Tag: cartels

  • How Trump could attack Venezuela

    How Trump could attack Venezuela

    President Trump has assembled the largest naval force in the Caribbean since the Cold War. How will it be used? Is he considering an attack on Venezuela to overthrow the Maduro regime? Will he pursue the drug cartels by attacking them in Venezuela? Or will the President simply continue America’s counter-drug operations at sea? With all of these possibilities there is the hope that the Maduro regime will collapse under the pressure of America’s military might.

    At present, the United States is countering the flow of illegal drugs by sinking suspected drug-carrying boats off the coast of Venezuela. The effort is in its 11th week and has led to at least 21 vessels being destroyed. US counter-drug operations in the Caribbean have been going on for decades and have bipartisan support (although the use of lethal force does not). In 2023, President Trump campaigned against drug smuggling, calling it an attack on US citizens. Yet he also cautioned against being involved in foreign conflicts. As he said in his inaugural address: “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” The current approach to Venezuela balances these two commitments.

    The political challenge is that, having built up such military strength and made explicit threats against the regime (with Trump saying “Maduro’s days are numbered”) if America doesn’t attack, it could be characterized as another instance of TACO – “Trump always chickens out.” Maduro would celebrate having successfully stood up to the gringos for a second time. President Trump would need some sort of diplomatic success to stand down without looking weak.

    The arrival of the Gerald R. Ford seems to signal some sort of direct action against Venezuela. The aircraft carrier, a scarce and powerful military asset, is not suited for plinking small drug boats. Aerial gunships, maritime patrol aircraft and drones have been doing this fine on their own. However, the Ford, in combination with bombers and other naval assets, is perfect for attacks on the mainland. The United States has enough Tomahawk missiles and other land attack munitions in the region for such strikes. Indeed, the Pentagon has reportedly briefed the president on attack options.

    What are these options? The United States could expand its ongoing counter-drug campaign by using this assembled military force to attack the drug cartels in Venezuela: destroying drug production facilities, disrupting seaports and airports used for smuggling, and killing cartel leaders. Such strikes would hit a major drug transit hub and deter would-be cartel members. Even when the cartels adjust, as they will, the attacks set a precedent for a muscular way of countering the flow of drugs. Attacking the cartels ashore is also attractive because it is easy to stop and claim victory, as the strikes will have visibly destroyed some drug smuggling capabilities.

    The administration could decide to overthrow the Maduro regime, which it sees as leading an illegitimate narco-terrorist state. It has put in place a narrative that would justify such a step. An air campaign could attack the headquarters of the Venezuelan security forces and Maduro’s United Socialist party, as well as bases for internal security forces, and perhaps some military air defenses.

    An air campaign might also try to kill Venezuela’s leaders, including Maduro himself. But even putting aside the legality of this, it is hard to hit a target that is moving and hiding. In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, the United States launched an aggressive air campaign against “high-value targets.” None were successful in killing senior Iraqi leaders. It took a decades-long intelligence effort for Israel to penetrate Hezbollah to track and kill its leadership in 2024. It is unclear whether the United States has a similar level of reach within the Maduro regime.

    In the background of all of these options is the hope that the regime collapses internally – an implicit goal from the beginning of the campaign. The intimidation effort has increased over time with the rising military capability, operations close to the Venezuelan coast, flybys of US bombers, and covert CIA action to undermine the regime. Perhaps an element of the Venezuelan security forces could be induced to break away and launch a coup. To prevent this, Maduro has worked hard to ensure his military’s loyalty, incorporating senior officers into his kleptocracy and weeding out any who showed unreliability. Yet the United States is quietly pointing out to military figures that when it overthrew Saddam’s government, the Iraqi military was disbanded. The message is clear: change sides or face social and economic ruin.

    A ground invasion, despite all the attention it has garnered, is not possible at the moment. The United States has about 2,200 Marines in the region, whereas Venezuelan ground forces number about 90,000 between the army, national guard, and marines. Conducting a ground invasion would require massive, multi-divisional reinforcements of at least 30,000 troops and likely much more. There are no signs of such deployments.

    Yet current situation is unsustainable. The United States is like an archer who has drawn his bow. Eventually, the archer must launch an arrow or stand down. An armada – particularly the USS Ford – cannot remain in thCaribbean for more than a few weeks. These assets will be needed elsewhere to respond to crises in other parts of the world, conduct exercises with allies, or show force to competitors like China. There is immense pressure to begin operations or back down. President Trump says he has “sort of” made up his mind. What he does now will reveal his theory of victory.

