Tag: Putin

  • Witkoff’s Ukraine peace proposal is unworkable

    Witkoff’s Ukraine peace proposal is unworkable

    With Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s political authority already under grave assault in the wake of a major corruption scandal, he now faces a new challenge – this time from his erstwhile ally, the United States. A high-level US delegation led by army secretary Daniel Driscoll is meeting Zelensky in Kyiv today to present the latest version of a peace plan aimed at ending the war.

    The contents of the plan have not been officially revealed and so far it has not been publicly endorsed by Donald Trump. But two things are already clear. One is that there’s nothing new in it. And two, there’s nothing good in it for Zelensky.

    The latest plan was thrashed out during a series of secret meetings between Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev and his US counterpart Steve Witkoff in Florida earlier this month. The details of the 28-point proposal were leaked yesterday to Axios, apparently by the Russian side, and accidentally confirmed by Witkoff himself who tweeted that the reporter “must have got this from K.” Presumably, Kirill Dmitriev himself.

    The plan differs little from previous proposals already rejected by the Ukrainians and is, in essence, a restatement of the maximalist demands with which Vladimir Putin began the war. One clause demands that Ukraine cede the remainder of the Donbas region that Russia has so far failed to occupy, another calls for Kyiv to cut its armed forces by half and reduce or altogether abandon certain types of weaponry, particularly long-range missiles that could hit targets in Russia. Kyiv would also have to agree to reduce or halt Nato military assistance and ban Nato boots on the ground in any form – thus scuppering any chance of a peacekeeping force envisioned by the Franco-British-led “coalition of the willing.” In terms of domestic policy Ukraine would be required to recognize Russian as an official state language – in fact something supported by Zelensky when he was first voted into power in 2019 as a candidate who could reach a compromise with Moscow. The deal also demands that Kyiv grants formal status to the Russian Orthodox church, which the Zelensky government had targeted as an agent of Kremlin influence.

    The deal is “exactly what Putin has always demanded – de-Nazification, demilitarization and partition,” says a former senior member of the Zelensky administration who is currently in Kyiv. “What did we fight for, if only to arrive back where we were at the beginning… People will ask, who made us spill our blood?”

    The proposals on the table today in Kyiv are, without a doubt, far worse for Ukraine than any of the Minsk accords signed in 2014-15 but rejected by many Ukrainian nationalists. Indeed, when Zelensky came close to doing a deal on the breakaway republics of Donbas in October 2019 and again in 2021-22, an active and aggressive “Resistance to Capitulation Movement” linked to the Security Service of Ukraine threatened Zelensky with a “veterans’ Maidan” if he “capitulated” to Russia.

    The terms are also harsher than the draft peace deal discussed in Istanbul in March and April 2022 but abandoned by Ukraine as being too punitive.

    Even in the extremely unlikely event that Zelensky were forced into signing away the Ukrainian-held part of the Donbas, the moment he did so Ukraine would become instantly ungovernable. Frontline Ukrainian units who have fought for years to hold the so-called “fortress belt” of cities from Sloviansk to Kramatorsk would likely refuse orders to withdraw. “This [deal] demands that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians be forcibly evacuated from their homes or handed into Russian captivity,” says the Ukrainian official, who spent two years as a member of Zelensky’s cabinet. “There is no way our forces would abandon these people… and government that signed such a deal would be treated as traitors and overthrown.”

    The demand for a pull-back in Donbas makes the Witkoff-Dmitriyev plan, as it stands, politically and militarily impossible to implement. Which raises crucial questions: is Putin deliberately insisting on an unworkable deal because he does not want peace? Or are some parts of his demands, for instance the remainder of Donbas, a negotiating position he is prepared to abandon?

    Another question is why the US is pushing for this deal in the full knowledge that neither Zelensky nor any other Ukrainian president could ever agree to it. Acquiescing to the partition along the line of control is already politically painful and perilous enough – but demanding a voluntary withdrawal from lands successfully defended by the blood of thousands of young Ukrainians is a deal-breaker. It’s possible that Trump wants to wash his hands of the whole Ukrainian mess and walk away, blaming Zelensky’s supposed intransigence. It’s also possible this is just another zig-zag in Trump’s diplomatic slalom over Ukraine, sliding back and forth between threats to Zelensky and threats to Putin. It’s not even clear whether Trump or Secretary of State Marco Rubio even fully endorse the latest plan, with their respective spokesmen remaining resolutely tight lipped.

    One thing is clear – this is not a proposal that Zelensky can sign. But with the front lines slowly advancing westward, his own political credibility crumbling under allegations of outrageous war profiteering against his closest allies, money running out, and Russian assaults on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure increasing in accuracy and impact, Zelensky is also running out of options.

