Tag: Germany

  • The steady erosion of academic rigor in German schools

    The steady erosion of academic rigor in German schools

    German teachers are a privileged species. Most of us enjoy the status of a Beamter, a tenured civil servant. We can be dismissed only after a serious criminal conviction, we are exempt from social-insurance contributions and even our mortgage rates are lower. Such comfort discourages dissent. Yet, after more than 25 years as a pampered Beamter, I find myself overwhelmed, not by the teaching load or the students, but by the accelerating erosion of academic standards.

    Having taught English, history and Latin at four different Gymnasien, I have learned that challenging students is now frowned upon by both bureaucrats and politicians. Nearly all my colleagues agree that standards have plummeted. A mathematics teacher tells me that assignments he set 20 years ago for his older students would now be beyond even the brightest. One thing is certain: the children are not to blame.

    The decline began in 1964, when philosopher Georg Picht published The German Education Catastrophe, calling for a drastic expansion in the number of college-eligible high-school graduates. Until then, only those who graduated from a Gymnasium, the equivalent of a selective high school, qualified. Picht’s alarmism found ready ears. In 1960, 7 percent of students left school with college-level results; today, more than half do. The inflation of academic credentials accelerated with the 1999 EU Bologna reforms, which dismantled the traditional and rigorous European degree structure and replaced it with the Anglo-American model. Only medicine and law escaped. The effect has been the slow death of Germany’s once-superb vocational system. Many small- and medium-sized businesses no longer offer apprenticeships but almost anyone who has finished high school can find some comfy course at college. More than 70 German universities now offer degrees in gender studies. It’s dumbing all the way down.

    As college places were massively expanded, the Gymnasien had to lower their entry thresholds to keep pace with the demand for more and more students. Since 2002, in my own state of North Rhine-Westphalia, parents have had the right to choose their child’s secondary school, regardless of their teachers’ recommendations. Children deemed unready for the Gymnasium are admitted and, once enrolled, bureaucratic obstacles prevent them from being moved to a more suitable high school.

    The deterioration has been striking in my subjects. Since 2007, students have been allowed to use dictionaries in English exams, which discourages them from memorizing vocabulary. That same year, the Zentralabitur – a centralized state exam – replaced teacher-written finals. Previously, each school designed its own papers, tailored to what had been taught. Now, vague, homogenized curricula require little factual knowledge. History was replaced by the nebulous goal of “intercultural communicative competence.”

    Objective grading once relied on the Fehlerquotient (number of grammatical errors per hundred words). This was derided as “too rigid,” replaced by an imprecise points system designed to boost marks. Marks are awarded for trivialities, such as “structuring” a text. Students quickly learn the formula: use a few stylistic devices – enumerations, metaphors, repetitions – and you can be seen to analyze anything. Teaching to the test has replaced teaching to think. Real objectivity would require blind marking, external examiners and anonymized papers – none of which exist.

    When I attended a Gymnasium in the 1980s, advanced English students were required to study an entire Shakespeare play. Later, this became selected scenes, then scenes from film versions. In 2023, the Bard was dropped entirely, replaced by the study of “questions of identity and gender.”

    Since 1970, North Rhine-Westphalia has had only eight years of non-leftist control over education. Progressivism now permeates every level. Among teachers, Green sympathies are disproportionately high. Of the 17 newspaper articles used in exams between 2020 and 2025, not one came from a conservative source. The Guardian and the New York Times dominate.

    Behind all this lies the creed of “competence orientation.” Grammar, spelling and factual knowledge are dismissed as obsolete. It is enough to “communicate effectively.” Why, then, read Shakespeare? Why learn a soliloquy by heart? In biology and geography, exams no longer test knowledge but the ability to interpret pre-packaged “material” – charts, graphs and snippets of text. A colleague who marks geography papers believes anyone with common sense and patience has a decent chance of passing.

    Latin, too, has been softened. Translation from German to Latin is banned as it is “too difficult.” Lessons are increasingly padded with Roman culture and history.

    When the state exam was introduced, most teachers welcomed it because it meant less work. I realized something had gone horribly wrong when I graded a history paper by a gifted pupil who provided precise dates, facts and definitions. The new state syllabus allowed only limited marks for such content. I only managed to salvage her grade by awarding her full points elsewhere.

    Across all subjects, measurable trivia has replaced genuine learning. Multiple choice has supplanted multiple perspectives. Today’s “competence orientation” manufactures compliant consumers who consult Wikipedia or ChatGPT for ready answers. To criticize “competence orientation” is near-heresy; every mainstream party endorses it. It was introduced in my state under a Green minister, continued by a Liberal and remains untouched under a Christian Democrat. For the left, it serves egalitarianism; for Liberals, it produces plentiful but pliant employees. The Christian Democrats’ acquiescence is harder to fathom. But the result of all this is clear enough. In 2011, a student of mine wrote at the end of a Shakespeare exam: “Students don’t have to learn any more facts. Studying in this way is boring. Students will die of boredom.” If only I could have given her full marks.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s December 8, 2025 World edition.

  • How to make an unforgettable Christmas dinner

    How to make an unforgettable Christmas dinner

    In the early 1970s, celebrity chef Jacques Pépin and his wife bought a dilapidated house in the Catskills so they could go skiing on the weekends. It was a real fixer-upper. Groups of friends would come up from New York City and pitch in on the renovation effort, and Pépin would serve dinner at the end of the day. These weekends were so much fun Pépin decided to memorialize them by hand-lettering and painting special menus.

    How Pépin convinced his friends to let him sit in the kitchen sketching petits poissons and heads of broccoli while they slaved away at framing and drywalling his winter getaway is, admittedly, mysterious. Settling in to hand-paint a menu before getting down the pots and cooking a five-star meal doesn’t square well with the image of the DIY weekend warrior leading the charge on home renovations. Clearly, the man was both a culinary genius and a master of persuasion.

    And his menus were utterly charming. They grew into a family tradition, where the menu for every special occasion was illustrated, lettered in Pépin’s elegant, curly script and preserved for posterity in the family archives. (They were, eventually, published in book form.) In addition to the list of courses, some had space for les invités, where the guests could sign and leave comments. Sometimes labels from the wine they’d enjoyed would be stuck on as well.

    He made menus for outside events too, for instance a Christmas menu for a dinner cooked at Stone Acres Farm in Stonington, Connecticut, in 2016, with the courses listed in black ink and the wines in green. What a feast it was. They began with gougères, goose liver pâté and Stonington scallops. Then they followed soup and grilled Noank oysters with crémant from Savoie and Guy Larmandier Champagne. The pièce de résistance was roast goose with gravy and potatoes in goose fat, accompanied by Châteauneuf-du-Pape. Dessert was an apple tarte tatin paired with Sauternes. Not too shabby.