  • Trump’s border policy is beginning to bear fruit

    Trump’s border policy is beginning to bear fruit

    The second Trump administration tends to characterize those who have illegally crossed the southern US border as drug dealers, criminals and rapists. That is, of course, exaggeration, but it is no more a fiction than is the alternative belief, common among liberals, that all migrants are desperate people fleeing for their lives, who cannot possibly be expected to live in their home countries and are utterly dependent on making it to America in order to survive.

    If that were true, illegal migration would be little to worry about and good for the soul – and indeed the economic well-being – of America. If illegal migrants’ lives seem a little messy now, and it is expensive to look after them, in time they will all settle down to become good citizens who boost the economy and make us all happier and more diverse.

    The folly of this belief has been exposed by the revelation that Mexican criminal gangs have been offering bounties for the heads of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. Kill an ICE officer in Chicago, apparently, and you will be due a reward of $10,000. Kidnap one and it is $2,000. This follows last month’s shooting at an ICE facility in Dallas, in which two detainees were killed by a gunman who had scrawled “anti-ICE” on his ammunition.

    Why the desperation to be rid of ICE officials? Because they have succeeded in disrupting illegal activities. It is no longer so easy for the cartels to bring personnel, drugs and weapons across the border. Criminal business models which relied upon easy transit between Mexico and the US are no longer viable.

    The gangs are not Dickensian petty criminals, they are highly complex, organized and lethal fighting forces

    Liberals used to like to say that it was unfeasible to close the border. It stretched too far. There wasn’t enough concrete in America to build the wall which Donald Trump proposed. People would just come in another way. Trump did not prove them wrong in his first term, but he has in his second. He has done so by designating large areas close to the border as military zones, which can then legitimately be defended by soldiers and military vehicles rather than just customs officials. Trump has been called a fascist for deploying the military in civilian situations. Crime had been falling in Washington, it is argued, so why the need to send in the National Guard? This month, the President has been the target of similar condemnation when the Department for Homeland Security sent 300 National Guard troops to Illinois. No sooner had they arrived than a district judge, in a case brought by state and city authorities, placed a temporary injunction on their deployment.

    Of course, the National Guard is being deployed to tackle not just illegal-migrant and international-gang activity but inner-city crime more broadly. Yet the depth and breadth of the cartels’ depravity is hard to exaggerate, as Katarina Szulc’s feature on baby-smuggling shows.

    When you have criminal gangs trafficking infants and offering bounties to contract killers to eliminate state officials, what are you supposed to do? The gangs operating in Chicago and many other cities are not Dickensian petty criminals. They are highly complex, organized and lethal fighting forces.

    Parts of America have ended up in the hands of gangs because their criminal activities have been tolerated for far too long. A rose-tinted view of migration failed to take into account that among the many plain economic migrants who have been crossing the US border illegally are criminals and terrorists who are capable of seriously undermining honest Americans’ quality of life.

    It is not just the US that has been naive about this. Sweden was once one of the world’s most peaceful nations, yet a soft migration policy which was practiced for several years failed to ask who was gaining entry. The result has been a surge of violence using grenades and other weapons which appear to have been sourced from the leftovers of the Balkans wars, three decades ago.

    Germany, Britain, France – all have suffered crime waves involving illegal migrants whose stories about seeking sanctuary from persecution were too easily swallowed.  Importing people from violent parts of the world always brings with it the risk that they will bring some of that with them, yet the asylum policies of developed nations have largely ignored the risk, tending to place far too much trust in the arrivals.

    Not everything ICE is doing is to be welcomed. There are too many tales of harmless tourists who have been speared by overzealous policing of visa rules. Cases such as that of Donna Hughes-Brown, an Irish woman detained by ICE officials in Chicago in July, do not do the department much credit. She is married to a US citizen, a military veteran, and had been living perfectly legally in the US for many years, but was taken into custody when her record revealed a minor misdemeanor involving a bad check a decade ago. It shouldn’t be too much of an effort to distinguish between a slightly wayward foreigner and a member of a vicious cartel. To subject them to similar treatment undermines otherwise necessary work in strengthening borders.