  • So much for Trump’s peace push

    So much for Trump’s peace push

    Here we go again. Now that Russian president Vladimir Putin has resumed his bombardment of Ukraine, President Donald Trump is responding by sanctioning the oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil. So much for the vaunted peace push that Trump has been engaging in since he met with Putin in August in Alaska. 

    The atmosphere has turned distinctly frostier since they held their pow-wow. Budapest was supposed to be a reprise of the brief thaw that took place in August but Trump has got cold feet after the Kremlin indicated that it was in no mood to compromise over the actual boundaries between it and Ukraine. Instead, as foreign minister Sergey Lavrov indicated, Russia cannot rest content as long as what he called unrepentant Nazis were in charge in Kyiv. Putin and his camarilla, in other words, want a restoration of the old order, which is to say a pliant puppet state.

    Apart from his blatant military failure to conquer Ukraine (it was supposed to be a cakewalk, according to what turned out to be his non-intelligence services), the problem for Putin is that Kyiv is becoming more, not less, independent as the war continues. Zelensky has learned from his previous encounters with Trump not to overreact to his momentary ebullitions of rage, which are usually replaced by a weary resignation to geopolitical dictates. Those dictates are that he is no position to dictate a surrender because Europe, much to its own surprise, has become the chief source of weaponry for Ukraine. Exhibit A is Zelensky’s new push for 150 Gripen fighter jets from Sweden, which he is currently visiting. For Europe, the supply of weaponry to Ukraine bids fair to become a source of a kind of Keynesian stimulus program. It also has the not inconsiderable advantage of allowing the Ukrainians to wage the conflict with Russia that the peace-loving Europeans themselves dread. 

    Trump’s own attention to Ukraine is episodic. He was briefly reanimated by the prospect of earning a Nobel Peace Prize. With Putin balking at a real cease-fire, Trump has other projects to pursue, most notably demolishing the East Wing of the White House and replacing it with a pharaonic temple to himself in the form of a ballroom that can hold up 900 or more guests. Trump may well sell the naming rights to the gleaming golden hall unless he decides to affix his own to it. 

    The real loser in all of this is probably Hungarian President Viktor Orbán, who faces a stiff election challenge in April. Hosting Trump and Putin would have been a true feather in his cap. Instead, he will have to forego the fancy visit and continue the grinding prospect of serving as Putin’s wingman in the European Union, a status that has brought much obloquy and little profit, other than a dispensation when it comes to energy prices from Russia. 

    Given Trump’s volatility, however, it may only take another phone call from Putin to prompt Trump to ponder another summit meeting. For now, Putin is flexing his own muscles, ordering a nuclear drill in northwestern Russia. As he becomes exasperated with Trump’s failure to propitiate him, Putin’s new credo when it comes to atomic weapons may be “drill, baby, drill.” Let’s hope it remains at just that. 

  • Trump, the foreign policy president?

    Trump, the foreign policy president?

    President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine continued his excellent sartorial adventure at the White House, appearing in an elegantly cut black suit and shirt on Friday as he met with President Donald Trump in the Cabinet Room. But while they may have helped avoid any emanations of wrath from his host, his habiliments did not appear to prompt Trump to approve the dispatch of Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv, a coveted item indeed. “We’d much rather not need Tomahawks,” Trump said. “We’d much rather get the war over. It could mean a big escalation. It could mean a lot of bad things could happen.” 

    Back to square one, in other words. In August, Trump had claimed that his summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin would lead to a breakthrough. It never happened. Instead, the Russian President made Trump look like a patsy. Now he’s trying to play the same game.  

    Trump acknowledged that Putin might be trying to string him along once more. Was he concerned? “Yeah, I am, but I’ve been played all my life by the best of them,” he said. “I’m pretty good at this stuff. I think that he wants to make a deal.” So far, his optimism has proven unwarranted. 

    For his part, Zelensky played his cards, the ones that Trump previously claimed he did not possess before reversing that judgment, very well. He did not provoke Trump. Instead, he said it was important to maintain pressure on Putin and ensure that Ukraine receives real security guarantees. Zelensky also held out the possibility of Ukrainian cooperation with America on advanced drone technology in exchange for long-range missiles. 

    The question for Trump is simple: does he want to up the pressure on Putin before he enters negotiations in Budapest? Or does he want to try and placate the Russian tyrant in the coming weeks? Trump’s very avidity for a deal is what has made him such a pliant object in the hands of Putin, a former KGB agent who has a shrewd understanding of his counterparts. Few, if any, American presidents have been able to come out ahead in dealing with him, whether it was Bush, Obama or Biden. Instead, Putin has outmaneuvered them while steadily increasing his reach and power, both at home and abroad. A bad hombre, to use Trump’s phrase. 

    The person that really seems to have incurred Trump’s ire is another dictator. “He doesn’t want to fuck with the US,” Trump announced during lunch with Zelensky. He was referring to Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro who has been a thorn in the side of Trump.  

