both at home and abroad. A bad hombre, to use Trump’s phrase. 

    The person that really seems to have incurred Trump’s ire is another dictator. “He doesn’t want to fuck with the US,” Trump announced during lunch with Zelensky. He was referring to Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro who has been a thorn in the side of Trump.  

    In what he regards as his sphere of influence, Trump wants to dictate the terms of surrender to pesky fellows like Maduro. Elsewhere, he wants to preside over ceasefires and peace agreements. The main thing is that Trump, and Trump alone, is at the center of events. 

    A summit in Budapest, where he is supposed to meet Putin, will once more allow Trump to seize the spotlight, at least for a few days. It may also provide a fillip to Trump’s ally, Hungarian president Viktor Orbán, who faces a tough election in April. The government shutdown in Washington may not have ended by then, but this prospect does not appear to trouble Trump unduly. He’s too busy becoming a foreign policy president to preoccupy himself with domestic matters.

  • Would taking back lost territories make Ukraine whole again?

    Would taking back lost territories make Ukraine whole again?

    For many of Ukraine’s supporters, Donald Trump’s recent declaration that Ukraine “is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form” came as a welcome – and unexpected – turnaround in US policy. “Ukraine would be able to take back their Country in its original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that!” wrote Trump in a Truth Social post in late September. “Putin and Russia are in BIG Economic trouble, and this is the time for Ukraine to act.”

    But would taking back the lost territories of the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea make Ukraine whole again – or could a reconquest instead condemn Ukraine to perpetual civil war against itself and prolong the conflict with Russia indefinitely?

    The key challenge for Kyiv now, 11 years after much of the Donbas became essentially independent and three and a half years after Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion, is that de facto ethnic cleansing has happened on a massive scale. The pro-Ukraine, pro-Kyiv population left the occupied areas, the pro-Russian stayed. To those who remained and collaborated with the new Russian authorities, a Ukrainian reconquest would not be a liberation but an invasion. The single largest contingent in the Russian army has been made up of local men from the Donbas – 120,000 of them. To get the territory back, Kyiv would have to fight these veterans for their own home territory. Now that partition is a reality, how realistic is it that Kyiv could reverse it?

    On the one hand, there is the argument that without Russian interference there would have been no civil war in Ukraine in the first place. While there were tensions between the Russian speakers of the Donbas and Crimea and the central Kyiv government before 2014, none were remotely serious enough to have sparked an armed insurrection. It was Russia that fanned the flames and turned local tensions into a regional war. Before Putin annexed the Crimean peninsula in February 2014, the one party that advocated separatism from Ukraine polled just 2 percent in local votes. In the aftermath of the Maidan uprising in 2014 Russian speakers in the Donbas were certainly resentful of laws imposing the Ukrainian language, over the ousting of the Donbas-based Party of the Regions and its leader Viktor Yanukovych and over a takeover of power in Kyiv by strongly pro-EU and anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalists.

    But the Donbas’s armed insurrection against Ukraine was not a homegrown affair; it was deliberately started by an influx of armed Russian ultra-nationalists led by ex-Russian military intelligence officer Igor Girkin (aka. Strelkov) and covertly backed by the Kremlin and Russian security services. By Girkin’s own account, the decision to launch an armed uprising in the Donbas was his, not the Kremlin’s. “At first, nobody wanted to fight,” Girkin claimed to the ultranationalist Russian newspaper Zavtra. “I’m the one who pulled the trigger of war… our squad set the flywheel of war in motion. We reshuffled all the cards on the table.”

    I traveled extensively in the Donbas in the spring and summer of 2014 and often heard a telling phrase from fighters on both sides of the front lines – the other side had “brought war to our land,” they said, which is why they had volunteered to fight to defend their land against “invaders.”

    Sergei Fedorenko, a Donetsk University history student who had volunteered at the headquarters of the self-styled government of the Donetsk People’s Republic, told me that “Kyiv had had their uprising” but the Donbas rebellion was “our Maidan.” By the late summer of 2014, the Ukrainian army had launched a full-scale military offensive to crush the rebels – and Putin had covertly deployed regular Russian armor, artillery and troops which crushed Kyiv’s forces. Russia, from that point, was inextricably invested both militarily and politically in the future status of Eastern Ukraine.