    That aside, there are many signs that enhanced measures against illegal migration in the US are beginning to bear fruit. The country will not become safer overnight, of course, because there are many criminals who are already active here. But the cartels’ threats of violence against ICE officials are a sign that the policy is beginning to work. The danger now is that the cartels will succeed in terrorizing those officials and deterring them from doing their jobs, as well as recruiting new members of staff.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • How the drug cartels are ‘diversifying’ into baby-trafficking

    How the drug cartels are ‘diversifying’ into baby-trafficking

    Juárez, Mexico

    On the morning of September 2, in Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexican law enforcement raided a remote safehouse and uncovered one of the most grotesque cartel operations they had ever encountered. They found not just the usual drugs but rudimentary medical equipment and bloodstained tarps. The evidence confirmed what many investigators had suspected but couldn’t prove: that growing US demand has created a black market in human babies. Police arrested a brutal female gangster, Martha Alicia Mendez Aguilar, who was allegedly running an operation that procured these babies, luring in young mothers and performing illegal C-sections. On the streets they call her La Diabla: the She-Devil.

    Many of these women were lured with promises of easy cash jobs during the final months of pregnancy

    For months, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) had tracked La Diabla’s movements. The dossier they compiled before the raid described a woman who was an expert at seeking out impoverished, pregnant girls and reeling them in with promises of work or money. For the girls in La Diabla’s grip, the promises proved empty. The babies were cut from the young mothers’ bodies and sold for as much as 250,000 pesos ($14,000) to American buyers in El Paso, Texas. It has been alleged that many of the girls did not survive the ordeal and their organs became another product to be sold.

    This seems almost too macabre to be true, but an account I heard from the mother of one victim persuaded me that the worst can and does happen. I talked to her in a cramped car in Chihuahua state as she clutched a rosary. “My daughter was a good person, she never wronged anybody… she was so excited to have her baby, investigators asked me if my daughter wanted to sell her baby, but that wasn’t the case. She was already buying everything for her son, and telling her daughter how she was going to be a big sister.”

    Her voice broke as she described searching police stations, hospitals, morgues – any place that might give her answers after her daughter went missing. It was only after La Diabla’s arrest that investigators confirmed that her daughter had been one of La Diabla’s alleged victims, lured with the promise of money for prenatal care. In the end she was butchered for profit.

    It would be one thing if La Diabla were a horrific anomaly but such stories echo across Mexico’s northern states, where women vanish daily into the machinery of organized crime. For years, Juárez has been synonymous with femicide, the killings of women often dismissed as collateral damage in cartel wars. La Diabla’s alleged operation is only the latest twist in the awful story.

    Many of the women who fell into her operation were offered promises of easy cash jobs during the final months of pregnancy, others with invitations to make new friends or meet a man interested in taking them on a date. One woman told me she narrowly escaped La Diabla’s network. She had been promised simple, legal work for quick pay in Juárez, nothing that seemed suspicious at first. “My friend had been working with people in Juárez and making money, so I guess she told them to contact me. Over messages the guy made it seem like a good deal and I wouldn’t have to stay long. They said they wanted to help me because I’m pregnant and they kept telling me how much money I would make with them.”

    She described being contacted over Facebook by a persistent individual, urging her to meet. This Facebook profile was later identified as one of those linked to La Diabla. A relative became suspicious and advised her that the offer seemed odd and the young woman backed out of the meeting. Her testimony is now part of the prosecution’s case. Her survival offers a rare glimpse into the mechanics of the trade: recruitment, transport and coercion. How many others never made it out alive?

    Investigations into this network, on both sides of the border, are only just beginning. A Mexican law-enforcement source who worked on the investigation spoke to me on the condition of anonymity. He told me: “There is a lot of talk that these babies were sold into illegal adoption but when we checked the phone contacts of the woman [La Diabla], the men transferring the money and crossing the babies were smugglers. We don’t know where the babies eventually ended up.”

    These smugglers are experts in moving everything and anything across the border. One man was recently found to have a six-week-old Bengal tiger cub from Tijuana in his car. Dried hummingbirds – a necessary ingredient for a folk-magic love potion – have been seized. Smuggling babies is more complex. Sham paperwork is often procured, including Mexican birth certificates, while the babies are sometimes drugged to ensure they don’t start crying, bringing attention to the smugglers.

    Why would the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), one of the world’s wealthiest cartels, move into baby-trafficking? The short answer is that there’s money in it, and because impunity allows experimentation. Trafficking older children has long been a shadow industry in Latin America and the US, for illegal adoptions, child labor, sex-trafficking. But the industrial-scale operation uncovered in Juárez points to something new: a cartel cutting babies straight out of mothers and then selling them to the highest bidder.

    Since January, the southern border crackdown has hit cartel profits harder than most US policymakers probably realize. Stricter enforcement and expanded surveillance have disrupted some of CJNG’s most lucrative human-smuggling routes and slowed the flow of fentanyl shipments north.