    In what he regards as his sphere of influence, Trump wants to dictate the terms of surrender to pesky fellows like Maduro. Elsewhere, he wants to preside over ceasefires and peace agreements. The main thing is that Trump, and Trump alone, is at the center of events. 

    A summit in Budapest, where he is supposed to meet Putin, will once more allow Trump to seize the spotlight, at least for a few days. It may also provide a fillip to Trump’s ally, Hungarian president Viktor Orbán, who faces a tough election in April. The government shutdown in Washington may not have ended by then, but this prospect does not appear to trouble Trump unduly. He’s too busy becoming a foreign policy president to preoccupy himself with domestic matters.

  • No, Trump has not changed course on Ukraine

    President Trump has once again played the global foreign-policy commentariat for fools. They have taken a startling statement from Trump’s Truth social-media account on Tuesday as a sign of a new policy – or at least a new attitude – toward the Russia-Ukraine war. Yet what Trump actually wrote says nothing of the sort. 

    If Trump really were newly committing himself to Ukraine, why would say, as he’s so often said before, “I wish both countries well”? One country has invaded the other; wishing one of them well means wishing defeat on the other. Wishing them both well indicates indifference.

    At a stretch, one might choose to believe Trump meant his kind regards to both sides as a mere pleasantry, or perhaps he meant that sub specie aeternitatis he wishes the people of both nations well. His record belies that interpretation. So does the rest of what he wrote Tuesday.

    Trump’s Truth statement came on the heels of a meeting with Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy in New York. The Ukrainian leader accentuated the positive: “Trump is a game-changer by himself,” he said. Yet Trump’s words describe a very familiar game, played by the rules Trump has followed all along.

    If anything, he has reiterated more forcefully before that Ukraine is Europe’s affair, not America’s. Look closely. “I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.”

    That means if Ukraine falls short of that optimistic conclusion, it will be the EU’s fault, along with Zelenskyy’s – but not America’s.

    “With time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option.” 

    The US is, of course, part of NATO, but near the end of the post, Trump adds this in clarification: “We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them.”

    That hardly sounds like the United States asserting its leadership role in the alliance to direct greater aid to Ukraine. It’s instead a restatement of an existing policy (“we will continue”) and a reminder that Trump sees Europe’s NATO members as being responsible for their own decisions (“do what they want with them”) and whatever results they get – or don’t get.

    Trump emphasized to Vladimir Putin that his war is a failure and an economic catastrophe, and the administration’s disappointment with Russia’s intransigence in prolonging the war is no secret. Despite what his detractors may believe, Trump did not come back into office intent upon delivering Ukraine to Putin. If a negotiated peace, or at least armistice, is not available, Trump is quite comfortable keeping up military aid of the sort the US has been providing all along. Yet his Truth post suggests even that will increasingly be framed in terms of Europeans’ self-responsibility. This is their war, and theirs to end, where Trump is concerned.

    NATO’s Eurocrats should think twice before popping the champagne. If Trump sounds more sanguine than ever before about total victory for Ukraine, what will he say about Europe, and NATO, if that happy ending doesn’t come to pass? Will he say Europe, including NATO, lost a war that should have been easy to win and thereby proved its uselessness – proved, in fact, the need for regime-change in Europe’s own capitals and for America to slash its underwriting of the Continent’s defense? Trump has now set extremely high expectations for others to meet. You can be sure he hasn’t done so unwittingly.

    Trump doesn’t want to see Ukraine utterly crushed by Russia. Yet he also doesn’t want NATO to be America’s business rather than Europe’s. Business is about profit, and in Trump’s eyes, NATO is unprofitable. For now the president is providing charity; he’s a generous man. But if NATO’s European members can’t realize the returns that Trump says are attainable, he’s going to curtail his giving.

  • Can Trump force NATO to step up on Russian sanctions?

    Can Trump force NATO to step up on Russian sanctions?

    The pipelines would be sealed off. The supertankers would be left in the ports, and the wells would have to be capped. When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, it was confidently assumed that sanctions on Moscow’s oil and gas industry would be so punishing for its fragile economy that it would quickly force Vladimir Putin to plead for a settlement. Unfortunately, it has not worked out like that. Instead, the sanctions against Russia have been widely flouted. In response, President Trump has demanded that NATO makes them stick. But would sanctions really work and cripple Putin’s war machine? 

    President Trump was in typically robust form. Over the weekend, he demanded that the rest of NATO enforce the sanctions that have been imposed on Russia. Quoting from a letter sent to all members of the alliance, he wrote on social media:

    I am ready to do major sanctions on Russia when all NATO Nations have agreed, and started, to do the same thing, and when all NATO Nations STOP BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA. As you know, NATO’S commitment to WIN has been far less than 100%, and the purchase of Russian Oil, by some, has been shocking!