    You might be tempted to dismiss Pépin’s handmade menus as a charming but irrelevant hobby, a sort of chef’s journal. But this would be to overlook the man’s genius. His menus are infused with perhaps the most important ingredient of all, something without which Christmas dinner is doomed: a sense of occasion. Like a wedding, Christmas is a milestone of sorts. Like a wedding, the very concept of Christmas dinner is burdened with expectations, fears and emotions. It demands ceremony and tradition, but also liveliness and warmth. How can this occasion, this time in history, this particular guest list, this family and this place be woven into one unforgettable evening – hopefully without burning down the house?

    Handmade menus alone won’t do it, though they’ll help. It takes a master strategy, and the one I propose is straight from the wedding handbook: your outfit (or in this case your dinner), should include something old, something new, something borrowed and something blue.

    Something old – that’s easy. Christmas is all about time-honored culinary traditions: stuffed birds, roast boar (as I had once at a beautiful Christmas in Germany), tourtière in Québec, oysters on the half shell gulped down by the French, figgy pudding served up à l’Escoffier in a blaze of brandified glory. Something old puts you in touch with all ages past through the shadowy line-up of ancestors and ever-so-greats, all celebrating Christmas after Christmas, handing it on all the way to us.

    But Christmas isn’t only about generations past. It’s also about the future: a fresh start, the birth of the baby Jesus, here to take on the world, live, die and reign forever. So the second element of a good Christmas menu is something new, adventurous and exciting. Time for crown roast of lamb, a terrifying cheese that looks like a brain, roasted brussels sprouts on a giant stalk which you can stand up on a platter in the likeness of a Christmas tree (or piece of medieval weaponry), trays of rich little sea urchins, the foie gras of the ocean.

    Thirdly, something borrowed. When it comes to weddings, you borrow your grandmother’s necklace, your best friend’s hair clip or your sister’s shoes (if your sister lets you borrow her shoes, she doesn’t actually want them back, does she? Asking for a friend). It’s the same at Christmas: serve your grandmother’s shortbread, your best friend’s Caesar salad and shamelessly steal your sister’s recipe for mistletoe martinis.

    Last but not least: something blue. It needn’t be food (though Stilton is always an option); it can be in the decor, a trick of light, a mood. Christmas isn’t all red and gold and green. Just ask Elvis: “I’ll have a blue, blue, blue, blue Christmas.” Poignancy is part of the day, so they knew in medieval times; their carols were happy, but sometimes startlingly sad: “In sorrow endeth every love but thine, at the last.” Like salt, a pinch of Christmas sadness rounds and deepens the flavors of the day, counteracting the bitter and elevating the sweet.

    Blue doesn’t only stand for sorrow. It also represents the precious and the good. When a bride wears “something blue,” it is supposed to mean purity and love. In medieval times, blue pigment from the lapis lazuli stone was the rarest and most expensive color – which is why it was used for depictions of the Mother of God.

    So when you settle down this festive season in a corner of your hectic, wrapping-paper-strewn home, like Pépin mid-construction, to paint little watercolor fish and garlands on to your festive dinner menu, don’t forget to work some blue into the pattern. Without the lady in blue, there is no Christmas; without Christmas, there is no Christianity – and without Christianity, it’s a cold, lonely night, with nothing between you and the wolves.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s December 8, 2025 World edition.

  • Four Twenty Five’s wine list is better than most

    I was recently invited by friends to a small birthday fête at Four Twenty Five, Jean-Georges Vongerichten’s latest New York restaurant at (wouldn’t you know it) 425 Park Avenue. It was, as Bertie Wooster might have put it, oojah-cum-spiff, a worthy companion to the Terrace and Nougatine, those other famed New York refectories by Jean-Georges.

    I won’t bore you with the victuals, which were so far from boring themselves that it would take more than a column just to enumerate those toothsome morsels. Instead, let me mention a couple of the wines we enjoyed, noting for posterity that the wine list at Four Twenty Five is one of the most extensive and thoughtfully selected in New York City. I hope to have occasion to make a thorough study in the years to come.

    We started with a 2023 Alzinger Grüner Veltliner “Federspiel” from the Ried Mühlpoint vineyard, one of Alzinger’s best spots. It is a dry, light-bodied wine of about 11.5-12 percent alcohol. The year afforded a bright, sunny growing season and this is a bright and sunny wine, sophisticated but not fussy. Incidentally, the term “Federspiel” comes from falconry and refers to the bait used to lure the bird homeward. The vineyard lies on the clay and gneiss-bedded slope of the Steinertal in Wachau, Austria.

    Readers with long memories will know that the Austrian wine industry almost disappeared in the decade following the 1985 diethylene glycol scandal. Attentive quality control analysts discovered that several Austrian wineries were lacing their potations with what amounted to anti-freeze, which made the wines taste sweeter and rounder. The juice found its way to the German market and some was illegally blended with German wine. The discovery of the adulteration cratered the Austrian wine industry for a decade, but now it is back in a big way.

    Indeed, grüner veltliner, the most widely planted grape in Austria, has for some years been one of the trendier whites, and for good reason. It is notably food-friendly, complex, subtly aromatic but clean, its distinctive spiciness coming from rotundone, the peppery tasting chemical compound that is also present in syrah. I have no idea how much Jean-Georges is charging for a bottle of this grüner from the Alzinger winery since I was in the happy position of being a guest on this occasion. Out in the wild, two Andrew Jacksons ought to snag you one.

    For our main course we moved on to a wine from the Arbois appellation in Jura, the wine growing region between Burgundy and Switzerland. “Very distinctive and unusual wines”: that’s how every description of wine from the Jura begins, and rightly so. The most famous are vins jaune, fermented, as is sherry, under a flor of yeast.

    We had a 2020 Savagnin “Amphore” from Bénédicte and Stéphane Tissot (about $100 retail). The Tissots age this wine for five months in clay amphora, a process similar to that used in the production of Georgian wine, and then in large wooden casks called demi-muid. The result is a bright orange, cloudy wine that is reticulated with hints of stone fruit, black tea and cider. It is, as one commentator noted, “powerful stuff,” and not just because of its high acidity and 14.5 percent alcohol. Distinctive. Delicious. Delightful. I did not know at the time, but it turns out that DNA analysis recently revealed that grüner veltliner is a natural crossing of the savagnin grape and an obscure Austrian variety from the Burgenland region of eastern Austria, so our evening’s wine consumption had hidden interconnections.