    To compensate, cartels have pivoted, inventing new economies of violence. Baby-trafficking, organ-harvesting, crypto-laundering – each is a response to lost revenue. Every shift in US policy changes the underworld of organized crime. Crackdowns don’t end the business, they mutate it.

    Cartels adapt faster than the governments trying to contain them, turning political victories in Washington into new criminal blueprints in Sinaloa, Jalisco, and now Juárez. The arrest of La Diabla was made possible by unprecedented coordination between US and Mexican agencies.

    NCTC Director Joe Kent later called it a “terrorist cartel” operation, a phrase once controversial, now codified by President Trump’s designation of CJNG and other cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This meant that US counterterrorism infrastructure could be redirected against them. Intelligence once focused on al-Qaeda and ISIS now targets cartels such as CJNG that control swaths of Mexican territory with military precision.

    After the border crackdown, cartels have pivoted – inventing new economies of violence

    US officials insist this is the only way to treat them: as terrorists. And yet, for families in Juárez, Chihuahua, Guadalajara, and beyond, the designation doesn’t matter. What matters is that women are dying, babies are vanishing, and every cartel bust feels like just another head cut from a hydra.

    “This is one example of what terrorist cartels will do to diversify their revenue streams and finance operations,” Kent said. Yet what I saw in Juárez was beyond policy language. It was the commodification of life at its most obscene. For American couples desperate for a baby, willing to look the other way about how it came into their arms, $14,000 is a fraction of the cost of legal adoption. For child-traffickers, it’s even better, and for CJNG, it’s a goldmine. But for the women left behind, it’s a death sentence.

    As La Diabla sits in a Juárez prison awaiting trial, the questions are piling up. How many babies were sold? How many women were allegedly killed? Who on the US side is being held accountable for buying into this supply chain? Mexican authorities say they have identified several women connected to the network, though they will not disclose their identities.

    US officials insist investigations into American buyers are ongoing. But in borderland cities like Juárez, the fear remains. Everyone wonders if another La Diabla is already taking her place.

    For the families I spoke to, there’s no comfort in intelligence victories or policy designations. There is only the gnawing absence of their daughters and granddaughters and the knowledge that somewhere, their stolen babies might still be alive, raised in American suburbs with no memory of the women who carried them.

    Before I left Chihuahua, the mother I interviewed cried with me for her daughter and the granddaughter she leaves behind. “I want justice, I want this woman to pay for what she did to my daughter. She was smirking in the courtroom, and I need her to pay.”

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • Inside the Cartel is not your average true-crime memoir

    Inside the Cartel is not your average true-crime memoir

    Martin Suarez’s Inside the Cartel is part confession, part war chronicle, and part emotional autopsy of a man who spent years on the edge of death in order to bring the world’s most ruthless drug syndicates to their knees. It is not your average true-crime memoir. There are no cheap thrills, no voyeuristic obsession with gore, no Netflix shine or studio gloss. Instead, Suarez offers something far more dangerous: the truth. In the world of cartels, after all, the truth is synonymous with death.

    Inside the Cartel is not an easy book to read, nor is it meant to be. It opens with a gun pressed to the back of the author’s head and never really lets the reader exhale after that. Suarez’s prose is tight, muscular and cinematic without straying into melodrama. His storytelling is precise, even surgical. But it’s the content that burrows under the skin.

    His kids grow up without him while he plays cat-and-mouse with men who would slit his throat without blinking

    Suarez, a former deep-cover FBI agent, spent years embedded within the Medellín and Cali cartels under the guise of “Manny,” a trafficker with nerves of steel and a contacts database that stretched from Boston to Bogotá, Houston to Honduras. From the get-go, we are submerged in a world where gifts come wrapped in ribbons but conceal bundles of blood-soaked cash; where priests double as witch-doctors and bless bricks of cocaine with Santería rituals; where staying alive means watching everything, all the time.

    The narrative is propelled by events so insane they’d be unbelievable if they weren’t meticulously documented. There are airdrops of cocaine over the Caribbean, bales of dope hitting the sea “like refrigerators falling from the sky,” smuggling vessels rigged with covert surveillance, and multimillion-dollar busts that feel like heists on the high seas. But beneath the adrenaline is something more poignant: a man torn in half. One part federal agent, another part family man, all parts haunted.