    If the whole of the alliance stepped up to the plate, he continued, the United States would impose far tougher sanctions on Russia and force a peace between the two countries.

    Despite the demonic language, Trump, as so often, has a point. There is plenty of evidence that the sanctions have been quietly ignored. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Turkey is the third largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels after China and India, followed by two EU members, Hungary and Slovakia. The EU itself is only aiming for 2028 for ending all contracts with Russia. And those, of course, are just the official figures.

    There is a booming trade in black market oil, with tankers routed through third countries to disguise its origins. The strategy Ukraine’s allies are imposing is clearly not working. Despite the sanctions, the Russian economy has been booming, with 4 percent growth last year; while some of that may well be artificial, it has hardly brought the country to its knees, let alone stopped the war in Ukraine.

    Of course, it is easy for the US to be tough on sanctions. It is self-sufficient in oil and gas – although Europe could easily be self-sufficient as well if it legalized fracking – and doesn’t need to import anything from Russia. Even so, it is hard to see the point of NATO if its members cannot stick together on this issue.

    Donald Trump has a point. It is not fair to expect the US to take all the pain of sanctions if other members can’t be bothered. And neither is there much point in ramping up sanctions if the ones that were imposed three years ago can’t be made to work. He is almost certainly wrong to believe that they will force Putin to capitulate or even persuade him to start serious negotiations. But NATO should at least try – because right now, the sanctions in place against Russia are a joke.

  • Why is Putin probing Poland with drones?

    Provocation, mistake, or something in between? Either Putin sent Russian drones into Poland’s airspace on Tuesday night to test Nato’s reaction, or Ukrainian electronic jamming scrambled the targeting systems on Russian drones and sent them haywire. Or perhaps the Kremlin is playing a grey-zone game, launching an accidentally-on-purpose attack to push Europe’s boundaries. 

    Whatever Putin’s intent, the shooting down of several drones marks the first time ever that Nato warplanes have engaged and destroyed Russian weapons in European airspace. Though Polish prime minister Donald Tusk noted that “there is no reason to claim that we are in a state of war” he did call the incursion “significantly more dangerous than all previous ones” and warned that a military conflict with Russia is “closer than at any time since the second world war.”

    The problem with the Kremlin testing the boundaries theory is that it doesn’t make much political or military sense. Poland’s relations with Ukraine are already souring, which is exactly how the Kremlin wants it. Just days ago Polish President Karol Nawrocki said that he believed that Ukraine’s accession to Nato should be “postponed” because of the risk of automatically involving allies in a conflict with Russia. He added that discussions about Ukraine’s EU membership were “premature,” stressing that such processes “require time and the consideration of economic factors.” Decoded, Nawrocki fears that Poland’s agricultural sector will be undercut by cheap Ukrainian produce, and Kyiv will receive all the EU subsidies that currently go to Warsaw. Poland also recently ended most benefits payments to Ukrainian refugees settled in its territory. 

    Why, when relations between Poland and Ukraine are heading into choppy waters, would Putin wish to rekindle their solidarity by attacking Polish territory directly? 

    Militarily, too, it’s not clear what the purpose of a deliberate Russian “probing attack” might be. The drones seem to have flown in different directions, one ending up 275 kilometres into Polish territory toward Warsaw while the others were shot down around Rzesow in the south-east of the country. A true test of Poland’s air defense would presumably involve a concentrated attack on a specific target. And Shahed drones – and their Russian-made clones, known as Geran – are a strange way to test defenses as they are notoriously slow and heavy, unlike Russian cruise missiles or indeed hypersonic rockets like the nuclear-capable Kinzhal. The military utility of Shahed attacks is to overwhelm air defense batteries by sheer force of numbers, relying on just 10 or 20 percent of the drone swarm getting through. 

    The problem with the Kremlin testing the boundaries theory is that it doesn’t make much political or military sense

    Another piece of evidence that the incursion may not have been deliberate are reports indicating that after the drones went Awol into Polish airspace some Russian strategic bombers aborted their missions, returning to base without launching their cruise missiles against Ukrainian targets. If true, it could suggest that Russian commanders were wary of escalating the war beyond Ukrainian territory.

    This week Russia and Belarus are about to commence scheduled joint military exercise dubbed Zapad-2025, designed to test their response to a western attack on Russia. For decades, the annual ritual of the Zapad war-games have been a moment of heightened tension for Poland and the Baltic states. To deliberately stage a serious provocation against Nato on the eve of the exercise would be a reckless and foolish move by the Kremlin. But then again the whole full-scale invasion of Ukraine was in itself a massive act of recklessness and folly. 

    What is clear is that Putin is very serious about smashing Ukraine’s energy and transport infrastructure before winter sets in. The massive swarms of missiles and drones that Russia has been sending almost nightly set new records for their scale. A major target seems to be military supply hubs for Nato materiel around Lviv, Lutsk and Rivne – all close to Ukraine’s border with Poland. 