    Grüner veltliner. Savagnin. Here’s another grape you will be hearing more about: clairette blanc. It’s prominent in many Provençal whites (you’ll also find it in wines from the Rhône and Languedoc). We’ve had occasion to sample the rosé from Domaine du Bagnol before. The white from this storied vineyard from around the ancient fishing village of Cassis is a blend of clairette blanc, ugni blanc (also called trebbiano), and roussanne. It sells for about $30. Like its Cassis neighbor Clos Sainte Magdeleine, another winner, it is a subtle, quietly aromatic wine that grows and blossoms on the palate. Cassis has been home to the vine since Greek sailors from Phocaea arrived in the 6th century BC. The wine writer and importer Kermit Lynch calls it “an earthly paradise.” When you book a trip, let me know if you require an unpaid travel companion.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s December 8, 2025 World edition.

  • Is Germany ready for military service?

    Is Germany ready for military service?

    It’s finally crunch time for Boris Pistorius’s plan to reintroduce military service in Germany. Following a delay of several months thanks to the country’s snap federal election campaign at the start of the year, the defense minister’s new “Modernization of Military Service” draft law is currently being debated in Berlin.

    Under Pistorius’s proposals, all 18-year-olds will be asked to complete a questionnaire that will gauge their willingness and ability to carry out military service. For men, the quiz will be compulsory; for “other genders” – including women – it will be optional. Those who declare themselves willing to serve will be invited for a formal assessment for recruitment into the armed forces, while anyone refusing to fill out the questionnaire could face a fine. Volunteers will then be expected to serve a minimum term of six months. Bar unexpected delays, the new law is expected to come into effect from January 1, with medical exams for all potential recruits to be made compulsory by July 2027. 

    Conscription was suspended during Angela Merkel’s stint as chancellor in 2011. But so far, it appears that, despite earlier resistance to the idea of bringing it back, Berlin’s politicians are in broad agreement that resurrecting military service in some form is now a good idea. What they can’t seem to agree on, however, is what to do if Pistorius’s new law doesn’t bring in enough volunteers to plug the gaps in Germany’s armed forces.

    Pistorius has grand plans to grow the German army to 260,000 active troops and 200,000 reservists by 2035. But following years of financial cuts, along with a marked decline in employment conditions, the Bundeswehr has shrunk to a nearly all-time low of just over 182,000 active personnel. Many in Berlin – but in particular Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative CDU party – want reassurance that, should the new military service law fail to bring in enough voluntary recruits, other means can be used to boost the army’s numbers.

    A working group of MPs from the CDU and Pistorius’s social democratic SPD have suggested that any shortfall in volunteer numbers into the armed forces could be made up through a randomized lottery. Defending the idea, CDU parliamentary leader Jens Spahn said this would ensure any compulsory recruitment was fair. Few in Berlin – and beyond – appear to agree.

    Blasting the proposal for a backup lottery, the head of the German army Carsten Breuer said it would be an ineffectual way of taking stock of the country’s manpower reserves in the event of an emergency. “From a military perspective,” he said, “it is crucial that the entire year group is examined.” This could only be achieved through blanket conscription, he added.

    Pistorius himself was also quick out of the gates to slam the idea of a lottery for plugging the gaps in the Bundeswehr, arguing that this would fail to bring in the best possible recruits. “One thing is clear,” he said. “If voluntary service isn’t enough, there will be no way around mandatory conscription.” Such a move, he added, would also act as a deterrent against an increasingly belligerent and provocative Russia. Hoping to make the Bundeswehr a more attractive employer and avoid having to resort to any kind of “plan B” measure, Pistorius’s draft law also lays out plans to improve pay and working conditions with the aim of improving the retention issues the armed forces have been plagued with in recent years.

    The dispute between Pistorius and members of the governing coalition to which he belongs has been ongoing ever since his draft law was introduced to the Bundestag in mid-October. A planned press conference between the CDU and SPD on the eve of the draft law’s first reading was canceled with hours to go, reportedly after an agreement to include the backup lottery in the legislation fell through. 

    Several weeks of wrangling later, there are few signs Pistorius or his parliamentary opponents are any closer to finding a resolution. “There’s really only one proposal,” senior CDU politician Norbert Rottgen told German media today defensively. “With the procedure we are proposing, everyone has the same chance, the same risk of being called upon. That is the equality we are upholding. Any better proposal is welcome.”

    Conspicuously absent from the discussion over a lottery versus mandatory conscription is any suggestion of how the government would force young Germans into the army – and how to punish those who don’t comply. It is safe to say that passing any sort of law allowing jail time or fines for such rebellious youths would go down like a lead balloon with younger voters. This most likely goes some way to explaining the degree of resistance any suggestions of mandatory conscription have been met with.

    Also unsurprisingly, the idea of bringing back military service of any kind is proving very unpopular with Germany’s youth – the demographic, of course, most directly affected by Pistorius’s new legislation. Enquiries into how to register as a conscientious objector are reportedly on the rise. Meanwhile, a study co-authored by the university of Hamburg found that only 14 percent of 18- to 29-year-old men who had never done military service before were willing to put themselves forward for it. According to another survey from INSA, only 20 percent of respondents aged between 18 and 29 were in favor of a lottery recruitment system. Interestingly, it found that on balance, more Germans preferred a return to mandatory conscription than any kind of lottery.

    The Hamburg study, however, may hold some good news for Pistorius. According to their research, even extrapolating just the small percentage of young Germans who expressed a willingness to volunteer for military service, Pistorious would be able to meet his target for bolstering the Bundeswehr’s numbers “without coercion.”

    With eight weeks left of the year, Pistorius is steadily running out of time to calm the disquiet around his draft law. He has held the honor of being Germany’s consistently most popular politician since he took up the post of defense minister nearly two years ago. But caught between a fractious Bundestag and an unimpressed public, will Pistorius’s military service law knock him off that top spot?

  • How Germany is preparing for war

    How Germany is preparing for war

    Hamburg

    What would happen if Russia was planning an attack on Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia – and the threat was sufficiently great that NATO felt the need to send troops east across Europe to face off against Moscow?

    This was the scenario the German Bundeswehr spent several days rehearsing last month, working out how the army would transport its soldiers towards NATO’s eastern flank in the event of conflict in the Baltics. For three days, the port city of Hamburg played host to the exercise Red Storm Bravo: 500 soldiers, along with roughly 300 members of the emergency services and other civilian organizations, took part – the largest military exercise in the city since the end of the Cold War.

    In the event of conflict with Russia, Germany would, because of its geographical position, become a “hub” for NATO to coordinate the flow of soldiers and weaponry to the front line in the east. Troops from the US and across western and southern Europe – including Britain – would flow through the country toward Warsaw and on. The purpose would be deterrence in the hope that a show of international force would put Vladimir Putin off an attack that would test NATO’s commitment to Article 5, which considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all.

