Tag: Israel

  • How António Guterres wrecked the UN

    How António Guterres wrecked the UN

    As the world’s leaders and foreign ministers meet in New York for the UN General Assembly this week, recognition of a Palestinian state is expected to be paraded as progress towards peace. In reality, it will be nothing of the sort. It will confirm what has become increasingly obvious to anyone watching the UN over the past eight years: that the organization is in a state of malaise, and its Secretary-General, António Guterres, is the embodiment of the decline.

    The UN is no stranger to dysfunction, which I saw first-hand as a Security Council Counterterror Coordinator for five years. Every secretary-general has faced allegations of irrelevance, hypocrisy or incompetence. But Guterres stands out for having presided over an organization that is now derided by its own staff. It is not the usual frustrations of understaffing or the griping of a bureaucracy that has never been known for efficiency. It is the weary recognition that the institution has lost its way, and that its leader appears more interested in burnishing his progressive credentials than in delivering results.

    Guterres presents himself as a statesman, but in truth he is an old-fashioned European socialist with all the expected traits: endless preaching, no moral courage, and a fondness for rewarding loyal friends with plum jobs they seem unqualified for. The result is a hollowed-out organization where personal loyalty and national patronage count for more than competence.

    The UN has always had its share of cronyism – but under Guterres, it has become the organizing principle of appointments, in contravention of the current imperative to make cuts. High-caliber officials with relevant experience are sidelined while mediocrities from the Secretary-General’s inner circle are parachuted into high-profile posts. There was particular disquiet among UN staff earlier this year, when Guterres promoted fellow Portuguese national Miguel Graca to Assistant Secretary General in March, making him a director in Guterres’s own executive office. Critics observed that a sideways move could have been made at zero cost, rather than incurring the salary burden of creating a new ASG at this time of austerity. 

    Guterres is an exceptionally poor leader. I will never forget the sense of vacuum at the top during and after Covid, when the UN became the laughing stock of New York for its excessive attachment to working from home. Instead of leading the calls to get staff back into the office, he devolved decision making down to middle management who ultimately had to bear the brunt of staff complaints about returning to Turtle Bay. As one senior UN manager said to me: “Guterres gets to sound like the one who cares about staff welfare, while we have to impose operational necessity on them.”

    The charge sheet does not end there. Equally glaring is an inconsistency in his loud campaign for gender parity in senior appointments. This has sometimes extended to throwing carefully compiled interview shortlists back at his top aides and demanding a woman be selected. When his own re-appointment was at stake in 2021, all talk of female empowerment conveniently evaporated. There was no question of stepping aside to support a woman candidate; equality, it seems, was good enough for the bureaucracy but not for him. This hypocrisy is noticed, and it corrodes morale. In the case of the new Portuguese ASG, this particular “Global North” male was allowed to buck the trend of promoting “Global South” females wherever possible.

    Guterres’s crusade for fashionable causes does not end with gender politics. However noble his dogged progressivism may seem in the West, such an approach has proved catastrophic in conservative host countries. I am no fan of the death penalty, but when three of the five permanent members of the Security Council have it (China, the United States and technically Russia) what justifies the UN in adopting such an inflexible stance against it in Iraq? When UN overreach leads to expulsion, it leaves the host country and its citizens without the support and protection they desperately need. In recent years, we have seen the UN effectively forced to leave Mali, Sudan and DRC; and to abandon its work in Iraq on securing justice for the victims of ISIS.

    Even staff who still believe in the essential role of the UN despair of the Guterres effect. Speaking of his attendance at the Brics summit in Russia last October, where he was photographed sharing what looked like a very deferential handshake with Vladimir Putin, one official said: “Nato wouldn’t put Guterres in a difficult position by inviting him to their summit, but even if they did he wouldn’t attend.” What this conveys is not just frustration, but a recognition that the UN under Guterres has lost its way. He, however, remains deaf to these warnings, apparently more interested in applause from the lowest common denominator of the General Assembly than in preserving access to make a positive difference in Baghdad or Bamako.

    For all the malaise inside the organization, the UN still enjoys reverence among the wider public, and an annual budget of $3.72 billion for day-to-day running costs. To many people it remains the arbiter of legitimacy in world affairs, a sort of secular Vatican whose pronouncements carry moral weight simply by virtue of being made. That misplaced deference is precisely what has allowed various UN Special Rapporteurs to make wild assertions that Britain and other western allies are serial human rights abusers.

    While conflict has spread in many regions in recent years, Guterres has done precious little to stop it. The Gaza war has exposed the rot most starkly. From the moment Hamas launched its 7 October massacre, murdering families in their homes, raping women and abducting children, Guterres has struggled to say plainly who was responsible. His initial reaction to the terror attack? It “did not happen in a vacuum”.

    His interventions since have been framed almost entirely in humanitarian terms, with little mention of the hostages, and endless calls for ceasefires that made no demands of Hamas. Despite several countries voicing their concerns, the aggressively controversial Francesca Albanese was reappointed as Special Rapporteur for Palestine. The UN has turned a deaf ear to increasingly forceful objections from the US to its Palestinian refugee operation, UNRWA, which is hopelessly compromised by its long association with Hamas. And it is also alienating the US by refusing to work with the American-Israeli Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

    The durability of the UN brand meant that last week’s “genocide” report on Gaza landed with the authority of scripture rather than the polemic it truly was. The fact that the chair of the “expert panel” which put the report together has a long history of anti-Israel bias was glossed over once her findings bore the UN stamp. The enduring illusion of UN sanctity allows the institution to launder prejudice and pass it off as impartial judgment. But this illusion of sanctity fools nobody in Washington, DC, where the UN’s most powerful member state and largest donor is sharpening its knives for an organization in which it has lost all confidence. President Trump’s UNGA speech on yesterday was full of scorn for the organization’s contribution to meeting international challenges.