    Volodymyr Zelensky was elected President in a surprise landslide in May 2019, on the promise of bringing the low-intensity conflict in the Donbas to an end – and normalizing relations with Russia. By October 2019, Zelensky had struck a deal with the leadership of the rebel republics of Luhansk and Donetsk to hold a referendum on their future status. Importantly, there was no question at that time of the eastern republics joining Russia or becoming fully independent – and even the Kremlin was still insisting that they were part of Ukraine. But the referendum plan was scuppered by protests by Ukrainian ultranationalists in Kyiv, led by Azov Brigade founder Andriy Biletsky. The last peaceful chance to re-incorporate the Donbas into Ukraine was lost.

    From 2014 onwards, a steady exodus of Donbas residents fled east into Russia and west into Ukraine. The economy of the once-prosperous region – Donetsk had even hosted the Euro 2012 soccer tournament – was ruined. Everyone young enough and smart enough to make a new life for themselves elsewhere left voluntarily, while many ordinary people whose homes along the front lines had been destroyed were forced to seek shelter with relatives and acquaintances wherever they could.

    This exodus rose to a flood in the aftermath of Putin’s 2022 invasion, especially after Russian forces began systematically rounding up pro-Kyiv activists and anyone who had worked for Ukraine’s army or security services. The practical result was a massive political and ethnic cleansing. Those who remained in the Russian-occupied territories were forced to accept Russian passports, re-register their property in a Russian land registry or risk losing it and, most terrifyingly, faced the mobilization of their menfolk into the ragtag army of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR and DNR).

    Could a reconquest condemn Ukraine to perpetual civil war and prolong the conflict with Russia indefinitely?

    Far less disciplined than the regular Russian army, the Donbas levies sometimes fought with antique pre-World War Two rifles. They also suffered some of the highest casualties in the early months of the war.

    One of the most striking things about the first phase of the invasion was how isolated the resistance to Russian troops was in the south of Ukraine. In the north of Ukraine, around Kyiv and Chernihiv, Putin’s Battle Group North encountered strong resistance – and meted out horrific retribution against civilians in Bucha, Irpin and other towns.

    But in the south, Russian units from Crimea reached the Kakhovka dam just four hours after crossing the border and surrounded Kherson a day later. They encountered little resistance either from the Ukrainian army or from locals. In the center of Kherson, hundreds of citizens marched with Ukrainian flags, but the protests soon melted away after the brutal arrests of some of the ringleaders. Only Mariupol, the home of the ultranationalist Azov Battalion, held out and was systematically destroyed by massive Russian bombardment. Several dozen Russian-installed local administrators were assassinated, whether by local partisans or by Ukrainian commandos is not clear. But by September 2023, the areas under Russian control were sufficiently pacified for referendums to be held which, unsurprisingly, showed support for joining the Russian Federation comfortably over 90 percent.

    Today, there is no public opinion polling nor a free press and very little independent reporting from the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. We see only occasional snapshots through a glass, darkly. Russian journalist Alexander Chernykh has recently reported from Donetsk for the Moscow-based Kommersant Daily and found locals resentful of water shortages, of Ukrainian bombing, of a lack of public transportation and basic services. “Many soldiers wear Soviet flags and insignia,” complained one Donetsk resident. “As if these people are fighting not for modern Russia, but for another state.”

    Another anonymous local told the BBC Russian service that “occupied Donetsk is useless to anyone. Young people are waiting till they are old enough to leave to ‘free’ Ukraine.” What is hardest to find are voices, even on anonymous Telegram channels, from inside occupied Ukraine calling for a liberation.

    Seen from Kyiv, the problem of regaining the lost territories is an impossible conundrum. On the one hand no government official or politician – not even the more pragmatic voices such as former foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko, former Zelensky advisor Oleksiy Arestovych or current presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak – dares to publicly acknowledge that the territories are lost forever and that reconquest is impossible. In private, however, several current and former members of the Zelensky administration say that Ukraine is a more united nation without the Donbas and Crimea.