    It would be a huge operation: the Bundeswehr’s Operation Plan Germany, details of which were leaked to the press last year, envisages 800,000 NATO troops and 200,000 vehicles traveling across the country toward the front line. According to one army source, even with Germany’s motorways and ports used to full capacity, this would take close to a week. Red Storm Bravo was a rehearsal of the section of Operation Plan Germany that runs through Hamburg.

    The purpose of Red Storm Bravo was as much to familiarize German civilians as the army regarding what to do in the event of a coming war. Only a fraction of the Operation Plan Germany soldiers took part but the scenarios neatly reflected the possible challenges. Soldiers rehearsed setting up and manning checkpoints; the fire service practiced fishing a sinking barge out of Hamburg’s port; and the ambulance service simulated a mass casualty event with multiple victims.

    The first day’s main event was moving a military convoy through the center of the city after dark. As the sun set over Hamburg’s port, I watched the heavily armed soldiers march toward a fleet of about 70 military vehicles, lined up three abreast. Some were small armored vehicles, others enormous Rheinmetall-branded trucks, several with machine-gun turrets that would later be manned as the convoy sped through the city. Many soldiers wore balaclavas to prevent them being identified, according to our Bundeswehr escort.

    There is an art to traveling in a convoy. It moves as one, meaning that as long as the leading vehicle continues to move, the others follow in an unbroken line, regardless of red traffic lights or civilian traffic. This convoy of just 70-odd vehicles snaked back roughly 2.5 miles – a considerable logistical challenge.

    At two points along the route, the convoy was stopped by pretend protests: at the first, army reservists in civvies waved banners and chanted at the convoy to “turn back”; at the second, “protesters” staged a sit-in, with signs saying “glue” around the necks of some to denote those who would have stuck themselves to the ground. The point was for the riot police to practice removing them. Groups of three took turns: a grab at the protester’s head from behind and a knee to the back, one arm twisted around, then the other, allowing the police to peel them off the ground and carry them away.

    When the planning for Red Storm Bravo was initiated, few could have predicted the new significance it would take on in the weeks leading up to it. Last month, a series of suspected Russian drone incursions into NATO territory set alarm bells ringing. Alongside Germany, Romania, Denmark, Norway and Poland have all reported drone activity close to military bases and other critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace for a total of 12 minutes on September 19.

    “We developed the scenario for Red Storm Bravo last December and now reality has actually caught up with us somewhat,” said Captain Kurt Leonards, the head of the Bundeswehr’s Hamburg command, who oversaw the exercise. “Whether that’s in Poland, in Estonian airspace, or even the whole discussion now taking place in Denmark, it shows how topical this issue is, and that’s why we have to react very quickly and expand our capabilities.”

    Poland and Estonia triggered NATO’s Article 4 less than two weeks apart, requesting alliance members come together to discuss the incursions. While the mood in NATO’s Brussels HQ appears to be calm so far, the rhetoric coming from individual members is somewhat more bellicose.

    In comments supported by NATO chief Mark Rutte, Donald Trump gave his endorsement to any NATO ally shooting down Russian aircraft entering its territory. Poland and Lithuania have declared they will do precisely this. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said: “We are not at war, but we are no longer living in peace either.” The German government intends to change the law this fall to allow the army to shoot down any drones deemed a threat. Last month, the EU agreed to move forward with building a technological “drone wall” along its eastern boundary.

    The mood on the ground in Germany is clearly jumpy, too. At approximately 1 a.m. on a stretch of road just outside the center of Hamburg, as the Red Storm Bravo convoy paused to set up for the second of its two protest simulations, a whining buzz became audible overhead. Alarm bounced around the crowd of assembled press and official observers as a small black drone hovered above us. “Is it one of ours?” someone asked nervously. It was only after a press photographer was able to get a grainy shot of it that one of our military escorts confirmed it did indeed belong to the Bundeswehr.

    Leonards agreed that Hamburg had seen an increase in drone activity. “Of course, you don’t always know where the drones are coming from,” he said. “Are these drones the work of a state actor that’s systematically operating here? Or do we have a teenager with a remote-controlled drone who wants to test how fast the police can arrive on the scene?”

    Following years of underinvestment, the German army is restocking its arsenal thanks to reforms that will see defense spending exempt from the country’s rigid debt rules and a one-off €100 billion fund ringfenced by Merz’s predecessor, Olaf Scholz. Some of this will be invested in anti-drone technology.

    Following years of underinvestment, the German army is restocking its arsenal

    In an army barracks in the Hamburg suburbs, the Bundeswehr demonstrated some of the gadgets already available. First to be sent up was a type of “hunter drone” capable of ensnaring other drones mid-flight by shooting out a web, Spider-Man-style. Disabling drones this way avoids having to use expensive weaponry to shoot them down and lowers the risk of falling debris injuring civilians. Once the hunter drone had lowered its catch to the ground, a four-legged “drone dog” dubbed “Lassie,” equipped with a camera and other sensors, was sent out to inspect it.

    Despite these recent undertakings, questions over the German army’s readiness for conflict remain. In June, defense chief General Carsten Breuer warned that Russia could be ready to launch an attack on a NATO state by 2029; according to one government source I spoke to, this could be even sooner. Meanwhile, according to official figures, just under 183,000 soldiers are actively serving in the Bundeswehr, and a damning report published in May revealed that, at the end of last year, more than 20 percent of military positions remained vacant. The reintroduction of conscription seems inevitable to meet its commitment to NATO troop numbers.

    So, is Germany prepared for the defensive challenges ahead? When asked this, Leonards said: “Germany is in the process of significantly developing its armed forces and the Bundeswehr. And I believe we’re really on the right track.” Not a resounding yes, then. But any preparation against an increasingly provocative Russia is better than none.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • Should the Nord Stream saboteurs be extradited to Germany?

    Should the Nord Stream saboteurs be extradited to Germany?

    The identity of the saboteurs who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022 was for years the western security establishment’s worst-kept secret. Just two weeks after a series of explosions within the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark crippled three of the four undersea natural-gas pipelines linking Russia to Germany, Scandinavian diplomats in Brussels were already being quietly briefed that the most likely culprits were Ukrainian. By January 2023, a forensic investigation by German police had discovered traces of the explosives on board the charter yacht Andromeda and found that the vessel’s movements aligned exactly with the location of the blasts. Crucially, the Germans also established both the cover identities and the real identities of the seven Ukrainian members of the sabotage commando.

    Ukraine’s hand in the sabotage operation was common knowledge among western security agencies

    By the time The Spectator published a detailed report in March 2023 pointing the finger at Kyiv, Ukraine’s hand in the sabotage operation was common knowledge among western security agencies. As one senior British intelligence official told me in January 2023, “The story will come out sooner or later… but we’re not going to be the ones to leak it.”