    Into this fog comes the great folly of statehood recognition. At the time of writing, 156 of the UN’s 193 member states have already recognized Palestine and achieved nothing. Ordinary Palestinians remain no freer, no safer and no more prosperous than before.

    At best, recognition lends a sheen of legitimacy to Mahmoud Abbas and his corrupt Palestinian Authority, a body so discredited that it has lost control of large parts of the West Bank to Iranian-backed groups. At worst, recognition teaches extremists that massacres work. To grant statehood in the aftermath of 7 October is to confirm that pogroms pay. Applause in the General Assembly will only underline the message received on the ground.

    Member states that still care about the UN should be under no illusion. An organization that cannot call Hamas what it is, that loses missions by imposing western social agendas on skeptical hosts, and that breeds contempt among its own staff, all while somehow managing to maintain the gloss and credibility of an internationally renowned arbiter of diplomacy is not merely failing. Some of its perversities are making the world a more dangerous place.

    The UN was founded to defend peace and security, and it is still needed to do just that. I have seen too many conflicts in which individual member states either have no interest or refuse to take responsibility, and we will always need the UN or something similar to step into that kind of breach. But under António Guterres the UN has become a theater of platitudes, a showcase for hypocrisy and an institution starved of resources and hollowed out by malaise.

    I hope the UN survives and even thrives beyond Guterres’s tenure. It has many excellent, dedicated staff and the world still needs its services. But the organization needs reform and new leadership. Until then, recognition of Palestine will be yet another empty gesture in a UN increasingly defined by them.

  • Doha attack was a blast from the past

    Doha attack was a blast from the past

    Israel’s audacious strike against the leaders of the Hamas terrorist organization in Qatar exemplifies the Jewish state’s new security doctrine – one of boldness and risk-readiness. The Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023, was a watershed moment that reset security calculations in Israel in a significant way. The results are Iran’s proxy network defanged, and a Tehran shaken after its own 12-Day War with Israel. Many observers believe that Israel’s strikes in Qatar risk unraveling the Abraham Accords and undermining U.S. interests. But as past episodes have demonstrated, there is likely to be immediate outrage followed by a reversion to the status quo.

    On September 9, Israel shocked the world by launching a military operation to kill senior Hamas leaders who were gathering for a meeting at their longtime refuge in Qatar. Preliminary reports suggested that among the targets were senior officials Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammad Darwish, and Khaled Mashal. The strike took place on the territory of Qatar, which has long played both sides of the fence. It has created the impression it is a key U.S. partner in hosting an American airbase despite providing funding for Hamas, a U.S.-sanctioned terrorist organization with the blood of U.S. citizens on its hands and providing financial resources to media networks which incite hatred against Israel, putting Jewish Americans at risk.

    Public reporting indicates the strike was not successful in eliminating the top rung of Hamas leadership. There has also been handwringing that Israel’s daring attack – while tactically sensible – is nevertheless strategically unwise as it risks alienating the very Arab partners that Israel has been courting as a part of the Abraham Accords to counter the shared threat from Iran. Yet Israeli officials have been reframing it as achieving one objective in signaling that Qatar will no longer be immune from consequences in harboring terrorists.

    But history counsels that the initial alarmist reactions from Israel’s Qatar strike should be treated warily. This episode was reminiscent of two botched targeted killings in Israel’s history: in 1997 against then Hamas Political Leader Khaled Mashal in Jordan and in 2010 against Mahmoud Mabhouh in Dubai. In 1997, Netanyahu was prime minister as he is today. In that year, he ordered the assassination of Mashal in Amman. The timing of this decision came only three years after the Israel-Jordan peace treaty of 1994 – which is similar to the state of play in the current context with the Abraham Accords in force, even though Qatar is not a member.

    News accounts at the time reported that Israel’s prime minister authorized the operation against Mashal after a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem. Fast-forward to today, Netanyahu similarly greenlit the strike on Hamas in Qatar following a shooting on Jerusalem’s Ramot Junction that killed six civilians and wounded 12 others.

    Then, as now, there was also sensitive diplomacy under way as Israel mounted a daring counterterrorism operation. In 1997, Jordan reportedly sent to Israel an offer for it to mediate a suspension of suicide bombings from Hamas. In 2025, Hamas was considering a U.S. proposal for a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages.

    Nevertheless, there were some differences. In 1997, Israel acted through the Mossad in fomenting a covert assassination plot. Today, the Mossad reportedly opposed the strike in Qatar, and it was instead done through the Israel Defense Forces, which resulted in it being a military attack.

    In the immediate aftermath of the Mashal poisoning, there were angry recriminations. King Hussein conditioned the release of two Israeli agents who were captured on Israel identifying the drug it used on Mashal so that his life could be saved. King Hussein had threatened to close the Israeli embassy in Jordan and hold a public trial for imprisoned Israeli operatives if Mashal died. There were fears about the future of Israeli-Jordan relations, damage it could do to the 1994 peace treaty, part of then-President Clinton’s legacy, as well as intelligence ties between Israel and Jordan.

    Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan observed in 1997, “I think it is an act of gross stupidity. We are always reminded that Israel is the only democratic state in the region… and yet you find the only democratic state in the region being associated with an act of terror.” Similarly, Qatar’s foreign minister in 2025 labeled the Israeli military strike on the Hamas compound “state terrorism.” Multiple news reports citing anonymous Arab diplomats have been warning that Israel’s attack against Hamas in Qatar risks making the Jewish state a pariah in the region, as opposed to Iran, and undercuts the spirit of the Abraham Accords, which is President Trump’s legacy as well as U.S. security guarantees.

    In the end, despite all the predictions of doom, the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty survived despite a temporary strain in relations.