    And here lies the real strength of the book: its heartfelt honesty. Suarez isn’t writing from the vantage point of victory. He’s writing from scar tissue. Again and again, he returns to the tension between duty and family. The phone calls to his wife Maria, in which he promises to be home and disappoints her, time after time. The guilt of missing holidays. The knowledge that his kids are growing up without him while he plays cat-and-mouse with men who would slit his throat without blinking.

    “I always had to be available for the cartel, day or night,” he writes, “which meant I always had to be Manny.” Though it sounds like a Hollywood cliché, the agent torn between the job and his family, this isn’t some slick action script. There’s no fairy tale here. Just a man trying to be both a parent and a pretender, and failing at the former because he’s too good at the latter. This isn’t True Lies. It’s true life. And in true life, the spy doesn’t save the day. He just misses dinner. Again.

    Some of Suarez’s best passages don’t involve bullets or bricks of cocaine. They involve the quiet, stomach-knotting moments between operations – the decompression after a raid, the sleepless nights in a safe house, the fake apartment that “felt small and lonely… as if basked in disappointment.” This is the mental toll of undercover work, rarely acknowledged, almost never admitted in law-enforcement memoirs. Suarez, to his credit, lays it bare.

    But that internal exposure never devolves into self-pity. The book maintains a clear-eyed realism. He doesn’t glamorize undercover work, nor does he posture as a martyr. Being an undercover FBI agent, especially back then, during the heyday of the craft –where many of the policies and procedures of becoming someone else to catch criminals were being written on the fly – “required more courage than most men possessed,” he says, and it’s hard to argue.

    The work was so dangerous that agents wore wires, knowing that their discovery meant a brutal death. When Suarez recounts the moment a hitman cornered him at gunpoint outside his home, the tension is more existential than physical. “I couldn’t let myself die like a dog,” he writes – and you believe him.

    There’s a sure-footed rhythm to the writing. The narrative moves between fact and introspection without ever feeling forced. Suarez fakes a seizure to earn the cartel’s trust; it’s a bold move in a world where hesitation means death. But every decision, great and small, carries weight. He doesn’t describe the pressure, but drags you into it. He plays egos off against each other, builds intrigue through lies, and slips through the cracks of bureaucracy. This is more than enforcement; it’s psychological combat.

    The prose, for the most part, remains efficient and gripping. Suarez writes with the clipped precision of a man trained to observe, not embellish. Descriptions are sharp, almost journalistic, but layered with emotional resonance. Even something as banal as smuggling logistics takes on an eerie intensity when you know one wrong move could mean dismemberment in a sugarcane field.

    Inside the Cartel does, however, have its weaker moments. Some chapters slow down unnecessarily, weighed down by exposition or tangents that feel like post-operation briefings rather than storytelling. There’s a slight bloat in the middle when Suarez transitions into his role as a money launderer for the North Coast Cartel. While the information is essential, the pacing stutters. You begin to feel the drag of detail while the drama that powered the earlier sections starts to wane.

    It’s here that the futility of what he is doing begins to surface. Suarez nods toward it – the endless cycle of cartels, the revolving door of players and product – but never fully engages with the system that makes the whole thing feel unbreakable.

    There are scattered allusions to the scale of the drugs trade and the sheer volume of cocaine flowing through the Caribbean, but little examination of what these dangerous busts actually accomplished beyond the headlines. He documents the seizure of $500 million of cocaine, for example, an extraordinary tactical win, but does not explore what it means strategically to remove one shipment while ten more arrive via a different route. The operation is a triumph. The war, however, continues.

    Suarez never pauses to consider how American demand fuels this entire machinery. Or how US policy – militarized, punitive, often myopic – creates the very black markets it then wages war against. There’s no reference to the cyclical nature of interdiction followed by adaptation, and some commentary would have been welcome on the staggering prison populations back home, or the communities in Latin America ravaged not just by cartels, but by corrupt governments emboldened by US funding.

    Granted, Suarez isn’t a think-tank analyst; he’s a soldier. His task was to build a legend, earn trust and survive. But for readers looking for a deeper exploration of how all this knotty tension fits into the larger drug war narrative, the memoir can feel narrow. There’s no moment of moral reckoning about whether the ends justified the means, or if the means made any long-term difference. He reflects on the personal cost, yes, and does so effectively.