    Details of the German, Danish and Swedish investigations were kept secret not only from the public but also from EU and US politicians, and from the United Nations, for a simple reason: the news that Ukrainians were involved in an attack on Germany’s critical infrastructure could have a devastating impact on Kyiv’s relations with its major European supporters – as well as on public support for Ukraine. Or as Germany’s BND foreign intelligence agency put it in a response to a parliamentary question in October 2022: “Information regarding this question cannot be issued – even in classified form – due to considerations regarding the welfare of the state.”

    Denmark and Sweden officially shut down their investigations in February 2024 without releasing any information to the public. But the official omertà was finally broken last summer by the office of Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General, which has shown itself to be more concerned with justice being done than with saving the blushes of politicians in Kyiv – and Berlin. At least two European Arrest Warrants were obtained in June 2024 for Ukrainian suspects. And in August of this year 49-year-old former military diver Serhii Kuznietsov was arrested while on holiday near Rimini and remanded in custody by Italian magistrates, while another military veteran Volodymyr Zhuravlyov was detained in Pruszków, Poland, on September 30. But judges in both Poland and Italy have refused to extradite the suspects to Germany – sparking a political battle over whether they should face justice at all.

    “The problem with Nord Stream… is not that it was blown up, the problem is that it was built,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said recently, arguing against extraditing Volodymyr K to Berlin. The head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, Sławomir Cenckiewicz, told the Financial Times that “if Germany is prosecuting someone based in Poland who destroyed the source of income of the Russian war machine, then we see a clear contradiction in interests between Poland and Germany… From our point of view, this investigation doesn’t make sense, not only [for] Poland but also [for] the whole [NATO] alliance.”

    In other words, while Berlin prosecutors see the Nord Stream operation as an attack on Germany, the Poles view it as an attack on Russia. And while the Ukrainian citizenship of the suspects is not in doubt, the exact role the Ukrainian government and military played – as well as who conceived of, planned and ordered the attack – remains a mystery. The Russians, for their part, continue to insist that the attack was organized on a “state level,” and Putin himself has dismissed as “sheer nonsense” any suggestion that the pipelines could have been destroyed by a handful of possibly freelance Ukrainian frogmen. Kremlin media regularly blame the US for the attacks.

    The controversy over the extradition has become inextricably linked with Germany’s own political debates over the causes of Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the legacy of the policy of cooperation with the Kremlin by successive German chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel.

    From the moment Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom corporation first proposed massive undersea Baltic gas pipelines that would bypass Belarus, Ukraine and Poland and link Germany directly to the Yamal gas fields of northern Siberia in 2006, Poles and other eastern Europeans consistently and adamantly opposed the project. They argued that an abundance of cheap gas would increase European dependence on Russia, while at the same time enriching the Kremlin. Schröder and Merkel countered that increasing Russia’s economic dependence on European money would encourage peace and cooperation.

    Even when Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea fundamentally undermined this logic, Merkel nonetheless greenlit the €9.5 billion Nord Stream 2 project in 2015, despite strong opposition from Washington. In the event, the second set of pipelines were completed but never certified and never came online. One of the two Nord Stream 2 pipes survived the attacks intact and is still full of pressurized gas, ready in theory to be switched on at any moment.

    In several important ways, history has proved the critics of Nord Stream right – not least about the danger that the Kremlin would use its control of more than a third of Germany’s energy supply as a political weapon. In June 2022 Gazprom reduced the pressure through Nord Stream 1 to 40 percent of its previous flow, claiming that recent European sanctions had prevented the delivery of Siemens-made turbine blades. The following month the company shut down supplies, citing annual maintenance work. Service was resumed ten days later, but at only 20 percent capacity, and on August 31, Gazprom closed Nord Stream 1 indefinitely, officially because of further technical issues. Indeed, it was precisely in order to stop the Kremlin from applying energy blackmail on Berlin that, reportedly, the Ukrainian plotters decided to put an end to Nord Stream – and Russian leverage over Europe – once and for all.

    The critics were also right about the dangers of Germany and Europe’s economic dependency on cheap Russian gas. The Kremlin’s serial messing with supplies predictably sent gas markets into a panic, with spot prices for natural gas soaring to €70 per megawatt-hour in August 2022, up from €27 in January. In the aftermath of the destruction of Nord Stream in late September, Germany rapidly built floating harbors to offload supplies of expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG), and booked massive new shipments from the US, Canada, Qatar and – ironically – Russia (which as of last year was still Europe’s second largest LNG supplier, after America).

    The problem for the German economy was that several major sectors – notably large, energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, refining and fertilizers – have faced much higher costs. An IMF report suggested that the negative impact on Germany’s GDP of the shutoff of cheap Russian piped gas would be 1.5 percent in the second half of 2022, 2.7 percent in 2023, and 0.4 percent in 2024. That same IMF study predicted that the destruction of Nord Stream and its associated gas price rise would add some 2 percentage points to German inflation in 2022 and 2023 because of higher energy costs rippling through food, manufacturing, transport and consumer goods. While it’s impossible to know exactly what German economic performance would have been without the Nord Stream hit, Germany’s economy contracted by -0.3 percent in 2023 and -0.2 percent in 2024 while inflation shot up to 7.9 percent in 2022 before falling to 2.4 percent by 2024.

    In short, whoever carried out the Nord Stream operation cut off Russia’s most valuable tool of political blackmail and wrecked one of Gazprom and the Kremlin’s most lucrative income streams. But they also killed off German growth and pushed up inflation across the continent.

    To some, Germany’s insistence on prosecuting the saboteurs smacks of hypocrisy. “Forgive me if I say that the sight of Germany now ‘investigating’ the sabotage of Nord Stream feels like a mockery of history – another manifestation of German arrogance and hubris,” says Sławomir Dębski of the College of Europe in Warsaw. “Perhaps they should start by investigating Schröder and Merkel – they were the ones who blew up Europe’s trust in Germany as a reliable ally.”

    Berlin prosecutors see the Nord Stream operation as an attack on Germany – the Poles see it as an attack on Russia

    Others are outraged that Ukraine should have carried out such a destructive attack on its own allies’ economies despite receiving tens of billions of dollars in international aid and, it is said, in defiance of strong opposition from Washington. In August 2024 the Wall Street Journal, citing senior but anonymous sources, reported that the operation was ultimately commanded by General Valerii Zaluzhnyi (then Ukraine’s top commander) – and had gone ahead despite President Zelensky allegedly trying to call it off after pressure by US intelligence.