    A similar dynamic played out in 2010 when Israel, with Netanyahu as prime minister again, killed Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a co-founder of Hamas’s military wing, in a Dubai hotel. The local police then published CCTV footage which revealed embarrassing details about Israeli tradecraft and caused a rift in its relations with a few countries after non-Israeli passports were used in the operation. The killing took place just as the United Arab Emirates and Israel were engaged in sensitive and covert diplomacy to improve relations. Despite the warnings of rupturing relations, an Israeli cabinet minister visited Dubai in 2014 and the United Arab Emirates joined the Abraham Accords a decade later.

    It is true that the current geopolitical context is different from the previous episodes of Israeli targeted killings – especially with Israel increasingly isolated internationally over Gaza. However, this history of absorbable diplomatic fallout from Israeli targeted killings likely motivated Israeli decision-makers to take a gamble in the strike on Hamas in Qatar. While there are loud denunciations of Israel, skepticism should prevail over dramatic, substantive fallout. The Middle East has seen a version of this movie before.



  • Trump treads a fine line on Qatar and Israel

    Oops. The White House is claiming that President Trump directed the ubiquitous Steve Witkoff to warn Qatar that Israel was going to strike Hamas headquarters in Doha. But Qatari officials denied that they received any such warning.

    “What happened today is state terrorism and an attempt to destabilize regional security and stability, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is leading the region to an irreversible level,” Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stated in a televised address. “These missiles were used to attack the negotiating delegation of the other party. By what moral standards is this acceptable?”

    Trump himself has been a study in inconsistency on the Israeli effort to target the Hamas leadership. On the one hand, he declared on social media that “unilaterally bombing inside Qatar, a Sovereign Nation and close Ally of the United States, that is working very hard and bravely taking risks with us to broker Peace, does not advance Israel or America’s goals.” On the other, he averred that “eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal.”

    The reason Trump is trying to spit the difference is, of course, that he wants to placate an aggrieved Qatar without openly denouncing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump’s caution may also be ascribed to the fact that there is no evidence that the attack was successful. Hamas is claiming that none of its senior leaders were killed. If so, the move was worse than a crime, to borrow Talleyrand’s famous phrase. It was a blunder.

    Trump has indicated to Al Thani that there will be no second strike, thereby ensuring that Hamas can operate with impunity. White House spokesman Karoline Leavitt says that Trump told Al Thani, “such a thing will not happen again on their soil.” Meanwhile, the fate of the hostages held by Hamas looks even more tenuous.

    Writing in the Washington Post, David Ignatius pointed out that “By undermining diplomatic options for ending the conflict, Israel has narrowed its path forward. Its only choice now might be military reoccupation of most of Gaza – something that Israeli officials say they badly want to avoid.” Some members of Netanyahu’s cabinet may be jonesing to occupy Gaza and extrude its inhabitants into Egypt. But whether Netanyahu himself wants to pursue that path is an open question. He may have reckoned that he could score a big success by blasting the leadership of Hamas into oblivion, then claim a grand victory over the terrorists who have been menacing Israel.

    Instead, he has created a chorus of international obloquy, as France, Germany and Great Britain, among others, denounce the Israeli move. In Trump’s own MAGA base dissatisfaction with Israel is mounting. At the recent National Conservatism conference in Washington, for example, American Conservative editor Curt Mills created something of a furor with his criticisms of the close ties between Israel and America. Mills asked, “Why are these our wars? Why are Israel’s endless problems America’s liabilities? Why are we in the national conservative bloc, broadly speaking, why do we laugh out of the room this argument when it’s advanced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy but are slavish hypocrites for Benjamin Netanyahu? Why should we accept America First – asterisk Israel? And the answer is, we shouldn’t.”

    With his attack on Doha, Netanyahu has ensured that the debate over Israel and America will only intensify. Quo vadis, Donald Trump?

  • What Israel’s Qatar strike reveals

    What Israel’s Qatar strike reveals

    “We are ready to accept a deal (with Hamas) that would end this war, based on the cabinet decision,” Israeli foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar said this morning. Yet whatever diplomatic momentum existed evaporated into thin air hours later. In an unprecedented Israeli operation in Qatar, Israel targeted the very Hamas officials they were supposed to be negotiating with. In the blink of an eye, smoke was rising from a building in the Qatari capital, Doha. Hamas’s chief negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, was targeted in the attack. Israel said the raid was in response to this week’s Jerusalem bus attack and the atrocities of October 7.

    The Qataris are livid; Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only made a mockery of the diplomatic process but ordered what could arguably be called a hostile act against a country in the Middle East whose diplomatic services are in high demand.

    “While the State of Qatar strongly condemns this assault, it confirms that it will not tolerate this reckless Israeli behavior and the ongoing disruption of regional security, nor any act that targets its security and sovereignty,” Qatari government spokesman Majed al-Ansari wrote on X.

    Operations like this aren’t new for Israel, of course. The Israelis are known to have some of the best intelligence assets available; the Mossad is one of the most sophisticated, capable and impressive intelligence services in the world. The list of successful tactical strikes like the one that took place in Qatar today is long, from the years-long campaign against the Black September terrorist group, the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah military official Imad Mughniyeh in Syria to the 2010 killing of Mahmoud al-Mabbouh in Dubai. The message is as clear as day: if Israel wants you dead, you will eventually be dead.

    The difference between those cases and today, however, is that Israel wasn’t technically engaged in negotiations with those groups at the time.

    The latest draft ceasefire to end the war in Gaza, put together in part by Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, was tabled days just a few days ago. The proposal would have compelled Hamas to release all of the remaining 50 or so hostages on the first day of a 60-day truce, mandated a gradual Israeli troop withdrawal from Gaza and establish a process whereby negotiations would continue until the two sides finally reached a permanent ceasefire. But that deal now lies in tatters, if it was a serious proposal to begin with.