    The wider geopolitical absurdity also goes unexplored. A few lines about the structural difficulty of the “War on Drugs” – the way it fuels demand, fortifies cartels and scapegoats the powerless while banks launder billions undetected – would’ve added weight. The cartels Suarez helped dismantle weren’t defeated but rebranded, with new bosses, new routes and new logos inked on the same bags of white powder. The machine didn’t break, it evolved. Moreover, Suarez is very much the hero of his own tale. That’s understandable; the man risked his life countless times. But at points the self-mythologizing edges toward overkill. One wishes he’d let others speak more or included more external perspectives, even if the identities of those speaking had been disguised for safety. The absence of dissenting voices means we must take his interpretation at face value. Again, this is a memoir, not a biography. But the lack of narrative checks can give parts of it the feel of a solo mission, when in truth, these operations were executed by large, complex teams.

    Still, the book’s climax – an elaborately staged multimillion-dollar cocaine bust executed under the pretense of a successful smuggling operation – is a masterclass in tension. The FBI essentially lets Suarez complete the entire mission: pick up the drugs, coordinate distribution, and then, at the last moment, let the trap spring. The cartel walks straight into it. The final raid reads almost like a tactical thriller.

    However, if you were hoping for a happy ending, you’ll be disappointed. The operation succeeded, yes, but at great personal cost. Suarez never gets to return to being just “Martin.” The ghost of Manny lingers. Even years later, he knows that “the cartel never forgets.” That line sticks with you. By the end of the book, you understand something rather sobering: Suarez didn’t just infiltrate the cartel. The cartel, in return, infiltrated him. It rewired his brain, restructured his life and fractured his family. And yet, he did it willingly.

    Inside the Cartel is many things: a true crime epic, a psychological case study, a blueprint for undercover operations and a portrait of a man at war with who he has become. But more than anything it is a chilling testimony to the terrifying, thankless work of those who live in moral gray areas, sacrificing everything for the safety of others.

    Suarez was never just pretending to be a criminal. He was walking a fine line between concealment and exposure, every day, for years. And when he finally stepped off the treadmill, the scars were permanent. If you’re looking for another cops-and-cartels potboiler, this isn’t it. This is the real thing. It’s gritty, haunting, and, despite its flaws, certainly worth your time.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • Schrödinger’s covert action

    Schrödinger’s covert action

    While much of the pushback from the right wing to Donald Trump’s international hawkishness has come from voices focused on the Middle East, and feared potential for wider wars prompted by support for Israel, the actual test of a break within the Republican coalition on foreign policy disputes could come over the president’s stepped up focus on Venezuela.

    The most recent development, with Trump issuing a rare public acknowledgement that he has authorized covert CIA actions on land. “I authorized for two reasons, really,” he explained this week. “Number one, they have emptied their prisons into the United States of America. And the other thing are drugs, we have a lot of drugs coming in from Venezuela and a lot of the Venezuelan drugs come in through the sea.”

    Think of it as Schrödinger’s covert action – does it really stay covert once you announce it? This would also seem to go against Trump’s stand against starting new wars, particularly those with a mind on regime change, which some of the president’s more hawkish supporters would clearly like to be the ultimate aim. It also includes newly ordained Nobel Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, who took to the airwaves in an interview with Christiane Amanpour this week practically begging Trump to greater action against Nicolas Maduro’s regime.

    The sheer amount of resources the United States has moved into the region is impressive, well beyond the drones being used to take out a series of Venezuelan drug shipments at sea. As The Wall Street Journal reports:

    “The U.S. has moved advanced weaponry into the Caribbean and in the skies north of Venezuela, including eight Navy warships, an attack submarine, F-35B jet fighters, P-8 Poseidon spy planes and MQ-9 Reaper drones. The Pentagon has deployed elite special operations forces, including the Army’s secretive 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the ‘Night Stalkers,’ a U.S. official said. Large troop-carrying and attack helicopters are part of the mix, with some aircraft conducting training flights fewer than 90 miles from Venezuela, the official said.”

    This is definitely a significant force, but what it isn’t is a prelude to a land invasion of the sort likely necessary to take on Maduro’s armed forces. Instead, for now at least, Trump seems happy with the kind of actions that disturbs Rand Paul and Thomas Massie, but doesn’t commit larger troop numbers or personnel to a regime change project.

    A fundamental aspect of the Trump tenure in his second term is that everyone is mindful about the future and what it will bring – namely, if his personally defined version of America First is the enduring approach of the GOP, or if there is a shift toward either further pullback around the world or back toward a default pre-Trump Republican security policy.

    There are plenty of observers on both sides who emphatically believe they will be the beneficiaries once that post-Trump sort happens. Their reactions, and the reactions of voters on the American right, to whatever does happen in Venezuela in this ramped up non-covert covert action could determine where the wind is blowing headed into 2028. Or it could become an object lesson in how even the president most resistant to starting new farflung foreign wars might end up in one much closer to home.