    From Ukraine’s point of view, the attack was a major success, qualifying as one of the most geopolitically effective covert operations in history. Ukraine’s main strategic weakness over the late summer of 2022 was that the promise of a resumption of cheap Russian gas would fatally weaken European resolve to back the war effort. But with Nord Stream physically gone, Europe’s return to its Gazprom addiction ceased to be a threat. For the Kyiv government to undertake such an attack would carry enormous political risks if the story ever came out. But specialist operatives acting independently would be legitimately deniable. Which has pretty much remained the case, until now.

    With extradition blocked and the two arrested suspects now at liberty, there will be no trial and no chance that details of the operation will be produced in court. And the biggest secret of all – the full truth about who in Kyiv ordered the attack – will likely remain hidden for years to come.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • A rendezvous with destiny

    A rendezvous with destiny

    Gianluca and I mounted the steps to the Friedrichsbad in Baden-Baden, Germany, in pensive silence. We hadn’t made eye contact since we’d met in reception at our hotel, the divine Brenners, for this rendezvous with destiny. At the front desk, we were sternly reminded of the dress code. We nodded. For the next three hours we were going to be stark naked in a 19th-century, Renaissance-themed, domed and frescoed temple to the God of Thermal Springs, adorned with hand-painted majolica tiles, statuary and a sequence of pools and chambers. “Kein Textil,” the woman repeated.

    After removing every stitch, we processed to the shower room – me checking that the area, equipped with vast ceiling-mounted bronze fittings, had several exits – wearing only blue plastic slippers. Gianluca had left his spectacles behind. “Probably a good thing,” I said, as I wrenched a lever for my regulation three-minute drenching. My towel was already soaked so I abandoned it in a hammam where men lolled on stone benches, legs apart. Gianluca and I sat in silence on a raised dais, snuffing the sulfurous airs and glancing at fellow bathers as if this was the most natural thing in the world.

    We are like babies who have returned, in advanced middle-age, to the blissful ataraxy of our mothers’ wombs

    In my head, I had entered a rhapsodic state already. “This is marvelous,” I was thinking. “When in Baden-Baden, you should definitely go to the Bad, not that modern one next door, the Caracalla, where you’re allowed swimwear, but here, this is the echt Bad,” I was telling myself, pitying the others who’d chosen to go to the super-deluxe spa and pool at the Brenners and how they’d all wish they’d been to this proper old one by the ruins of the Roman baths. For the next hour we moved silently between numbered pools and chambers designed to warm and cool the body with air and water and purify the mind. I had entered a fugue state. It was clear to me now. The reason you or I can be as naked as a Lucian Freud is that this is the one place you would never announce, “But don’t you know who I am?” – it only works if nobody knows who you are. We are all equal, and equally human! This is helped by nobody talking. Being naked while simmering in waters spouted onto the earth’s surface by artesian pressure from 12 springs containing sodium chloride, from a depth of 2,000 meters – waters that reach a temperature of up to 155°F – cannot be improved by small talk of any kind.

    Gianluca and I were lolling in a pool underneath a cinnamon-painted dome. This is one of the only times, I was thinking, where we can bask in an amniotic bubble as if we are babies who have returned, in advanced middle-age, to the blissful ataraxy of our mothers’ wombs, all our needs and wants provided for by this warm immersion, cares washed away.

    Without his spectacles, Gianluca couldn’t see where we should go next – there were so many options. He turned to a man he assumed was a regular, standing at one end of the pool we were in. He was wearing glasses. He looked at home. Unfortunately, he turned out to be Scottish. “I’ll show ye,” he said eagerly, hauling himself out. We had no choice but to follow his buttocks into a room where you bobbed in shallow water on slabs, like beached whales. Look, I didn’t mind showing my front bottom to any number of naked Germans. Given a choice they’d be naked all the time. But I found I minded someone from Auld Reekie asking out loud in front of half of the Black Forest (no pun intended), “Are you Rachel Johnson?” And then saying he knew it was me, confiding “it’s your hair” and so on, breaking the fourth wall and whipping away my invisibility cloak at the same time.

    As we lay with our herbal teas on daybeds afterwards, Gianluca apologized, but I was over it already, and asking him how it was for him. Was there a vibe? I mean, were men checking each other out? I couldn’t tell as I am not a gay man, you see. “Within seconds,” he said, and then explained about the various men, “the skinny one in the corner” and “that fat blond one with the button mushroom,” the looks exchanged and how only gay men sat like that, legs akimbo.

    As we left, pink, clean and moisturized with mineral lotions, the fat blond one with the button mushroom turned out to be from Newcastle, England. I know this because as we exited, he followed us out of the changing room, and suggested we went “for a few beers.” Reader, we made our excuses and left the Geordie with the chode (don’t ask me to explain) on the steps of the Friedrichsbad.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s October 27, 2025 World edition.

  • Why you should never date a German man

    Why you should never date a German man

    Call me unpatriotic but, although I’m German, nothing could ever have persuaded me to date a German man. I married an Englishman, finding Teutonic attitudes towards romance unbearable. Dating can go on for years, often ending in a quiet, dry dissolution after a decade. If you’re lucky, the relationship will limp on towards marriage, driven more by the need to save on taxes than any belief in what many Germans consider an antiquated institution.

    Two hundred years ago, we had the tragic intensity of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, a cornerstone of the Romantic movement. It was so wildly popular that it sparked one of the first waves of romantic consumerism: perfumes, clothing and even mugs depicting scenes from the novel were sold. Fast forward to today, and we have Fack ju Göhte (2013), a comedy about a German-Arab ex-convict who poses as a literature teacher to hunt down the buried loot referenced in Young Werther. The country that once led the Romantic revolution now seems less interested in all-consuming passion than in cultural self-destruction.

    Instead of declarations of love, the modern German man is more likely to insist on splitting the bill 50/50, even on a first date – and heaven help the woman whose cash app request is off by even a cent. It’s no surprise that German jewellry shops and florists are disappearing – not just victims of an economic recession, but of a romantic one too.

    It’s tempting to blame communism. The German Democratic Republic’s drive for total female workforce participation aimed at turning women into men, with a few biological differences. Some progressives still call this empowerment, but it mostly meant steamrolling over what many women actually wanted. Personally, I’d take babies over a factory floor any day. Preferably babies that arrive with flowers and a husband who doesn’t ask me to split the hospital bill.

    Another culprit is western feminism, which encouraged women to demand equal rights. Too often, that has meant demanding to be treated as men rather than respected as a woman. If you browbeat any man who dares to open the door for you or offers up his seat, then soon almost none will. As these small gestures collapse, so does the architecture of romance, which must be built on an imbalance between the sexes.