    If Israel’s latest hit tells us anything, it’s that Netanyahu and his government aren’t interested in a negotiated resolution to the war in Gaza. This relatively mundane observation won’t come as a surprise to anybody who has been paying attention to the conflict for the last two years, but it’s worth pointing out nonetheless. Indeed, despite the Trump administration’s sporadic attempts to mediate between Israel and Hamas – and Trump’s own boasts about solving a bitter conflict his dim-witted predecessor couldn’t – the Trump White House hasn’t been any more successful in its diplomatic endeavors than the Biden White House was. Palestinian civilians are still dying. Israeli hostages, in dreadful conditions, are cowering in Hamas’s tunnel network. A humanitarian disaster is getting worse by the day. And Israel, its international reputation at its lowest in history, is drilling further down.

    Of course, a big part of this can be chalked up to the stubbornness of the combatants and their propensity to treat diplomacy as gamesmanship. Getting the two sides to agree on anything is more difficult than herding cats. The positions of Israel and Hamas remain poles apart. Whenever one side appears open to the certain peace framework, the other throws wrenches into the works. Following the October 7 attack, Israel remains committed to defeating Hamas as an institutional, political and military force, essentially wiping out the movement in totality. Yet Hamas isn’t going to sign its own death warrant, and Netanyahu knows this perfectly well. Describing this entire process as trying to jam a square peg into a round hole would be an understatement.


    The Americans, though, deserve a portion of the blame as well. Trump vacillates between wanting peace in Gaza and then enabling Israel’s military strategy, with the end result being incoherence. At times, Trump rightly wags his finger at Netanyahu and contradicts the Israeli premier in public, particularly on the subject of what is happening in Gaza. But the next day, he basically writes off Gaza as Israel’s problem and suggests that whatever the Israelis decide to do, he will unabashedly support it.

    To the extent the Trump administration has a Gaza policy, it’s akin to throwing various peace proposals into the ether – all of which eventually die on the vine – that are designed more to convince Washington’s Arab partners that the United States is doing something than to actually end a war in which tens of thousands of people have been killed.

    One thing is for sure: with this latest strike on Hamas in Qatar, Netanyahu has dealt a serious blow to a diplomatic process that was already on life support. And this was likely the goal all along.

  • Iran is down, not out

    Iran is down, not out

    The sirens began at about 5 a.m. A Houthi ballistic missile was on its way, over Jerusalem, in the direction of the coastal plain. After half a minute or so, I began to hear the familiar sound of doors scraping and muffled voices, as people made their way to the shelter.  

    It has become a regular occurrence. No one makes much of a fuss anymore. For most Israelis, most of the last 70 years, Yemen was a remote country on the other edge of the Middle East, the part facing the Indian Ocean, rather than the Mediterranean. What was known about it consisted of a few items of food and folklore that the country’s Jewish community had brought with it to Israel when it fled there en masse in the late 1940s. Now, it has become a strange, uninvited nocturnal visitor, periodically launching deadly ordnance at population centers.  

    Outside Syria, the Iranian losses are decidedly less terminal

    The missile, like the great majority of its predecessors, was quickly intercepted and downed. The Ansar Allah government in Sana’a can’t match the Jewish state in either attack or defense. Still, on the rare occasions when the Houthis have broken through, the results are not to be dismissed. They succeeded in closing Ben Gurion airport for a few days back in May, when one of their missiles landed near the main terminal. And in July, a civilian in Tel Aviv was killed when a Houthi drone penetrated the skies over the city and detonated in a crowded street.  

    Israel’s response to the Houthis’ aggression has been swift and consequential. Extensive damage has been inflicted on the Hodaida and Salif ports, the airport at Sana’a, the oil terminal at Ras Issa and other infrastructural targets. Speaking to me in his offices in the port city of Aden a few weeks ago, Yemeni defense minister Mohsen al-Daeri noted the “huge impact” of the Israeli counterstrikes, describing the airport, Salif and Hodeidah as the “lungs” through which the Houthis breathe.  

    But with due acknowledgement to Israel’s response, it should be noted that while the Houthis’ lungs may be damaged, they are clearly still breathing. Their continued ability to lob occasional missiles at Israel goes together with their ongoing and far more consequential terrorizing of shipping seeking to pass through the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea route. In the last two months, they have sunk two Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned ships. Traffic through the area remains down by 85 percent compared to the pre-October 2023 period.  

    In June, I visited the frontlines in Yemen’s Dhaleh province, where the Houthis face off against UAE supported fighters from the Southern Transitional Council. The discrepancy in capacities between the sides was immediately apparent. The STC fighters are well organised, highly motivated and able to hold the line. But in weaponry and in particular in the crucial field of drones, the Iran-supplied Houthi fighters have the clear advantage.  

    The evident durability of Iran’s Yemeni allies raises a larger question. In Israel (and in the West, in so far as the west pays attention to such things), a trope has taken hold according to which the successful campaign fought by Israel and the US against Iran in June, along with Jerusalem’s mauling of Hezbollah in 2024 have effectively put paid to Tehran’s regional ambitions and broken the Iran-led regional alliance. The very coining of the term “Twelve-Day War” to describe the June fighting is clearly intended to recall Israel’s triumphant Six-Day War in 1967, in which the Jewish state vanquished the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The 1967 victory broke the forward march of Arab nationalism. The 2025 war against Iran, implicitly, is deemed to have achieved something similar with regard to Tehran’s Islamist regional bloc.  

    The achievements of the US and Israel against Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere were without doubt impressive and demonstrated a vast conventional superiority. There are reasons, however, to temper the euphoria and take a close look at the current direction of events. This is important not only or mainly because modesty is a becoming virtue. It matters because failure to note how Iran and its proxies are organizing in the post-June 2025 period runs the risk of allowing them to regroup, rebuild and return.  

    Of the defeats and setbacks suffered by Iran in the course of 2024 and 2025, only one element is almost certainly irreversible. This is the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Assad’s toppling has removed Syria from the Iranian axis and turned it into an arena of competition between Israel, Turkey and the Gulf countries.  