    In the wake of the drone incursion Tusk invoked Nato’s Article Four for only the seventh time since the alliance was founded, calling on allies to “consult” in case of a threat. That will be an important test of Donald Trump’s attitude to Nato. Last week Trump had said that “we are with Poland all the way and we will help Poland protect itself.” Blasting Nato’s European members as free riders has been a long-time Trump talking point. But in July EU leaders pledged to up their contributions to 5 percent of GDP – and Nato’s secretary general Mark Rutte called Trump “Daddy.” Whether this has fundamentally changed Trump’s attitude to Nato remains to be seen.  

    European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union address vowed that Europe would apply “more pressure on Russia to come to the negotiating table. We need more sanctions.” France’s Emmanuel Macron called the airspace violation “simply unacceptable… We will not compromise on the safety of our allies.” But so far nothing that Nato, or Europe, has done so far has succeeded in deterring Putin or swerving him from his systematic campaign to crush Ukraine. 

  • The West can’t afford to shun Russian oil

    The West can’t afford to shun Russian oil

    Donald Trump is a radical foreign-policy innovator. Over the past few decades, the US has tried a range of non-military means to nudge, squeeze and occasionally strangle its adversaries. These range from travel bans and banking restrictions, to export controls and trade limitations. But never has the US – or indeed anyone – tried to use import tariffs as a species of economic sanction.

    Trump has threatened Vladimir Putin with introducing “secondary sanctions” against countries that import Russian oil – a threat intended to strike at the heart of Russia’s war economy. And on August 4, Trump appeared, for the first time, to make good on that threat. To the surprise of diplomats and trade negotiators in Washington and Delhi alike, Trump abruptly announced that he would be imposing a 50 percent tariff on India as a punishment for its importing Russian crude. “India… doesn’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine,” Trump wrote on social media, blindsiding officials who had been negotiating for months to reduce the $44 billion trade deficit with India. “Because of this, I will be substantially raising the Tariff paid by India to the USA.” US courts have challenged Trump’s right to tariff by executive order – but for the time being the punitive import tax stands.

    China and India are the world’s biggest importers of Russian crude, but the EU pays more into Putin’s coffers

    India was angry – and baffled. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, India has indeed become the second-largest buyer of Russian crude in the world after China. Between March 2022 and May 2023, crude oil from Russia rose from 0.2 percent to 45 percent of India imports. That leap was largely thanks to hefty discounts offered by Moscow that made Urals crude a bargain compared to full-priced oil from India’s traditional suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. But buying Russian crude did not violate any US or EU sanctions, which merely fixed the price at $60 a barrel. The intention of the sanctions was to squeeze the revenue Moscow received from oil exports without disrupting the world’s oil supplies. Indeed, in May last year, US ambassador to India Eric Garcetti admitted that India “bought Russian oil because we wanted somebody to buy Russian oil at a price cap; that was not a violation.” The idea was “to ensure the prices did not go up globally,” Garcetti added, and “India delivered on that.”

    There have been widespread allegations that Indian buyers have actually been paying amounts over the agreed price cap through various creative accounting tricks known as attestation fraud – for instance by inflating transportation costs or using networks of middlemen to launder the price differential. But the bottom line is that Russia’s war on Ukraine has brought India a major economic windfall in the form of cheap energy for the domestic market and massive profits from re-exporting oil products refined from Russian crude to Europe, with sales worth more than $130 billion per year. India currently supplies 15 percent of Europe’s diesel, for instance, as well as a similar amount of Ukraine’s. And the Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries, whose refinery in Jamnagar is the largest in the world, has seen its stock price jump by 34 percent since 2022.

    Will Trump’s dramatic 50 percent tariff on many (though not all) Indian imports to the US force Delhi to stop importing Russian crude? That seems unlikely, since Indian companies are making so much money from refining and reselling Russian oil. India is the world’s fastest-growing economy and has no oil supplies of its own.

    The 50 percent tariff on India is double that imposed on most Asian countries. But it is in line with an equally severe rate he applied against Brazil in an attempt to pressure the leadership to end the detention of former president Jair Bolsonaro. But while Trump describes his tax on Indian exports to the US as a “secondary tariff,” in practice there is no such thing. There’s just tariffs with a political label attached.

    China and India are indeed the world’s biggest importers of Russian crude. But it’s actually the EU that pays more money into Putin’s coffers. Russia continues to be Europe’s second-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG). And before Ukrainian attacks on the Druzhba pipeline disrupted supplies last month, Russian crude oil flowed through it and into Slovakia. Yet Europe has not been threatened by Trump – nor for that matter have US allies Turkey and Japan, also major customers of Moscow’s. Europe repeatedly announces its intention to free itself from its fatal addiction to Russian gas. Yet despite 18 packages of sanctions on Russia, there are as yet no actual European restrictions on buying Russian gas.