    Sadly, Germany’s unromantic streak can’t even be said to be a recent aberration, despite the excesses of communism and feminism. Perhaps there is something more fundamental in the German character. You only have to read Erich Kästner’s 1928 poem “Sachliche Romanze” (“Sobering Romance”), which gruesomely dissects the eight-year death of love into wordless nothingness, to wonder. Certainly, we are a practical, taciturn people, and have adapted to the world of elasticated waistbands and low-maintenance short hairstyles quickly. Far too often, it isn’t just the men you see wearing cargo trousers or stretchy hiking gear, but the women also. Mata Hari would struggle to maintain any mystique in brightly colored moisture-wicking polyester.

    That doesn’t fully explain the issue, however. The right-wing commentator Anabel Schunke has spoken about how far too many German men are a kartoffel “potato”) and compared them unfavorably with Turkish or Arab migrant men, who still bother to wear aftershave and offer expensive gifts. These talahons, as we call them in Germany (from an Arabic phrase meaning “come here,” popularized by a Syrian-German rapper), might like to wear designer tracksuits and get haircuts in barbers with black-and-gold color schemes, but at least they make an effort in the dating arena.

    It’s possible the old ways are making a comeback, thanks partly to Instagram. German men who use the platform have started to present themselves as gentlemen. Influencers like Justus Hansen pose in suits and Barbour jackets, happily putting one foot in the past and another in the present. Without an older generation to guide them, young German men are looking to the internet to discover forgotten traditions. It helps if they can look good in the traditional trachten (the English call them lederhosen). Similarly, German women have discovered ways to look sexy in the dirndl, that Germanic bodice and blouse combination.

    There is an upside to German men. Even Tacitus, writing nearly 2,000 years ago, singled out the Germanic tribes for their rare commitment to monogamy: barbarians, yes, but loyal ones. Not much has changed. For all his quirks, the German man is generally a solid provider, faithful and competent with a toolbox. He’ll even stick around if you get an Angela Merkel bowl cut and go up three dress sizes. Just don’t ask him to give up the jean shorts, the bad haircuts or his beloved cargo joggers. There are limits to his love.

  • The AfD’s mission to seduce West Germany is starting to pay off

    The AfD’s mission to seduce West Germany is starting to pay off

    The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party continued its westward march in popularity across Germany yesterday, securing third place in the local elections in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Preliminary results show that, alongside the outcomes of mayoralty and district administrator elections which took place in the state, the far-right party won 14.5 percent of the vote across the 396 municipalities which went to the polls. The liberal SPD party came in second with 22.1 percent, while the CDU – the governing party in Berlin – secured a third of the vote, with 33.3 percent.

    The German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, will be breathing a small sigh of relief at the results this morning. Although these were local elections, yesterday’s vote has been treated as a litmus test for the first four months of his chancellorship, and it seems he has just about emerged unscathed. But it would be a mistake for the CDU leader to think he is now off the hook until next year’s more significant round of state elections.

    While Merz’s Christian Democrats managed to cling on to the top spot in North Rhine-Westphalia, the party did marginally worse than at the last set of local elections in 2020, losing 1 percent of support. This is, however, the party’s worst set of local election results in the nearly 80 years since North Rhine-Westphalia was founded. More concerningly for the Chancellor, the AfD managed to nearly triple its vote share from 5.1 percent five years ago. These results are just the latest sign that, slowly but surely, it’s not just the former East Germany – traditionally the AfD’s homeland – that is falling for the siren song of the far right.

    While yesterday’s elections concerned the lowest administrative rung on the ladder of the German state, they were far from insignificant. North Rhine-Westphalia is Germany’s most populous state – about a quarter of the country’s population lives there, with over 13 million eligible to vote (including 16- and 17-year-olds). Voter turnout has been projected at nearly 57 percent – a 30-year high. A flurry of visits to the state in recent weeks by the country’s most prominent politicians, including SPD chairman Lars Klingbeil, prominent Green politician Ricarda Lang and even Merz himself, demonstrated just how important yesterday’s vote has been considered in Berlin.

    For Merz’s coalition partners, the SPD, last night was bleak. Winning just a projected 22.1 percent of the vote, the liberals are on track for their worst results in North Rhine-Westphalia’s history. Damningly, the party actually did better than polling done at the end of last month predicted by over four percentage points. That municipal elections in Germany often serve as a protest vote against the governing parties in Berlin is of little comfort to the SPD. Yesterday’s dire results led one of the party’s MPs, Ralf Stegner, to describe the SPD’s situation as “extremely dangerous – perhaps even life-threatening.”

    This set of elections was fought primarily on issues over which Merz and his colleagues in the Bundestag have little direct responsibility. Topics such as problems with traffic and the condition of infrastructure such as local roads and bridges cropped up repeatedly. Nevertheless, some themes – such as concerns over the increase in the cost of living and housing pressures in the state – tapped into a broader national discourse. 

    Predictably, the AfD took advantage of voter concerns surrounding the “integration of foreigners” into the local community as a proxy to once again form their campaign around the questions of migration. Poignantly, the town of Solingen, where three people were stabbed to death and a further eight injured at a festival by a Syrian refugee last summer, sits within the state. Tesla billionaire Elon Musk once again threw his support behind the far-right party, as he did in February’s federal election, tweeting at the end of August that “either Germany votes AfD or it is the end of Germany.”

    The local election campaign period was also not without its oddities. An unusual cluster of deaths of AfD candidates in the state in the run-up to the vote – seven in total – led to conspiracy theories, pushed by the party itself, that something nefarious may have taken place. No evidence has so far emerged, though, to suggest foul play in their deaths. 

    Ahead of the vote, Merz diplomatically promised to “draw conclusions” from the results and, more specifically, to use the lessons his party learns to take the fight to the AfD in the coming months and years. Among the many problems looming over Merz and his SPD coalition partners is a clear issue of demographics: just under 70 percent of over 60s voted for the CDU and the liberals, compared to 43 percent of those under 25. 

    If the two parties want to secure their political survival over the coming years, they will have to significantly broaden their offerings to younger voters. This won’t be easy: interestingly, it wasn’t only the AfD that scooped up a significant number of youth votes (11 percent): the left-wing Die Linke party secured support from 18 percent of 16-25 year olds. Berlin’s establishment parties are facing a political assault on both sides.

    As a microcosm of German politics, last night’s vote in North Rhein-Westphalia shows just how fractured the country is becoming. The results aren’t quite set in stone yet: with a higher than expected number of candidates failing to reach the 50 percent thresholds to win their seats, at least 147 municipalities and districts will hold runoff elections in two weeks’ time, which may yet shift the final vote shares.