    Elsewhere, however, the Iranian losses are decidedly less terminal. In Yemen, as we’ve seen, Tehran’s Houthi clients have yet to suffer a decisive blow. They have managed effectively to close a vital maritime trade route to all but those they choose to allow to pass. The West and the Gulf are not currently engaged in equipping their own clients to give them an offensive capacity against the Houthis. Unless and until that happens, Iran’s investment in Yemen is set to continue to deliver dividends.  

    In Iraq, largely ignored by western media, the Iran-supported Shia militias remain the dominant political and military force in the country, commanding 238,000 fighters. They prudently, and apparently on Iranian advice, chose to largely sit out the war of the last two years. But the current ruling coalition of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani rests on the support of the militias, in their political iteration as the “Coordination Framework.”

    The ruling coalition is in the process of advancing legislation that will make permanent the militias’ status as an independent, parallel military structure. In Baghdad in 2015, a pro-Iran militia commander told me that the intention was to establish the militias as an Iraqi version of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran. The current legislation would go far toward achieving this aim.  

    In Lebanon, too, despite its severe weakening at the hands of Israel, the Hezbollah organization is flatly rejecting demands that it disarm. The government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has made clear that it has no intention of seeking to use force to induce the movement to do so. Given Hezbollah’s infiltration of state institutions, including the Lebanese armed forces, it is not clear that the government would be able to employ coercive measures even if it wished to. The continued Lebanese dread of civil war also plays a role here. Only Israel’s ongoing campaign to prevent Hezbollah’s rebuilding of its forces is likely to be effective.  

    So taken together, what this picture amounts to is that Iran has suffered severe setbacks on a number of important fronts over the last 18 months. But in none of them, with the possible exception of Syria, is it out of the game. The sirens in the Jerusalem night sky are a fair indicator. Complacency would be a grave error. Reports of Iran’s demise have been much exaggerated.  

  • Queers for Palestine burst Pride

    Queers for Palestine burst Pride

    The annual Ottawa Pride rally was cancelled on Sunday after the group, Queers for Palestine, blocked the parade, owing to the refusal of the organizers, Capital Pride, to agree to the demands of “pro-Palestine” activists. Among the demands was for Capital Pride to back a complete boycott of Israel, and for Ottawa Mayor Mark Sutcliffe to apologize for not attending last year’s parade, which was described by Jewish groups as more a ‘protest against Israel’ than a rally for LGBT rights.

    Regardless of one’s position on the conflict, for supposed human rights activists in a North American capital city to successfully hold the rights of the local gay community hostage to developments in the Middle East, is illustrative of the state of activism in the West and the succumbing of local authorities to “pro-Palestine” thuggery. Not only is there nothing “pro-Palestine” about insulting queer Palestinians by glorifying their jihadist persecutors Hamas, whom Gazans have been protesting against for years, but it takes a colossal lack of introspection to demand that an LGBT rights movement call for the boycott of a state that does a much better job of safeguarding those very rights than anyone in that far-away region of focus.

    Perhaps what busts the gauge on the hypocrisy-meter is the silence of groups such as Queers for Palestine on the single largest threat facing LGBT rights in the world today.
    One is unlikely to find, for instance, anywhere on the Instagram page of Queers for Palestine-Ottawa that Islam is the sole religion and organized ideology in the world today that still codifies death for homosexuality, with over 10 Muslim-majority countries upholding the capital punishment, and numerous others mandating caning or harsh prison sentences for the “crime” of being queer.

    When certain Jewish groups found last year’s Capital Pride statement on Israel to be “antisemitic”, they chose to boycott the rally, a right Queers for Palestine could have exercised this year. There are numerous pro-Palestine demonstrations taking place across the West, including in Ottawa, where these activists can register their protests against Israel, without harming the rights of those very people they are using to propel themselves into recognition.

    The histrionics of the current pro-Palestine groups in the West are even alienating those who have for long stood for Palestinian rights, with many LGBT activists in Ottawa accusing Queers for Palestine of “hijacking” the movement.

    Queers for Palestine of Ottawa should ask themselves why there is no Queers for Palestine in any of the Arab states? Why do Gulf monarchies not allow any public pro-Palestine or anti-Israel rallies, at all? Why isn’t Queers for Palestine protesting against the Arab states, including Israel’s neighboring states of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria that have aligned themselves with Israel’s security policies and want to have nothing to do with the Palestinians?

    In fact, one is freer to demonstrate for Palestinians, including queer Palestinians, in Israel more so than Arab states, as evidenced by the ongoing protests in Tel Aviv.

    Surely Queers for Palestine should have a word or two to say about Saudi Arabia? Saudi has not only hanged and lashed members of the LGBT community, but has more Muslim blood on its hand than any non-Muslim state, having long used Palestinian lives to propel Salafi jihad around the world.

    There should also be some self-reflection over evident Muslim hostility towards the queer community in the West, whether it’s the US’s first Muslim-led city council banning pride emblems in Hamtramck or Muslim parents rallying for LGBT erasure in British school curricula, or Muslim kids being asked to stomp on pride flags in Canada.

    But, of course, instead of protesting against these unsavory views, policies, regimes and groups, Queers for Palestine are misusing the freedoms of the West to champion the Islamists who hold them. Israel fits a one-point agenda for these activists who seek to paint Jews as the perpetual aggressors and Muslims as the perennial victims. Unfortunately, they have fallen too far deep in narcissistic echo chambers to realize that their anti-Israel, and often anti-Jewish, hysteria, is doing absolutely nothing to help the real queers of Palestine who are being persecuted and killed by Hamas.


  • Netanyahu is getting desperate

    Netanyahu is getting desperate

    As the IDF announced the imminent mobilization of some 80,000 reservists in preparation for the decisive battle to seize Gaza City, the prospect of a negotiated deal with Hamas – one that could secure the release of the 20 hostages believed to still be alive, along with the remains of 30 others presumed dead – appears to be slipping further out of reach.