    Brussels has attempted to ban the import of refined oil products originating from Russian crude. But as well as being technically impossible to verify, a long series of carve-outs and exceptions for Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the UK and the US are buried in the small print of every one of the EU sanctions packages.

    The paradox that makes both EU and US attempts to sanction Russia incoherent and ultimately toothless is that the West cannot afford to stop Russia from exporting energy. Russia is the world’s second-largest crude oil producer and exporter (after Saudi Arabia), with an output of around 9.5 million barrels a day – nearly 10 percent of global demand. In the immediate aftermath of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, fears of Russian oil being pushed out of the market drove Brent crude prices soaring to $137 a barrel – nearly double today’s prices. Fears of a sharp, energy price-driven recession twisted both the Biden administration and European leaders into the mental pretzel that prevails today. Washington and the EU keep threatening to suffocate the Russian economy, but are in practice unable and unwilling to pay the price of losing Russian oil.

    The EU has implemented a new, lower, flexible oil-price cap for Russian crude of $47.60 per barrel, effective from September 3. This floating cap is set at 15 percent below the average market price of Russian Urals blend – but this will affect only European importers. It’s also wide open to fraud – for instance, the Druzhba pipeline carries Kazakh oil as well as Russian, allowing customers to claim they are buying from Kazakh producers.

    To date, Ukrainian saboteurs, rockets and drones have been far more effective than EU or US economic sanctions in denting Russian energy exports with attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022 and recent raids on Russian oil refineries and oil export terminals. For much of the conflict, the Biden administration consistently blocked Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure for fear of a price shock. But from the frequency of Ukrainian attacks it now seems those gloves have been taken off (as long as Kyiv doesn’t use US weapons inside Russia).

    Fears of an energy-led recession twisted the Biden administration into the mental pretzel that still prevails

    Russia’s economy has also, for the first time in the war, officially slid into recession, having shrunk for the past two quarters. But that’s still very far from a deep economic crisis of the kind that could begin to threaten Putin politically. “As long as the war machine of the aggressor does not stop, we must be ready to implement new harsh measures to increase the cost of aggression,” Kaja Kallas, then prime minister of Estonia, told European leaders in March 2022. Days later, Joe Biden also claimed that “the totality of our sanctions and export controls is crushing the Russian economy.”

    Yet three and a half years into a war that consumes a staggering 45 percent of Kremlin spending, Russia’s economy is damaged, but far from crushed. Moreover, Putin himself continues to strut the world stage, treading the red carpets laid out for him from Anchorage to Beijing.

    It’s time, perhaps, to admit that economic sanctions have failed to change Putin’s behavior or destroy his ability to fight. The reason is that neither Trump nor his allies in the West have been willing to accept the economic pain of imposing any sanctions that could materially hurt Russia.

    This article was originally published in The Spectator’s September 15, 2025 World edition.

  • Xi and Putin dabble in vampirism

    “They’re vampires” was my first thought. I had just heard the news that Putin and Xi were discussing how to prolong their lives, as they walked toward their places at the Tiananmen Square military parade. 

    On the official news footage, Putin’s translator could be heard saying in Chinese: “Biotechnology is continuously developing.” And then: “Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and [you can] even achieve immortality.” Xi responded: “Some predict that in this century humans may live to 150 years old.” Kim Jong-un was there too, but is not known to have contributed to the conversation.

    Maybe the blood-sucking image came to me because I was, when I heard this news, giving blood. My next thought was that it is the quintessence of secular individualism, to plot an attempt at immortality. It is a statement that one’s life is an entity unto itself, isolated from human community. Also, vampirism was an image favored by Karl Marx, in his description of capitalism. 

    In Capital, for example, he describes capital as “dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.” So it is interesting that these three men grew up under communism. It would seem that the ideology had no real substance, no moral force.

    By the way, I rather enjoyed giving blood. After a nice summer break, things were feeling a bit oppressive over here in London, a city of strangers, elbowing each other out of the way. And it cheered me up, a friendly chat with a nice young nurse, and a sense of local community, of shared values. I’d feel differently if I was being paid for my blood: I’d feel resentful of the person who could afford to buy it from me. I’d feel that we were rivals, competing for resources.

    The immortality story featured on the evening news, as part of the general coverage of the military parade. The next item was our head of state, King Charles III, visiting a hospital in Birmingham, a visit delayed by his own cancer treatment. Unlike those Oriental despots, our monarch displays the vulnerability that he shares with the rest of us. 

    If he and his son William were overheard discussing prolonging their lives through organ donation, the monarchy would be over. He said to one patient: “Hips don’t work so well, do they, once you get past 70?” I might live in a palace, he was saying, but I share your knowledge of bodily infirmity, vulnerability.