    True to form, Merz has seemingly squeaked through his first electoral test as chancellor. His stuttering efforts to reset the narrative from Berlin following three largely disastrous years under his predecessor Olaf Scholz’s traffic-light coalition have yet to bear fruit – if they ever will. It is only then that the true test will come for Merz on one question alone: will he have become the chancellor who gave away power to the AfD?

  • Can Friedrich Merz save Germany from irrelevancy?

    Can Friedrich Merz save Germany from irrelevancy?

    Friedrich Merz arrived in Washington this week alongside Europe’s most senior leaders, ostensibly to coordinate the continent’s response to Trump’s Ukraine designs. Here was Germany’s moment to demonstrate the leadership it perpetually claims to seek – a chance to shape the conversation that will determine Europe’s security architecture for years to come. Instead, before the Chancellor could even present his case to Americans, his own foreign minister Johann Wadephul delivered a masterclass in diplomatic self-sabotage from Berlin.

    Germany must play “an important role” in any future peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, declared the CDU politician, before categorically ruling out German soldiers on Ukrainian soil. “That would presumably overwhelm us,” he explained with the sort of defeatist precision that has become his government’s signature. In a single sentence, Wadephul had kneecapped his own Chancellor’s negotiating position, advertising Germany’s limitations rather than its capabilities to anyone listening.

    Nothing feeds populists like politics’ inability to address change

    This wasn’t merely unfortunate timing – it was the latest installment in a pattern of cabinet colleagues undermining Merz’s already tentative efforts at international leadership. Whether on defense spending, migration policy or economic reform, the Chancellor finds himself repeatedly ambushed by ministers who seem determined to advertise Germany’s unwillingness to shoulder serious responsibilities. One might call it capitulation before the first battle was fought, but this represents something more systematic: the crystallization of a political culture that has made strategic irrelevance into an art form.

    Here lies the exquisite tragedy of modern Germany: a nation trapped between its aspirations and its neuroses, too large to be irrelevant yet too terrified to actually lead. While Merz and other European leaders huddle in the White House, desperately hoping to dissuade Trump from striking a deal at Kyiv’s expense, political Berlin sends its familiar signal: Yes, we speak of responsibility. No, we won’t actually take it.

    The coalition has made itself thoroughly comfortable in this culture of irresponsibility. Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil offered a textbook example of political evasion in his recent television interview, declaring that “naturally we must also assume responsibility as Europeans when it comes to security guarantees.” Whether this involves troops, training, money or something else entirely “must all be clarified in the coming days.” What sounds like commitment is actually an escape hatch – the political equivalent of agreeing to meet for lunch “sometime soon.”

    Few politicians dare acknowledge the challenges that Russian imperial ambition actually poses to Germany. CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter represents a rare voice of clarity, reminding his colleague Wadephul that European peace cannot be guaranteed without military backing – including ground troops if necessary. Germany, Kiesewetter argues, cannot lead from Central Europe whilst simultaneously refusing engagement where it matters. The mathematics are brutal but simple: you cannot exercise leadership whilst advertising your unwillingness to pay its price. Yet this is precisely Germany’s chosen strategy, demanding a seat at the top table whilst openly declaring vast swathes of policy off-limits.

    Chancellor Merz understands that Germany cannot define its role through economic power alone. Since taking office, he has tentatively begun moving Germany back towards leadership responsibility. But the resistance is formidable – within his own party, throughout the coalition, and amongst a public that has grown comfortable with foreign policy free-riding. The result is that Germany is stuck in an interstitial position: too significant to be ignored, too anxious to genuinely lead. Whilst Washington discusses Ukraine’s and Europe’s future, Berlin resembles a spectator at its own continent’s strategic deliberations. It wanted to be an actor yet seems content remaining in the audience.

    This dysfunction extends far beyond foreign policy. The coalition’s domestic paralysis mirrors its international timidity. When asked about the government’s future direction, Klingbeil couldn’t even feign enthusiasm for his own coalition. Rather than articulating any compelling vision, he made clear that he views this partnership as little more than a marriage of convenience – one held together primarily by fear of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD). Defining oneself solely in opposition to populists represents political dwarfism of the highest order. Those serious about defeating populism cannot practice politics purely ex negativo. They must offer positive alternatives, compelling visions, genuine leadership. Instead, Klingbeil offered warmed-over social democratic orthodoxy: higher taxes for high earners.

    But lack of revenue isn’t Germany’s problem. Rather, astronomical debt and a bloated welfare state burden the republic with obligations that will eventually crush future generations. Precisely when populists will find their richest hunting grounds. If Klingbeil genuinely wants to defeat populism, he must confront Germans with uncomfortable truths: they will need to work more and longer to save the pension system. Social spending must be cut – the state cannot continue housing every applicant in city centers. Real change requires discomfort for those who have arranged their lives at public expense.

    Klingbeil should also cease attacking coalition partners who dare speak inconvenient truths. When Trade Minister Katherina Reiche recently demanded Germans work harder, this wasn’t pandering to the right – it was acknowledging a bitter reality. The coalition catastrophically underestimates German citizens by assuming they cannot handle genuine reforms. The necessary cuts would be entirely explicable. Everyone understands that deterring Russia carries costs. Everyone can calculate that fewer young workers cannot indefinitely finance more retirees’ pensions. This requires basic arithmetic, not advanced mathematics.

    The irony is exquisite: by merely managing stagnation, the coalition achieves precisely what Klingbeil claims to oppose. Nothing feeds populists like politics’ inability to address change. If the Union and SPD continue this path, they can watch the AfD overtake them in the next election. Germany’s predicament extends beyond coalition politics to a fundamental crisis of strategic imagination. The country that once produced visionaries like Adenauer and Erhard, the architects of post-war European integration, now struggles to articulate any coherent vision of its role in a rapidly changing world.

    This matters far beyond Germany’s borders. Europe desperately needs German leadership as it confronts Russian aggression, Chinese economic warfare, and American strategic uncertainty. Instead, it receives hesitation, half-measures and the perpetual promise that someone else will handle the difficult decisions. The tragedy is that Germany possesses the resources, influence and historical experience necessary for genuine leadership. What it lacks is the political courage to embrace the responsibilities that leadership entails. Until Berlin overcomes its preference for strategic irrelevance over strategic engagement, Europe will remain dangerously dependent on powers whose interests may not align with European security.

    Germany’s choice is stark: lead or become irrelevant. The current strategy of wanting influence without responsibility represents the worst of both worlds and is a recipe for strategic marginalization disguised as pragmatic restraint. The question is whether German politicians will recognize this reality before their nation’s window for meaningful leadership closes entirely. Current evidence suggests they may prefer the comfort of managed decline to the challenges of actual leadership. If so, Germany’s partners should plan accordingly.