    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to political and diplomatic sources within the far-right coalition that has dominated Israel’s government for nearly three years, is “resolute in pursuing the war, even at the grave cost such a course is expected to exact.” For him, the campaign has become not merely a matter of policy but of survival.

    Yet even within the military’s top brass, doubts run deep. The mobilization order was issued by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, despite his opposition to the plan. In a tense cabinet meeting, Zamir warned that entering Gaza City – a densely populated urban labyrinth that is home to nearly 1 million Palestinians, half the Strip’s inhabitants – would be nothing less than a “death trap.” His estimate was that at least 100 soldiers were likely to be killed (adding to the 1,000 who have already been killed since October 7, 2023) and that some, if not all, of the hostages would perish as well, either in IDF bombardments or at the hands of Hamas in revenge.

    Netanyahu, his government, and even the chief of staff are all wagering on one crucial assumption: that most Israelis – including former top IDF and security chiefs who oppose Netanyahu and his rule – will stop short of calling for outright refusal to serve. This stands in stark contrast to the United States during the Vietnam War, or even Israel itself during the First Lebanon War, which dragged on from 1982 until 2000.

    And yet the hypocrisy is glaring. The ultra-Orthodox public – whose parties form an indispensable pillar of Netanyahu’s coalition – continues, under rabbinical edict, to refuse sending their sons into uniform, let alone into the line of fire.

    Where refusal does exist, it is expressed in quieter, grayer forms. Tens of thousands of reservists have simply failed to report for duty, cloaking their absence in explanations that are, in reality, acts of passive resistance: that they have already served 200 to 300 days, that their families are suffering, their businesses collapsing, their lives falling apart. Add to this some 15,000 wounded and traumatized veterans, and the picture becomes even starker. The army is also grappling with a sharp rise in suicides among soldiers.

    The IDF, fully aware of the phenomenon, prefers to turn a blind eye rather than confront it head-on, tacitly accepting these “explanations.” What makes this tolerance possible is money. The government has been compensating reservists generously, sometimes lavishly, to the point where service becomes not only bearable but, for some, financially profitable. The line between patriotic duty and mercenary work grows disturbingly thin.

    Meanwhile, the families of the hostages – and the public that stands with them against Netanyahu – are sinking into despair. On Sunday, nearly a million and a half Israelis once again poured into the streets, paralysing wide swaths of the country, even as the trade unions, tightly controlled by Likud, refused to lend their support. But exhaustion is palpable; the Israeli public is weary.

    Among the anguished voices, Einav Zangauker – whose son Matan is among the captives – delivered perhaps the most searing indictment yet. “If my son and the hostages die, their blood will be on your hands,” she declared to Netanyahu, “and I will haunt you for the rest of your life.” But if her words stung, Netanyahu showed no sign of it. Once again, he displayed an almost clinical indifference to the hostages’ fate, choosing instead to double down on the belief that this time, unlike so many times before, his military gamble will succeed and Hamas will be crushed and expelled from Gaza. His record of broken promises makes such confidence ring hollow, yet he remains undeterred.

    The Gaza war is part of a larger design

    Political analysts across the spectrum – including some who have long been sympathetic to him – increasingly agree: Netanyahu’s overriding motive is not national defense but political survival. For him, the war itself has become a kind of insurance policy, a means of diverting public attention from the crises metastasizing at home: economic strain, deepening social fractures, and Israel’s accelerating international isolation.

    The war will likely grind on for as long as it serves Netanyahu’s political interests – and for as long as Donald Trump continues to give him a free hand. This, despite Trump’s repeated lips service and rhetorical nods to the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Gaza, and despite the fact that his own special envoy, Steve Witkoff, was the one who crafted the framework for a deal: the release of ten hostages and 18 bodies in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and a two-month ceasefire.

    But what is happening in Gaza cannot be understood in isolation. It must be seen in the broader context of Netanyahu’s far-right coalition, without whose support he has no government. Ministers in that camp now speak openly of their intention to expel Gaza’s 2 million Palestinians and to plant Jewish settlements in their place – a replay of the West Bank project Israel has pursued since 1967. There, settler violence and terror against Palestinians are on the rise, with the Israeli military largely turning a blind eye.

    The Gaza war, then, is not merely a military campaign; it is part of a larger design. It is inseparable from Netanyahu’s wider effort to engineer a religious-nationalist regime change – a slow-motion coup aimed at dismantling Israel’s liberal-democratic order.

    What began as a justified response to a brutal terrorist attack has become, above all, one man’s desperate crusade for power.

  • What is the aim of Israel’s Gaza City operation?

    What is the aim of Israel’s Gaza City operation?

    Israel’s security cabinet on Thursday approved the Israeli Defense Forces’ plans for a major operation into Gaza City. The cabinet decision comes after the mobilization of 60,000 IDF reservists over the past week. Israeli forces are already operating on the outskirts of the city. Should the operation commence, it appears set to bring five Israeli divisions into areas of Gaza as yet untouched in the course of nearly two years of war.

    At a certain point a decision must be made. Hamas must be either conceded to or destroyed

    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described Gaza City as containing Hamas’s “last strongholds.” In a statement made before Thursday’s cabinet meeting, Netanyahu described the war as at its “decisive stage.” He also, however, appeared to hint that he has not abandoned the path of a negotiated settlement to the war, noting that he has ordered a new round of negotiations for the release of all remaining hostages and an end to the war “on terms favorable to Israel.”

    The opposition in Israel, along with representatives of hostages’ families are determinedly opposed to the Gaza City operation. They demand that Israel should agree to the latest proposal put forth by Qatari and Egyptian mediators, according to which Israel should accept a 60-day ceasefire in return for the release of ten hostages.

    More fundamentally, the opposition want an end to the war, in return for the release of all hostages, even if this means that Hamas survives as an organized political and military force in Gaza when the guns cease. Their contention is that Hamas is anyway massively damaged, and that failure to bring home the hostages will cause irreconcilable damage to Israel’s social cohesion and the contract between state and society.