    “Why would we re-incorporate this bleeding wound back into our country?” one former official who was a senior member of Zelensky’s government asked me in Kyiv recently. “Our task is to build a country that is secure from Russian aggression and a place where our children have a future… [Russia] has destroyed the occupied territories, turned them into a wasteland. That is a tragedy. But our job is to look to the future, not cry about the past.”

    In practical terms, too, a reconquest would involve a titanic and bloody military effort which a near-exhausted Ukrainian army could not, at present, conceivably undertake. Not to mention the catastrophic damage that the Russian invasion has wreaked on the region’s infrastructure, smashing key economic powerhouses such as the Azovstal steel works and dozens of deep coal mines which were once the region’s lifeblood.

    And even if, by some miracle, Kyiv’s forces were to take the shattered region back, what to do with the thousands of Russians who have bought cheap property there or who have been moved into the region from poor areas of Russia? They would, presumably, have to be ethnically cleansed in their turn. And then there is the question of political representation. With the electors of the occupied territories back inside Ukraine, the electoral map would once again swing back toward pro-Russian parties like the one ousted by the Maidan revolution.

    Restoring Ukraine’s prewar borders sounds, on the face of it, a just solution to an unjust invasion. But, as the Ukrainians say, a split trough cannot be made whole. In “liberating” much of the Russian-speaking part of Ukraine, Putin has smashed it and robbed its people of their futures – and in the case of thousands, their homes and lives. But at least the remaining 75 percent of Ukraine has a chance to rebuild and consolidate its democracy and statehood and one day become a prosperous European country. That will be its true victory.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 13, 2025 World edition.

  • Ukraine’s own Wagner Group

    Ukraine’s own Wagner Group

    As peace in Ukraine seems still far and the conflict is witnessing a new escalation of violence, a new breed of private military companies is already emerging, ready for a post-conflict Ukraine. Rooted in a draft legislation “On International Defense Companies” proposed on April 2024, the Ukrainian government aims to channel combat-seasoned veterans into regulated, transparent security firms rather than leave them adrift or, worse, turn them into mercenaries for hire in distant conflicts from the Sahel to the DRC.

    By framing Private Military Companies (PMCs) as legitimate employers under strict oversight, complete with licensing, arms registers and accountability mechanisms, a well-crafted law could both ease demobilisation pains at home and forestall the proliferation of unaccountable fighters abroad. Regulated PMCs could also provide financial stability for former soldiers and create a new revenue stream for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction budget.

    Moscow has taken notice. Some voices in Russia are already signalling that a condition for any long-term ceasefire could be a ban on Ukrainian PMCs, particularly those operating abroad. The concern is clear: future Ukrainian PMCs are likely to field not just battle-hardened boots on the ground but also elite combat drone operators, especially the frontline drone pilots, skilled intelligence analysts, hackers with cyberwarfare expertise and access to cyber weapons and frontline-experienced medical teams, all for hire.

    In effect, they would form a highly capable force and be a direct competitor to Russia’s Wagner Group, but with even more sophisticated capabilities in modern warfare and, most importantly, being palatable to the West. These PMCs will also capitalize on the combat experience of Ukrainian fighters, turning them into a force multiplier for regular armies worldwide by offering highly sought-after training in battle-tested tactics.

    It is not by chance that at a June 4 news conference in Berlin, President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled he may be open to the creation of private entities in Ukraine, a pointed response to a recent Russian memorandum demanding that Kyiv dismantle all “nationalist formations” and private military companies.

    The danger is that without proper regulation, highly trained and heavily armed veterans could operate abroad in a legal grey zone, behaving more like mercenaries than legitimate private military contractors. History offers a grim preview of what can happen when such forces operate without oversight. Russian veterans returning from the brutal urban combat of the Second Chechen War, many scarred by PTSD, often fell into cycles of addiction or found new purpose in criminal syndicates and mercenary outfits, some enlisted in a little-known outfit at the time, the Wagner Group.

    The modern mercenary landscape abounds with such examples: Colombian ex-soldiers linked to the assassination of Haiti’s president, to former ISIS fighters serving as proxies in the Libyan civil war. Together, these forces blur the line between statecraft and criminality, embedding themselves in the global black market that trades in weapons, narcotics and human trafficking.