  • Will Trump go to war with the cartels?

    Will Trump go to war with the cartels?

    President Donald Trump has signed off on a secret directive that, if activated, would let the US military hunt Mexican drug cartels the same way it once hunted al-Qaeda. Cartels branded as Foreign Terrorist Organizations could suddenly find themselves in the crosshairs of US drones, special forces and the full arsenal of counter-terror laws. Sinaloa, CJNG, Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua and even Nicolás Maduro’s own Cartel de los Soles are on the list.

    In Washington, the move is framed as a clean break with decades of failed “law enforcement” tactics. No more just DEA stings or financial sanctions, this is now a national security war. Marco Rubio put it bluntly: “We can’t continue treating these guys like local street gangs. They have weapons like terrorists. In some cases, they have armies; in many cases, they control Territory.”

    But here’s the catch: while the US postures about cartels as if they were ISIS, it’s also quietly negotiating with them.

    Courtrooms in New York and Chicago have told a very different story from the one emerging from the Pentagon. Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán was given life in prison without the death penalty because prosecutors promised Mexico he wouldn’t face execution. His sons, the Chapitos, are brokering plea deals that shave decades off potential sentences. Remarkably, some of his family members have received visas to live in the US.

    Other traffickers – men Washington brands as “terrorists” in press releases – end up in federal court trading testimony for lighter sentences, sometimes slipping into witness protection with new names and safe suburban lives. Washington will tell the public it doesn’t negotiate with terrorists. The reality? It does, when the terrorists happen to move cocaine and fentanyl instead of flying planes into buildings.

    President Claudia Sheinbaum insists: “Our territory is inviolable, our sovereignty is inviolable, our sovereignty is not for sale.”

    It’s a defiant stance rooted in history. US military interventions in Latin America rarely end without scars. But Mexico’s political class has another reason to keep Americans out. The cartel-politician nexus runs too deep. If US counter-terrorism teams start digging, they won’t just find stash houses in Sinaloa, they’ll find politicians fronting shell companies based in the US. For now, Sheinbaum’s drawing a hard boundary: They stay in their territory, we stay in ours. But Trump’s move shifts the power dynamic. Mexico is now being asked to cooperate in a framework that gives the Pentagon and US intelligence agencies more direct access to cartel Targets.

    Sheinbaum is drawing a line in the sand, but Trump’s directive shifts the power dynamic.

    Washington can now apply military, legal and financial pressure without formally crossing the border. Mexico is being cornered into cooperation, whether it admits it or not, leaving a wide-open back door for American intelligence operations.

    Once Washington slaps the “terrorist” label on a cartel, the rules change. What was once a cat-and-mouse chase run by the DEA turns into open season under the Pentagon’s counter-terror mandate. Suddenly, US special operations forces can treat cartel figures like battlefield targets.

    Surveillance drones circling over Baja California would no longer be limited to intelligence-gathering; they could be armed, authorized to strike. Special forces raids, once reserved for al-Qaeda camps in Yemen or ISIS safehouses in Syria, could theoretically land in the mountains of Sinaloa.

    The courtroom becomes another front line. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, families of victims are given the right to sue cartel bosses in American courts even decades later. The family of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, the DEA agent kidnapped, tortured, and killed in 1985, is already pushing such a case forward. The precedent is powerful: cartel leaders could now find their fortunes tied up in endless litigation, with victims’ families clawing at the offshore accounts and front companies that have shielded their wealth. What once looked like impunity shifts to exposure.

    The financial arena is just as critical. Washington has long wielded the Kingpin Act to sanction traffickers, but the terrorist designation broadens its reach. Now, entire financial ecosystems can be dismantled from shell corporations in Panama, to real estate holdings in El Paso neighborhoods, even US banks that turned a blind eye. The US has already tested this kind of economic warfare against Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela, sanctioning Cartel de los Soles figures and seizing assets tied to the regime. Now, cartels don’t just risk arrest anymore; they risk having their political patrons and money men dragged into the open.

    Perhaps the most consequential shift is reach. Once branded as terrorists, cartel leaders are no longer fugitives ducking DEA indictments; they have become international targets. US law now follows them wherever they go. If a Sinaloa lieutenant turns up in Spain or a CJNG broker tries to do business in Canada, extradition isn’t just a matter of slow diplomacy; it’s counter-terror enforcement. The precedent here is Panama in 1989: Manuel Noriega, a sitting head of state with deep ties to cocaine trafficking, was captured by US forces in a military operation and hauled into a Miami courtroom. The message was simple then, and it echoes now: no corner of the globe is beyond reach when Washington decides to treat a trafficker as an enemy combatant.