    The internal strains currently apparent in Israel indicate that the contradictions that have been apparent from the outset in Israel’s war aims are now becoming increasingly irreconcilable. This in itself is testimony to the demonic cunning that has lain at the heart of Hamas’s strategy for the conduct of the war since its outset. It remains to be seen if this strategy will yet lead to the group’s survival of, and hence victory in, the struggle now under way.

    Israel’s stated twin aims in the war in Gaza are the bringing home of the Israeli hostages and the destruction of the Hamas authority which has ruled in the Strip since 2007. There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of these two aims. It is not possible to negotiate with an entity and at the same time determinedly seek its wholesale destruction. Ultimately, logic and reality dictate that you will have to favor one aim over the other.

    The opposition in Israel and the main organizations representing the hostages’ families have a clear eyed solution to this dilemma: namely, prioritizing the former goal and effectively abandoning the latter. A smaller but no less notable population on the hard right of the Israeli political spectrum favor the opposite route – prioritizing the conquest of the entirety of Gaza, to obliterate the organized Hamas presence there, to the detriment of other considerations.

    For nearly two years, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to juggle these two aims, applying military pressure on Hamas while at the same time negotiating for the release of hostages. Netanyahu has achieved considerable success with this fudge. Hamas has suffered massive damage. A large number of hostages have come home (in return also for the release of large numbers of convicted Palestinian terrorists guilty of the murder of Israelis).

    This attempt to square the circle is also the reason for the sometimes apparently incoherent appearance of Israel’s ground campaign, in which areas of the Strip have been conquered, then abandoned, then conquered again. No effort to conquer the Strip in its entirety was being made. Rather, the intention was to keep Hamas under pressure and reduce its capacities, while negotiating for the return of the hostages. Of course, it is also the case that the prolonged, indecisive campaign which has resulted has led to damage to Israel’s international standing and alliances. There is little evidence, however, that this is of current pressing concern to the prime minister.

    The problem is that the contradiction cannot be glossed over indefinitely. Hamas will not release the final hostages and then consent to its own destruction. It will also not, as must now be apparent, agree to relinquish control of Gaza, release the remaining hostages, disarm and depart, regardless of the amount of pressure applied. Rather, it will end the war and release the remaining hostages only in return for its own guaranteed survival. Which means at a certain point a decision must be made. Hamas must be either conceded to or destroyed.

    As of now, Israel is in control of around 75 percent of the Gaza Strip. Gaza City and its environs account for a considerable part of the remaining area. The city is well fortified, and contains high rise buildings as well as a warren of alleyways. Taking it is likely to be complex and costly.

    If Hamas comes out of the current war battered but intact, which is its current state, and if Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza as part of a deal to end the war, then a historic precedent will have been set. It is one which will be unlikely to escape the attention of Israel’s enemies.

    An Arab military force will, for the first time since 1948, have taken and held territory west of the Jordan River, and then successfully resisted by military means an Israeli attempt to recover that territory. The taking of Israeli civilian hostages will be understood to have been the decisive factor in ensuring this achievement.

    Hamas’s leveraging of Israel’s concerns for its citizens (in stark contrast to Hamas’s evident indifference to the fate of its own civilians) will have the appearance of strategic brilliance about it, albeit brilliance of the most evil and cruel variety. It will then be likely to spawn many repeats and imitations, among the sizable Islamist camp committed to Israel’s destruction.

    This is the matter now under contention. In the days ahead, Netanyahu’s decision (or his preference for continuing to refuse to decide) will become apparent.

  • Mossad’s secret allies in Operation Wrath of God

    Mossad’s secret allies in Operation Wrath of God

    More than half a century ago Palestinian terrorists stormed the 1972 Munich Olympics, murdering two of the Israeli team and taking another nine hostage. The West German authorities, ill-equipped to deal with such incidents, agreed to fly the terrorists and their hostages to Egypt. Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, offered to mount a rescue operation. The Germans launched their own, resulting in the deaths of a police officer, four of the seven terrorists and all the hostages.   

    One consequence was the Israeli government’s Operation Wrath of God, a program to assassinate any leaders or planners associated with the massacre. Ten missions were organized in Europe, each signed off by the Israeli prime minister Golda Meir on condition that no innocent bystanders were killed.

    There have been several books about the operation and a 2005 film by Steven Spielberg. Aviva Guttmann’s account does not merely rehearse the stories, though each operation is outlined. Rather, she shows how the security services of European nations cooperated in identifying, monitoring and investigating international terrorists in general and how this aided Mossad in its pursuit of vengeance. 

    Cooperation was via the Club de Berne, an intelligence exchange between eight countries founded in 1969 in response to the growth of international terrorism. Soon expanded to include other countries, among them Israel, it handled communications via encrypted telegrams (which Guttmann calls cables) using the code word Kilowatt. Guttmann found these communications in publicly available Swiss archives. She analyzes each assassination, showing how the exchange of Kilowatt information helped Mossad identify and locate their targets, how the various security services learned about terrorist tactics, such as the recruitment or duping of young European women, and how hitherto unknown plots to murder or hijack were prevented.

    The first assassination was only a month after Munich. Wael Zwaiter, a young Palestinian translator in Rome, returned to his flat to find two men on the stairway leading to his apartment. They shot him 11 times, a bullet for each Munich victim. Journalistic opinion at the time and since concluded that Mossad got the wrong man – a bit-part player at best. But the Kilowatt telegrams show that he had an important logistical role.

    One operation that Mossad very definitely got wrong was in the small Norwegian town of Lillehammer in 1973 when they shot an innocent Moroccan waiter alongside his seven-months pregnant wife. Not only that, but the assassins were caught. Contributing factors to this debacle were an inexperienced, hurriedly assembled team and insufficient research – the poor man was confused with a real terrorist solely on photographic resemblance. Mossad teams generally comprised about 15 people – two to do the killing, two to guard them, two to organize cover and facilities, six to eight to research the target’s routines and movements and two to communicate both within the team and back to Israel.