    At the same time, the legality, accountability and military utility of PMCs are still highly debated. One certainty is that rogue PMCs have the same corrosive effect on societal cohesion as mercenary groups.

    The urgency is clear: the privatisation of warfare is not slowing down, and mercenaries are increasingly deployed as tools of state influence, operating in a legal grey zone where plausible deniability meets profit. The Wagner Group, now rebranded Africa Corps, keeps client government weak and the security situation in flux, ensuring continued demand for their services while securing access to lucrative natural resources. It’s no coincidence that the group’s chilling motto, “Death is our business,” endures, even after its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, perished in a fiery plane crash following his failed coup.

    Today, this privatised model of conflict complicates traditional notions of state-controlled violence. Without clear rules, rogue PMCs can destabilise regions, undermine peacekeeping efforts, and siphon talent from local security forces. Worse, history suggests that mercenaries, driven by profit, are often incentivised to prolong conflicts rather than resolve them. While the societal costs of unaccountable PMCs and mercenaries are borne locally, the consequences ripple globally.

    Yet not all private military firms operate in the shadows. Stringent international standards, accountability and adherence to human rights by PMCs could play a constructive role in regions where states are unable or unwilling to provide security services.

    If Ukraine’s future framework for regulating its veterans succeeds and prevents a mercenary Wild West, it may offer a blueprint for other nations grappling with the aftermath of conflict. The alternative, a world increasingly dominated by shadow armies, risks normalising a privatised form of violence with few checks, vast profits and long-term negative effects on social cohesion.

  • Will Zelensky’s trip to see Trump pay off?

    Will Zelensky’s trip to see Trump pay off?

    Volodymyr Zelensky is in Washington today to debrief with Donald Trump following the US President’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday. The purpose of today’s meeting at the White House will be to discuss the parameters of a potential peace deal in Ukraine. The last time Zelensky came to Washington was in February, when Trump and his Vice President J.D. Vance berated the wartime leader for not being sufficiently “grateful” for America’s support in the conflict with Russia. Once again, there is every possibility today’s summit will turn out as tense as it did six months ago. 

    Trump reportedly wants to discuss the territorial concessions demanded by Putin during Friday’s tête-à-tête. The Russian President is said to have pushed to be given full control of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions during the closed-doors meeting between the two. While Luhansk is almost entirely under Russian occupation, Ukraine still holds about 30 percent of the Donetsk region. Zelensky’s position on land swaps has thawed somewhat over the past month – over the weekend, he said the front line’s “contact line is the best line for talking.” But he has repeatedly rejected handing over any Ukrainian territory not already occupied by the Kremlin’s troops.

    Zelensky and his allies have a tall task ahead of them today

    Instead, the Ukrainian President’s aim for today is to once again try and extract security guarantees from Trump for Ukraine in the event of a peace deal with Russia. While the US special envoy Steve Witkoff –  who traveled with Trump to Alaska last week – has said the President had agreed to offering Zelensky “Article 5-like language” mirroring the NATO principle of treating an attack on one state as an attack on all, many questions remain over what such security guarantees would look like in practice. 

    Helping Zelensky make his case to Trump today – and hoping to protect him from the worst of his wrath – is an assortment of his largest European allies. They include UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian premier Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and NATO and EU chiefs Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen. Many of this cast of characters have been present at various hastily arranged virtual and face-to-face meetings with Trump and Zelensky over the past week or so. In the face of Trump’s cozier than was comfortable overtures to Putin in Alaska, these meetings show how anxious Zelensky and his allies are about the likelihood of the American President forcing Ukraine into signing a deal with Russia it doesn’t want to.

    Zelensky and his allies have a tall task ahead of them today. Taking to his social media platform Truth Social overnight, Trump once again put pressure on the Ukrainian President to accept the as yet unclear peace terms being cooked up between the American president and his Russian counterpart. He also ruled out a number of Ukrainian demands, including returning Crimea and “NO GOING INTO NATO.”