    I was also reminded of another king, David. He committed a sort of act of vampirism, bedding another man’s wife, and getting the man killed in battle. It was an act of total selfishness, a denial of common humanity. And he repented, and his change of heart resulted in the poetry of the Psalms, an ur-text of common human vulnerability. Let these men have a change of heart, one that does not involve literal organ transplants.

  • Why Putin is so chipper in China

    The often dour Vladimir Putin is looking very cheery in China, which has just hosted the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin to the north, and is preparing for a grand parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Beijing tomorrow.

    While Xi Jinping is clearly the man of the hour, Vladimir Putin seems to be having a good trip, too. Even as his Alaska summit saw him getting the literal red carpet treatment from Donald Trump, this is a chance to underline the degree to which Western efforts to isolate him really just mean that most European leaders are giving him hard stares. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, whose country continues to buy Russian oil despite punitive US sanctions, hopped into his (Russian-made) Aurus limousine for what ended up being an almost hour-long one-to-one chat. Putin has also had meetings with other leaders, from Turkey’s Erdogan and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian, to Vietnamese prime minister Phạm Minh Chính.

    Beijing is clearly pitching the SCO as the basis for an alternative global order, one in contrast to an existing one that the Chinese (and, frankly, many others in the Global South, or what Putin has taken to calling the World Majority) regard as built by the West to protect the West’s interests. The corollary, of course, is that the new system would be for Beijing’s convenience, but at present Putin doesn’t seem to have a problem with that.

    This is actually an issue on which there is a growing behind the scenes debate within the Russian elite. For Putin and his septuagenarian circle of cronies, all that really matters is winning (whatever that may mean) in Ukraine, and whatever compromises need to be made to that end are worth it. After all, Putin’s historical legacy, political credibility and perhaps even survival are all at stake. For the next political generation, the 50- and 60-somethings waiting, sometimes a little impatiently for their time in the sun, and whose horizons extend rather further, the danger that Russia will have already become a vassal of China’s by the time they take power is a worrying one. For now, though, Putin doesn’t want to hear it. China is necessary for his war, and that’s that.

    Xi Jinping is clearly the man of the hour, Vladimir Putin seems to be having a good trip, too

    Besides, events like the SCO summit allow him to hold forth on his usual concerns to a largely supportive audience. In his address, Putin pleased Xi by arguing that “the SCO could take a leading role in forming a fairer system of global governance. A system that would replace the obsolete Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, would take into account the interests of a wide range of countries, that would be truly balanced. It would not allow attempts by some states to ensure their security at the expense of the security of others.”

    Except, a cynic might note, for Ukraine. However, this war was also the fault of those pernicious Westerners: “the crisis arose not as a result of Russia’s attack, but as a result of the coup d’etat in Ukraine, which was provoked by the West. And then by attempts to suppress the resistance of those regions in Ukraine that did not support this coup. The second reason for the crisis is the West’s constant attempts to draw Ukraine into Nato, which poses a direct threat to Russia’s security.”

    Putting aside the precise characterization of the 2014 “Revolution of Dignity” which did, in fairness, topple a corrupt but democratically elected president, and the mischaracterization of Ukraine’s relationship with Nato – it was always Kyiv beating on the door, with the Western alliance prevaricating – this is a line which works especially well at such gatherings for two reasons. Firstly, it allows Putin to flatter his hosts and peers, expressing his appreciation their efforts to address what he calls the “root causes” of the crisis (and which Kyiv would describe as its rights as a sovereign nation). Secondly, it speaks to a powerful current of not so much anti-Western feeling (though there is much of that, exacerbated by Trump’s tariff extravaganza) as growing self-confidence in the rest of the world.

    There was, after all, a prevailing sense that the future is theirs in a bloc which accounts for more than half of the world’s population and about a third of its GDP, with an average economic growth last year exceeding 5 percent. 

    For Putin, faced with the daily evidence of the mounting problems facing Russia, it makes sense to be in a club where Russia still matters, where the mood is optimistic, and where most agree – or at least are not there and then going to disagree – with what he has to say.

  • Europe is a paper tiger

    Europe is a paper tiger

    “The purpose of NATO,” Lord Hastings Ismay, the alliance’s first secretary general, once quipped, was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” That formula defined Europe’s security for decades, and it worked because US power anchored the alliance. But as President Donald Trump’s administration demands its European allies carry their share of the burden, shows little appetite for sending troops to Europe and worries more about the Southeast Asian theater, Europeans are being forced to confront their lack of political will for their own security, underinvestment in defense and dwindling public appetite to fight for their country. 