    Guttmann’s principal concern – oft-repeated – is that European security services “played a vital role in the organization and execution of Operation Wrath of God.” The extent to which they did so knowingly is not always clear, although they could not have failed to know after Lillehammer. There is no doubt, though, that the information they exchanged with Israel (including their own investigations into Mossad killings) facilitated assassinations within their own borders. “One would simply not expect Europeans to help kill Palestinians… Governments… failed in their duty to keep safe all citizens,” Guttmann notes. Her disapproval is evident throughout, though not explicitly stated or argued. This is a pity because the opposite case – whether it can be justifiable to murder those seeking to murder you – is nowadays too prevalent to be dismissed without argument. We witness its effects daily on our screens.

    She concedes, however, that all participants benefitted from the exchange and that Israel was itself a significant contributor.  But in claiming that the various agencies “did not need to respect the same normative considerations as official foreign policy lines” she implies that they acted independently or against their own governments’ policies. On this side of the Channel at least, actions by the intelligence agencies, including exchanges with liaison services, require government approval. MI5 does not simply do what it likes. It is not the case that relying on “foreign intelligence shows… weakness and dependency,” as Guttmann says of Mossad.  Nor are attributing information to “friendly services within the region,” or claiming a source has “direct access,” forms of boasting; they and other formulae are necessary and conventional guides to assessing reports.   

    She is on firmer ground in questioning the effectiveness of targeted killings, as assassinations are now often called. In the short term they can be highly disruptive and satisfy an understandable thirst for revenge; but in the longer term leaders may be succeeded by those with renewed determination and security. Half a century on, the causes that prompted Wrath of God are with us still.

  • My battle to buy pierogi might end up in court

    I have been going to the farmers market in Martha’s Vineyard for nearly half a century. I buy corn, tomatoes and homemade products. Until last week every vendor at the market treated me with respect and loved to have my business. I spent about $100,000 on farm and home products over the years, so I was shocked when one vendor refused to sell me their pierogi.

    It turns out that this particular vendor, Krem Miskevich, doesn’t approve of Zionism – that is support for Israel’s right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people. To be a Zionist does not require agreement with Israel’s policies or actions – just its right to be. I strongly believe in Zionism. It is an essential aspect of my religion. Jewish prayer, going back thousands of years, asks God to help the Jewish people return to Zion, which is Israel. The Jewish bible and prayer book is filled with references to God’s decision to give the holy land to the Jewish people. Indeed, the bible warns that those who curse Israel shall be cursed. Israel is at least as central to Judaism as the Vatican is to Catholicism, as Mecca is to Islam and as Salt Lake City is to Mormonism.

    Jerusalem is mentioned in Jewish religious sources thousands of times. (Not in the Quran.) The very flag of Israel is based on the Jewish prayer shawl: The tallit. Its most basic symbols – the star of David and the menorah – are deeply religious in nature. To deny the religious connection between Zionism and Judaism is itself an act of anti-semitism, as well as ignorance. So it is difficult to separate the religious, nationalistic and political aspects of Zionism and Judaism. Not all Jews are Zionists, but not all Jews keep kosher or obey the Sabbath. That doesn’t mean that keeping kosher isn’t an important aspect of Judaism. So is Zionism. If a vendor refused to sell to all people who keep kosher, that would be unlawful, even though many Jews don’t.

    Accordingly, when Krem Miskevich refused to sell his pierogi to Zionists, they were engaged to a significant degree in religious discrimination, since most Jews are Zionists. To date I’m aware of no court that has ruled on whether Zionists who base their Zionism on the Jewish religion, are a protected class under the Constitution. That issue may be tested in court based on the vendor’s refusal to serve me. If they had refused to serve a customer because he was black or gay or Israeli or a Jew that would be expressly prohibited by Massachusetts law, as well as the law in many other states.

    This case is different from the supreme court case involving the baker who refused to design a cake for the marriage of a gay couple. Designing the cake involved artistic input and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. Selling already made pierogi, that was sitting on the counter, is not protected speech. It is like refusing to rent to somebody based on race, religion and other invidious factors. It is also wrong as a matter of morality: vendors who hold themselves out as selling to the public should not discriminate on the basis of political or religious views. If they were to, there would have to be two pierogi stands at the farmers market – one that sells to non-Zionists only; and one that sells to Zionists as well.

    After Miskevich’s refusal to sell me their pierogi was made public, a number of people called to advise me that Miskevich has engaged in antisemitic in addition to anti-Zionist protests. They are among the leaders of an organization on the vineyard that not only supports Hamas, but also protests Jewish cultural events that emphasize Jewish music, food, art and other aspects of Judaism that have nothing to do with Zionism. In other words, Krem Miskevich is strikingly similar to the infamous “Soup Nazi” on the Seinfeld show. “No pierogi for you” because you’re a Jew who supports Israel.

    They claim that their refusal to serve me is based on who I have represented as a lawyer. That, of course, is the essence of McCarthyism. In other words, their defense against accusations of anti Zionism is McCarthyism. I don’t know which is worse!

    Many residents of Martha’s Vineyard have shown their support for my fight against bigotry, but a considerable number support the bigot. Not surprisingly, his refusal to sell to me increased his pierogi sales at the farmers market. There is a very strong anti-Israel component on Martha’s Vineyard, as there is a strong element of hard-left radicalism. So I don’t know whether the farmers market will adopt the rule I’ve asked them to adopt: namely that in order to be a vendor at the farmers market one has to be willing to sell to everybody. I hope they will do that, but if not, this case may end up in the judicial system, which will have to decide whether Zionists are included in the class of people against whom discrimination is prohibited. Based on the close connection between Zionism and Judaism, they should be.