    Trump’s aggressive haste to secure a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine has seen him increasingly bend towards giving in to Putin’s maximalist demands to end the conflict – rather than securing an agreement that would benefit and deliver justice for Ukraine. While Zelensky’s European allies were quick to recognize this, they have so far failed to produce sufficient carrots and sticks of their own with which to bring Trump onside. There is little to suggest any of them will succeed in producing any white rabbits today that will conclusively sway Trump away from bullying Zelensky into accepting the terms of a treaty hashed out with Putin behind Ukraine’s back. Europe’s armies and finances inspire similarly little confidence that, should Zelensky walk away from discussions, his allies have the means to sufficiently support his country in the conflict with Russia without America’s backing. 

    Tonight’s events will start at 12 p.m. ET, when Zelensky’s European allies are scheduled to arrive at the White House. This will be followed by a one-on-one between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office, before all parties are due to meet at 3 p.m. What, if any, press conferences will be held afterwards are currently unknown.

    Ever confident in his own abilities to strike a deal, Trump has made it known that should things go well, he wants to bring Zelensky and Putin together in person within the next week. And yet even his own Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said yesterday that “we are not at the precipice of a peace agreement. We are not at the edge of one.” The path to peace for Ukraine – and a Nobel Peace Prize for Trump – appears longer than the American president may be bargaining for.

  • Is Putin taking Trump for a ride?

    Is Putin taking Trump for a ride?

    Already the Kremlin is setting the terms of the forthcoming summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Steve Witkoff, Trump’s emissary, set the meeting in motion with his mission to Moscow on Wednesday, which Trump called “highly productive.” But productive of what?

    Putin’s foreign-policy adviser Yuri Ushakov stated today that it was the White House, not the Kremlin, that wanted the meeting. He went on to dismiss Trump’s proposal that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky could take part in a tripartite negotiation, noting that “for this to happen, certain conditions must be created. Unfortunately, such conditions are far away yet.” Those conditions remain the complete surrender of Ukraine. 

    The Kremlin, in other words, has a strategic plan. Trump, as the columnist Christoph von Marschall observes in the Berlin Tagesspiegel, does not. Instead, he is being successfully manipulated by Putin. The dangerous bromance is back.

    Trump’s fondness for Putin and antipathy toward Ukraine is longstanding. Trump was vexed by Ukraine during his first presidency, and he continues to be in his second. He became enraged by Zelensky during his first term, when he asked the Ukrainian for a favor that had a disfavorable outcome, namely impeachment proceedings. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Trump hailed Putin as a genius and dumped on Zelensky. In his second term, Trump has continued to badger Zelensky and laud Putin, only to exhibit tepid signs of irritation with Putin after he balked at the US’s peace efforts and upped his heinous bombings of Ukrainian cities, launching a very real version of fire and fury. Suddenly Trump, who was warned by Melania that Putin was making a patsy of him, observed that maybe he was being “tapped along.”

    After proclaiming that he could end the war in a mere 24 hours, Trump wants to deliver the appearance, if not the substance, of an end to the conflict. Putin has shrewdly refrained from attacking Trump personally or condemning the president’s secondary sanctions on Russia. Putin’s track record in beguiling Trump, who appears to admire the Russian dictator, is a good one. In Helsinki, in July 2018, Trump publicly vouched for Putin’s bona fides, saying that he was sure the Russian had not interfered in the presidential election.

    Putin’s aspiration is one that the elite around him has long shared – to be treated as co-equal superpower with America, much as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, when each side had its sphere of influence and Moscow was free to carve up Central and Eastern Europe. For Trump, who views NATO as more of an encumbrance than an asset, the chance to cut a deal with Putin is an alluring one. But he also cannot completely ignore hawks inside his administration, such as General Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, as well as a contingent of Senate Republicans, led by Mitch McConnell and Lindsey Graham, who view Putin with alarm. Hence Trump’s Ukraine tergiversations over the past several months.

    For now, Trump is breathing optimism about his upcoming meeting, proclaiming in his press conference yesterday that there is a “very good chance that we could be ending…the end of that road.” Zelensky, by contrast, is sounding a more sober note: “The key is to ensure they don’t deceive anyone in the details – neither us nor the United States.” Here’s hoping.