    What Washington is signaling with the terrorist label is that the gloves are finally coming off.

    The cartels are no longer just drug syndicates; they are enemy networks, and the United States is prepared to dismantle them piece by piece, even if it means rewriting the rules along the way.

    But the contradiction is unfortunately glaring. In public, the US says cartels are terrorists. In private, prosecutors strike deals that let cartel lieutenants keep their lives, their families, sometimes even pieces of their fortunes.

    El Chapo’s wife, Emma Coronel, convicted of helping run his empire, served just three years before walking free in Los Angeles. Compare that to Guantanamo detainees who have been rotting for decades without trial. Who gets treated like a terrorist?

    The hypocrisy isn’t lost on Mexico. When Americans talk about hunting cartel leaders like jihadists, Mexicans see the headlines. When Americans cut sweetheart deals with those same leaders’ families, Mexicans see the footnotes in court documents, and, coupled with the immense loss these very figures have inflicted on Mexican society, it is a blatant slap in the face for the countless victims.

    This war is no longer just about fentanyl or border security. It’s about what happens when the US decides to treat a criminal empire like a terror network but still plays by the old backroom rules of plea bargains, immunity and political convenience.

    For Washington, it’s a double game: sanctions and indictments for some, green cards and plea deals for others. For Mexico, it’s a nightmare. If the US ever stops negotiating and starts treating the cartels like ISIS, the fallout will be catastrophic. If it keeps playing both sides, the hypocrisy will eventually boil over.

    One way or another, sparks are starting to fly. And this time, they won’t just land on cartel strongholds in Sinaloa or Jalisco. They’ll land in the halls of power in both Washington and Mexico City.

  • Is Colombia reverting to chaos?

    Is Colombia reverting to chaos?

    Two terror attacks which hit Colombia on Thursday revealed a scary new level of sophistication among the country’s ever present narco-terrorists – and threatened to return the country to the violence and chaos that many had hoped it had finally escaped.

    The double terror strikes killed 18 people and involved a car bomb in Colombia’s third most populous city of Cali in which at least six people died, and an earlier drone downing of a police helicopter near the city of Medlllin – long notorious as Colombia’s drugs capital – in which 12 people died.

    The use of a drone is thought to be the first time that the 21st century weapon has been used by terrorists in Colombia, and indicates that a worrying new level of sophistication has been reached by the ruthless so called narco-terrorists.

    Colombia has been plagued for decades by violence perpetrated by drugs gangs controlled by millionaire barons who have made their fortunes producing and selling cocaine. At the same time until 2016 the country’s democratically elected governments were fighting a jungle war against the left-wing guerilla army the FARC and far right paramilitary groups.

    Like many Latin American states Colombia has a long history of alternating between dictatorship and democracy, but the explosion in its production of illicit narcotics since the 1970s to feed the ballooning markets in the US and Europe has fuelled and fed these political conflicts.

    Colombia was prostrated for ten years of civil conflict between 1948 and 1958 between the traditional ruling Liberal and Conservative parties. The fighting, known simply as “ La Violencia” killed an estimated 200, 000 people – or 1 in 50 Colombians.

    Hardly had ‘La Violencia’ ended with the rival parties forming a pact of national unity when the influence of Fidel Castro’s socialist revolution in Cuba spawned guerilla rebellions launched by groups like FARC. At the same time the worldwide escalation in the demand for drugs saw the rise of drugs barons like Pablo Escobar, who accumulated so much wealth and bribed officials with their ill gotten gains that their criminal power came close to ousting elected governments. The Medillin Drugs cartel run by Escobar practically formed a criminal parallel regime to the legal government in the capital Bogota.

    Escobar and his bodyguards died in a gun battle with police in 1993, but other drugs lords picked up his torch and it became increasingly hard to differentiate between purely criminal violence and the political terror caused by groups like FARC. In 2016, after years of tortuous negotiations, the government reached a truce with FARC and the following year the guerillas laid down their arms and announced that they were transforming themselves into a legitimate political party.

    In 2022, the current President Gustavo Petro was elected as the first left-wing President in Colombia’s recent history and he has continued to pursue a peaceful path both with the far leftist groups who still use violence and the narco-terror criminal cartels.

    The latest two acts of terror are a hammer blow to the ever fragile peace process, and many fear that so long as the rest of the western world does drugs in industrial quantities the violence will continue.