    Following the meeting with President Donald Trump at the White House, discussions among European leaders and Volodymyr Zelensky began on potential security guarantees for Ukraine, should a peace settlement with Russia be achieved. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni described the proposition similar to NATO’s “Article 5-like” framework, a collective commitment that would assemble a coalition of the willing to deploy European troops. Reportedly, plans envision European states taking a lead in ground deployment, while the United States would focus on providing air support, logistical assistance and other non-combat roles.

    “Nobody believes that NATO countries would join the war. So, the promise of a NATO Article 5 is a red herring,” Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at the London-based Royal United Services Institute told The Spectator. “They talk about air policing, but what does that mean? Are you going to shoot down Russian jets?”

    That goes to the heart of the issue: would a European force genuinely deter Moscow, or merely create the appearance of resolve?

    During the Cold War, deterrence stood where troops stood. More than 300,000 US troops were stationed across Europe, on the ground in Germany (250,000) and elsewhere, ready to fight if the Soviet Union moved west. By the time Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, that number had dwindled to about 60,000.

    As the Western European nations prospered through the 1960s and 70s, defense budgets rarely matched economic growth, and after the Soviet collapse in the 1990s, spending plummeted further. Only a handful of countries, such as France, the UK and Poland, kept spending close to NATO’s 2 percent target. Others including Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands let defense spending fall to just 1 percent of GDP. Decades of neglect left the industry on the continent scrambling. Arms industries were neglected, with little investment in air and naval power, and NATO’s eastern flank continues to rely on Washington’s backbone.

    “We decided that we weren’t going to face a major war,” Savill explained. 

    In Europe tens of billions of euros were redirected each year to other priorities, particularly social welfare. Germany alone saved more than €20 billion annually compared with what it would have spent at higher levels of military investment. 

    “If tomorrow Russia would invade NATO, the only army that would be ready to fight is Turkish,” a Ukrainian senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity told The Spectator. “All the other ones are good for parades, not for real war.”

    The continent is now playing catch up. The European Union announced that it will mobilize €800 billion for defense investments, a plan Brussels wants to spread over four years through higher deficits, joint borrowing and redirected EU funds. Germany voted for historic military investments, while Italy ramps up arms production and Poland wants to double its military. 

    “The big problem Europeans have is that when you point at something they have and say, ‘oh, this is quite good,’ they just don’t have much of it, and much of it isn’t at a high level of readiness. It takes time before you can deploy it or use it. France and the UK have maintained very good armed forces, but they are small,” Savill points out.

    At the NATO summit in the Hague in June of this year, NATO allies agreed to raise defense spending to 5 percent. But few leaders are willing to touch the social spending that makes up one-fifth of the EU budget.

    “It turns out that Germany has lots of jets that don’t fly. Their army isn’t that deployable,” Savill said. “It will take several years to ramp production back up. Rheinmetall can’t suddenly produce shells, and MBDA can’t suddenly produce missiles. The trend has been reversed, but it will take years.” 

    Much of Europe spends more than twice as much on defense as Russia, but money doesn’t translate into military strength. Moscow pays its soldiers far less and maintains equipment at a fraction of Western costs. When adjusted for what each side can actually buy, the picture flips: Russia fields almost five times the military power of France’s defense budget, and six times that of Germany or the UK.

    Budgets and capabilities are not Europe’s only challenge. Public spirit is just as much of a problem. Gallup polls show the EU with the lowest readiness worldwide: only a third of citizens say they would fight for their country while non-EU states report far higher levels – a vulnerability money alone cannot solve. 

    As Europe begins to learn from its mistakes, Russia already has. It has rebuilt its military industry and armed forces, while fighting a high-intensity war. By late 2024, more than 600,000 Russian soldiers were on the frontlines, nearly double the initial invasion force. Moscow’s defense industry has been put on a war footing, opening new factories and converting civilian production lines. This has allowed Russia to replace its battlefield losses: in one year alone, it’s expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles, while producing 250,000 artillery shells every month. Stockpile three times greater than the US and Europe combined. 

    Zelensky, fearing another onslaught, insists on 100,000 foreign troops in Ukraine under any settlement. Military arithmetic makes that impossible. A front-line force requires three times as many in reserve and support. Europe might muster 10,000 quickly but it would be a political gesture more than a shield and would still rely heavily on US enablers. The 100,000 Zelensky wants would take months, if not years, and expose shortages in weapons and ammunition, and be unsustainable without Washington.

    Germany and Italy have already ruled out deployments. Britain and France may be willing, but their forces are too small for long-term operations. The Europeans hope to resolve the dilemma with so-called “tripwire” assurances which entails that even small deployment on the Ukrainian soil, can trigger larger intervention if attacked, preferably from the United States. 

    With its grand claims to be able to protect Ukraine, Europe has become a paper tiger. And Putin is very well aware. However guarantees are dressed up, they will rest not on Brussels but on Washington, and on a president whose stance, observers note, often shifts depending on who spoke to him last.